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ABSTRACT  
In local communities across the United States, local government officials – specifically 
local bureaucrats – are faced with the realities of a changing climate which include severe 
storms, prolonged droughts, larger and more damaging floods, and more. Simultaneously, the 
issue of climate change is incredibly polarized in US politics with one side claiming it is not 
happening (or if it is happening it is not human caused) and the other framing the issue as the 
direst threat (or close to it) facing the planet. 
This dissertation examines a empirical puzzle, asking whether and how local bureaucrats 
respond to the threat of climate change in their communities. I find that many, but not all, local 
bureaucrats are responding by developing climate adaptation plans and considering policies 
which might help their communities avoid the consequences of climate change. They are not 
acting alone, they work with support from the federal or state government, other bureaucrats, or 
multi-stakeholder organizations which allow them to access resources and gain political support 
when they would otherwise not have it. Climate change adaptation, like other emergency and 
disaster management policies, does not garner much attention from local politicians unless there 
currently is a disaster the community is responding to or recovering from that forces their 
attention. 
Throughout this project, I examine how local bureaucrats step out of their conventional 
role as policy implementors to shape local agendas and formulate policy – policymaking roles 
often dominated by elected politicians, members of the media, and advocacy organizations. I 
argue that local bureaucrats occupy the perfect institutional role for shaping the development of 
climate adaptation in local governments. They have issue-specific knowledge, making them 
emergency management and climate adaptation experts (or at least the actors with the most 
expertise of this kind in local government). This often leads to elected officials deferring to 
bureaucrats when policies and plans need to be written, like emergency management plans, land 
use plans. When bureaucrats write these plans, they have the opportunity to incorporate climate 
adaptation provisions. Local bureaucrats also hold institutional knowledge in local governments. 
They are more likely to know state and federal policies and requirements, which may encourage 
climate adaptation (e.g. the Obama Administration’s efforts through the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) to encourage local adaptation policy).  
Local bureaucrats are also more motivated than elected officials to address climate 
change. I find that the bureaucrats in this study were aware of the political debates around 
climate change, but they often adopted a position which separated local adaptation efforts from 
the polarizing debate around what causes climate change (i.e. who or what is responsible for the 
problem). This enabled them to address their communities’ needs to adapt without drawing 
opposition from conservative members of their communities who do not think climate change is 
happening or caused by human activities. 
I also address the intergovernmental environment local bureaucrats respond to: 
specifically, their relationship with their state governments and the federal government. Even 
though states and the federal government wield significant influence over local governments – 
mostly through the control of resources – local bureaucrats do not avoid climate adaptation 
solely because the state government disapproves. A few cases demonstrate that state 
governments’ and FEMA’s encouragement to address climate adaptation impacted local 
bureaucrats’ decisions to create adaptation policies. However, it was not the only or the most 
important influence in local bureaucrats’ decision-making. 
In sum, this project demonstrates that local bureaucrats are important actors in the 
development of local climate adaptation policy. Local bureaucrats’ efforts alone are not enough 
to adapt to climate change, but they are an important first step when politicians cannot or will not 
act. While only climate adaptation policy was studied in this project, these findings speak to the 
important role bureaucrats play in creating policy when elected officials do not – either because 
the issues have low saliences, are highly technical, or are politically polarized. 
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CHAPTER 1: THEORY 
1. The Water Is Rising in Miami Beach 
Miami Beach, Florida is a city of approximately 90,000 people situated on a barrier 
island at the southernmost end of the Floridian peninsula. The city is known for its pristine white 
sand beaches and semi-tropical climate, but in the past four years Miami Beach has been making 
national headlines for its sea level problems. The city sits at an average elevation of only four 
feet above sea level and many areas in the city are at or below sea level. In the past several years, 
ocean tides caused flooding even on sunny days and a yearly extreme high tide called “King 
Tide1” has inundated the entire city. 
Despite the immediacy and obviousness of sea level rise in Miami Beach, the city is 
operating without support from the State of Florida in their attempts to address the flooding 
(Wile, 2015). Florida’s Governor Rick Scott claims he is incapable of judging if climate change 
or sea level rise is a real threat or not because he is “not a scientist” (Caputo, 2014). 
Additionally, Scott’s administration has an unofficial policy banning the use of “global 
warming” or “climate change” in any official state communication (Korten, 2015).  
Without state government support, Miami Beach is left to figure out its own solution and 
raise its own funding. The city government decided to install a massive pumping system to keep 
the streets dry. The project is estimated to cost in excess of $400 million dollars (Davenport, 
2014; Paquette, 2014) and relies on existing drainage canals which use gravity to drain the land. 
However, the canals no longer properly function because of sea level rise, so large pumping 
stations push the water out to sea. The project is funded in large part by local property taxes, 
                                                 
1 For more information about King Tides, see the Environmental Protection Agency’s explanation at 
https://www.epa.gov/cre/king-tides-and-climate-change.  
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leading to what Washington Post reporter Danielle Paquette deemed “Miami’s climate catch-22” 
because the city must encourage beachfront development in order to raise funds to build the 
pumping system that will keep those same beachfront locations from flooding (2014). 
The situation in Miami Beach provides an example of how climate change will impact 
communities in the United States and how the polarized political debate surrounding the issue is 
likely to force policymaking away from federal or state venues and into alternative policy 
pathways with fewer partisan political consequences. Miami Beach is not the only community 
facing significant threats from climate change. The Universal Ecological Fund published a report 
in September 2017 estimating that the costs of climate-driven extreme weather and air pollution 
accounted for $360 billion in economic losses annually in the U.S. (Watson, McCarthy, & Hisas, 
2017). This report took into consideration the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration’s (NOAA) list of billion-dollar disasters. In 2017, NOAA identified 16 billion-
dollar (or more) disasters including Hurricane Harvey in Texas, Hurricane Irma in Florida, 
Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico, wildfires in the western states, and severe storms and tornadoes 
in the plains states. These 16 disaster events combined caused upwards of 309 billion dollars of 
damage (NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information, 2018). 
Compiling the direct costs of severe weather or disease outbreaks caused by climate 
change is in many ways a conservative estimate of climate change costs. According to a study of 
the county-level damages from climate change written by Hsaing et al (2017), climate change 
will also injure the economy by disrupting entire sectors like agriculture or hurting the labor 
market (e.g. more people suffer from diseases which take them out of work and more people are 
displaced from their homes due to severe weather). The researchers calculated a county-level 
mortality estimate. Nationwide, nine people out of every 100,000 people is likely to die from 
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climate change each year. Their estimate allowed variation by county, and they found that the 
high range of this is in Hernando County, Florida (just north of Tampa, Florida) where 69 people 
a year are likely to die from climate change. The authors found that climate change is likely to 
exacerbate existing inequalities. Poor communities and the southern states will be hit harder by 
the effects of climate change, largely because these areas have less economic capacity than 
northeastern or west coast states whose communities can afford to prepare for and respond to 
climate threats. 
Studies like those mentioned above try to quantify the costs of climate change. However, 
they cannot capture more intangible damages that lead to larger, long-term problems. For 
instance, after Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans in 2005, entire neighborhoods were 
abandoned as their former residents migrated out of the state. Businesses and schools in these 
communities were radically transformed (Robertson & Fausset, 2015). The cultural and social 
impacts of Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico are only beginning. Due to the U.S. federal 
government’s minimal disaster recovery efforts, campaigns for statehood and even independence 
are stronger (Hernández, 2018). If successful, these efforts could radically redefine the island’s 
economy, politics, and society. 
Even though the risks from climate change are not evenly distributed across the U.S., 
every county faces the potential of significant problems if climate change is not addressed. 
Climate mitigation would minimize these threats across the country (and the world), although it 
is too late to prevent any effects of climate change (Jones N., 2017). However, if climate 
mitigation does not occur – or occur fast enough – communities will need to adapt to minimize 
damage and save lives. 
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The risk of climate change damage, especially in areas with political opposition to 
addressing climate change, means that many local communities will be left to deal with the 
consequences of climate change without support from the state government. This raises a number 
of important questions about how local communities deal with climate change adaptation 
including: Who in local government is advocating for climate adaptation? What impact does 
polarization have on local adaptation policy development? Broadly speaking, this dissertation 
will answer this question: what role do local bureaucrats play in shaping local policy, especially 
local climate adaptation policy? 
2. Research Questions  
Climate change adaptation policy is at a nascent stage at the federal level in the United 
States largely due to political polarization and gridlock around the issue. Like many other 
environmental policy areas, legislative gridlock in Congress has pushed advocates to pursue non-
Congressional venues for policy change (Klyza and Sousa 2008, Pralle 2003). As alternatives to 
the national legislature become more important, scholars must turn their attention to the actors 
and institutions that shape policy change at the state and local level, which will not merely look 
like ‘scaled down’ versions of national politics.  
For U.S. policy, scholars are only beginning to explore local climate change adaptation 
planning. Scholars are looking at how institutions and organizations are building capacity to 
address climate change across sectors (Craft & Howlett, 2013), the adoption of specific policies 
(see Wood, Hultquist and Romsdahl’s work on Midwestern U.S. policy development (2014) and 
Zimmerman and Faris’s study of climate action plans (2011)), and the legal foundations for 
creating local policy (Gremillion, 2011). These articles suggest that integrating or 
“mainstreaming” climate adaptation into existing policies in the United States as an important 
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pathway for local policy development.2 Mainstreaming (or policy layering) capitalizes on 
existing structures rather than creating entirely new institutions. In other words, it represents a 
path of less resistance to policy change, although some authors have raised the possibility that 
this leads to maladaptation (Tennekes et al, 2014). While scholars are beginning to address 
climate adaptation integration, including Haywood et al’s study of adaptation through land-use 
planning in North and South Carolina (2014) and Wilbanks and Kates’s work on New Orleans 
(2010), they do not examine the process by which integration happens.  
Furthermore, when climate adaptation is considered as a new goal within an existing 
nonpartisan or bipartisan issue area – like preparing for disasters or managing public water – we 
expect to see climate change’s partisan baggage enter the conversation about the new policy.3 
This can cause traditional policymaking channels – like the federal legislature and the executive 
branches – to close due to partisan gridlock. However, other policymaking routes exist and may 
constitute the main arenas for action, including policymaking through the bureaucracy. As media 
reports show, some local bureaucrats are already playing an important role in shaping new 
climate adaptation policies (see Flesher 2014, Wernick 2014). Picketts, Curry, and Rapaport, for 
example, found that environmental planners in British Columbia are interested in incorporating 
climate adaptation into land use planning, even though they currently did not have the resources 
to do so (2012).  
Local bureaucrats are an important group of actors who are often overlooked in research 
on policy formulation and change. Scholars often focus on their role in policy implementation 
                                                 
2 There is a large emerging literature on climate policy integration focusing largely on efforts in Europe to address 
climate change through existing policies. For examples see Adelle & Russel (2013), Brouwer et al (2013), Carter 
(2011), Kok & de Coninck (2007), and Uittenbroek et al (2013). 
3 This dynamic has already been observed in the recovery effort from Sandy in New York City where Henry Ovik – 
former advisor to former Housing and Urban Development Secretary Shaun Donovan –admitted to avoiding the 
language of climate adaptation to sidestep the associated polarization (Shorto, 2014). 
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and miss how their behavior might impact whether and how policies change. I argue that local 
bureaucrats are uniquely situated to shape local climate adaptation policies because of their 
expertise and relative isolation from partisan pressures. I seek to improve our understanding of 
whether, and how, local bureaucrats influence climate change adaptation policy by studying the 
integration of climate adaptation goals into local flood and drought management policies.4 
Additionally, I examine how polarization and intergovernmental relations interact when a 
polarized issue – climate change – is introduced in an already complex policy area – disaster 
management. Understanding these dynamics sheds light on the role that bureaucrats play in 
shaping policy at the local level, but it also helps us understand when and how bureaucrats 
engage with highly polarized issue areas and become policy advocates or agents of policy 
change. The polarized nature of climate change contributes to the gridlock that stops national 
action and it also influences bureaucrats in unanticipated ways to both encourage and discourage 
action at the local level.  
This project specifically draws attention to bureaucrats as important strategic actors 
whose choices are influenced by their career goals, the wishes of their political superiors, a 
polarized issue environment, pressure from the public, and their personal beliefs (Teodoro 2011, 
Lipsky 2010, Wilson 1989, Stensöta 2011). Their position as local implementers of natural 
disaster policies makes them more likely to (a) pay attention to how climate change alters flood 
and drought prediction models, and (b) have expertise at the local level to shape the integration 
of climate change into existing policy. Thus, the first question this project asks is: In what ways 
                                                 
4 See Chapter 2: Methods for a more in-depth discussion of why flooding and drought management policy were 
chosen. In short, floods and droughts represent two types of regularly occurring disasters that will become worse 
with climate change.  
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do local bureaucrats play a driving role in shaping local communities’ climate adaptation 
plans?  
Second, this project unpacks the influence of intergovernmental arrangements on 
bureaucratic behavior. Federal, state, and local governments participate in flood and drought 
management. Federal and state governments set minimum standards and local governments 
design and implement policies to comply with those standards. Due to this, existing institutional 
arrangements and intergovernmental relationships shape local bureaucratic behavior as it pertains 
to integrating climate change adaptation into flood and drought management. Therefore, this 
project also addresses if and how the intergovernmental policy environment influences 
bureaucratic behavior vis-à-vis the development of climate adaptation policy. 
In the following sections, I develop a series of testable hypotheses and a typology of 
bureaucratic behavior. First, I discuss who front-line bureaucrats are and why they are uniquely 
situated to address climate adaptation in local governments. Next, I examine the sources of local 
bureaucrats’ influence over policy change, discussing both structural autonomy and personal 
motivations. Third, I argue that the level of agreement within the policy community about the 
validity of climate change and agreement on whether local governments can or should adapt 
influences bureaucratic decision making and action. Fourth, I present a typology of bureaucratic 
behavior which helps us understand how bureaucrats act to shape local climate adaptation 
efforts. This typology is not specific to climate change and can be applied to any situation where 
bureaucrats might act to shape policy in highly polarized issue contexts. Finally, I discuss how 
the influence of multiple principals at each level of government – local, state, and federal – 
shapes bureaucrats’ decision making. 
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3. Local Bureaucrats’ Unique Position to Shape Local Climate Adaptation  
To begin, it is important to clarify who front-line bureaucrats are and where their ability 
to shape local policy comes from. Front-line bureaucrats are on the edge of the bureaucracy, they 
work directly with the targets of a policy within a given community (the recipients of services or 
subjects of regulation). Also called street-level bureaucrats (as coined by Lipsky in his book 
Street Level Bureaucracy (1980 [2010])), common examples of front-line bureaucrats are police 
officers, social services case workers, and public-school teachers. Front-line bureaucrats can also 
be administrators whose work is predominately completing paperwork or attending meetings, as 
long as those tasks work directly for the people in a community.5 Examples of bureaucrats who 
work on flood management and drought management are publicly employed civil engineers, 
land-use and zoning administrators, community planners, and public water utility managers. 
These bureaucrats often work with community members on technical questions about policy 
regulations and requirements. 
Scholars and advocates often focus attention on elected officials as agents of change and 
overlook bureaucrats as potential policymakers. Instead, bureaucrats are cast primarily as policy 
implementers (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984; Altfeld & Miller, 1984; May & Winter, 2007; 
Wilson, 1989). This strain of the literature relies heavily on the principal-agent model6 
(beginning with Terry Moe’s application of principal-agent modeling to the bureaucracy (1984)) 
and shows clearly bureaucrats are not only agents of elected officials but are also beholden to 
their bureaucratic superiors and to the publics they serve.  
                                                 
5 This differs slightly from Lipsky’s definition because he was most interested in bureaucrats who worked directly 
with members of the general public. However, many of his observations apply to bureaucrats who work with a select 
group or class of community members. 
6 This work does not argue that principal-agent theory cannot explain part of the role of bureaucrats in the 
policymaking process. However, it demonstrates that principal-agent theory can be limiting because it minimizes the 
role bureaucrats play in shaping climate adaptation policy independent of their implementation duties. 
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 Principal-agent theory provide a framework for scholars to examine how well bureaucrats 
implement the policy preferences of elected officials and how and why bureaucrats do not 
conform to these preferences (Moe, 1984; Whitford, 2005; McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1987; 
McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984). Scholars have also tested alternative explanations for why 
bureaucrats conform to politicians’ wishes, including bureaucratic values (Meier & O'Toole, 
2006) and organizational structure (Hammond, 1986).7 Despite their disagreements, these 
scholars all remind us that bureaucrats step out of the role of “agent” and occupy other roles in 
the policymaking process. They can change policies during implementation by being ‘bad 
agents’: defying their superiors through whistleblowing (Peters & Branch, 1972; Martin & 
Rifkin, 2004), employing guerilla behaviors (O'Leary, 2006), or exercising their autonomy 
(Rourke, 1979; Carpenter, 2001). They can also exercise significant powers of discretion during 
policy implementation (Teodoro, 2011). Bureaucrats also influence policy formulation through 
sharing their expertise and influencing agendas (Altfeld & Miller, 1984), building neutrality in 
political fights (Huber, 2007), and by playing multiple principals off one another (Whitford, 
2005).8 Some bureaucrats even become policy entrepreneurs and introduce new policies onto the 
agenda in the same way that activists and elected officials might (Teske & Schneider, 1994). 
While most of these studies focus on federal or state-level bureaucrats, local bureaucrats 
are capable of shaping policy change, as several studies show. Lipsky (2010) focuses on the 
power of discretion in policy implementation and demonstrates that street-level bureaucrats are 
capable of ushering in innovations. Relatedly, Teske & Schenider (1994) argue that local 
                                                 
7 Although it is not germane to this project, the growing literature on stewardship theory to explain bureaucratic 
behavior further demonstrates the weaknesses in assuming a perfect principal-agent relationship between politicians 
and bureaucrats (see Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson (1997) and Van Slyke (2006) for examples). The relationship 
is much more fluid with bureaucrats taking on significant policymaking responsibilities. 
8 These will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 1, Section 4.  
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bureaucrats – especially city managers – are well positioned in local government to become 
policy entrepreneurs: introducing new agenda items and formulating policies. The authors argue 
that city managers’ structural influence in local government makes them excellent candidates to 
introduce a wide range of innovations. Both of these studies were right to focus on the 
institutional position of local bureaucrats as their source of influence over policy. This project 
builds on their work to argue that front-line local bureaucrats occupy an institutional position 
which makes them likely to influence policy change for the following reasons. First, they are 
more sensitive to changing conditions and attitudes of the publics they serve because they work 
on the front lines (Lipsky, 2010). This is especially true in local disaster management where 
bureaucrats are active in mitigation and response planning (Kusumasari, Alam, & Siddiqui, 
2010). The number and types of interactions front-line bureaucrats have with community 
members change with on-the-ground conditions, serving as a barometer of sorts. For instance, 
when heavy rain events lead to increased flooding in a community, the city engineer and public 
works director get more calls from residents, leading them to increase the community’s debris-
removal efforts or to consider changes to their storm water management system.  
The further removed a bureaucrat is from these pressures – or the higher in the 
organizational chart an individual is – the less likely they are to be responsive to these 
fluctuations. This is not to say that top-level officials in the bureaucracy or elected officials are 
always unresponsive; however, since their day-to-day activities do not include working with the 
local community or local environment in one issue area, they are less exposed to fluctuations as 
they occur. While Teske and Schneider emphasize the influence of top-level local bureaucrats 
(city managers), they overlook the role of information in shaping policy agendas (Jones B. D., 
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1994). Front-line bureaucrats have first-hand knowledge about the policy environment9 whereas 
city managers must rely on these actors passing information to them. Lower-level local 
bureaucrats therefore have an agenda setting power that managers lack. Their decisions about 
how to prioritize information shape how policy is created.  
Local bureaucrats have access to and influence in local agenda-setting venues. They are 
present during conversations and in spaces where local policies are made. These spaces include 
both public and private government meetings, conversations with other bureaucrats at the local, 
state, or federal level, and interactions with policy targets – property owners, builders, local 
businesses, the agricultural community, etc. Where advocacy groups have to establish access to 
local governments in order to shape policy, bureaucrats have this access as a part of their job. 
The spaces or locations where policies would change, then, include: local ordinances, local 
management plans, and conversations between the local bureaucrats and policy targets. 
Empirically, it is easier to see formal policy change – e.g. in ordinances and formal planning – 
because these are recognized spaces often documented with meeting minutes. However, as 
Lipsky (2010), Lin (2000) and others show this is not the only space where policies are shaped – 
informal venues like conversations between policy implementers and policy targets are spaces 
where policies can change. 
In local governments, front-line bureaucrats are also more likely to be aware of the 
policies that state and federal governments are addressing than their elected counterparts. Most 
local governments have volunteer or part-time elected officials, with the exception of large cities. 
                                                 
9 Here, “policy environment” describes the physical and social conditions the policy affects or is affected by. In the 
case of flood or drought management, the policy environment includes the local climate (rainfall and water in the 
natural environment), government agencies, citizens that would be affected by a flood or drought, and organized 
groups that have an interest in floods or droughts including – but not limited to – disaster response organizations like 
the Red Cross, homeowners associations, environmental protection groups, agricultural organizations, business 
owners, and business advocacy groups. 
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Thus, the professionalized policymakers in local governments are almost always bureaucrats. 
Local bureaucrats’ tenure is often long – surviving many turnovers in elected officials, and they 
are full-time hired staff rather than volunteers. Therefore, local bureaucrats are aware of signals 
sent from superior governments in the form of memos, grant application guidelines, discussions 
about new laws or policies, and more. For instance, when Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick 
created a climate change adaptation fund (Schoenberg, 2014), it sent the signal to local 
governments that climate adaptation is an important policy priority. Conversely, when North 
Carolina’s legislature passed a law to prevent localities from considering sea level rise in their 
planning documents, this sent the signal that climate change adaptation should not be prioritized 
(Rawlins, 2012).  
Additionally, front-line bureaucrats are nonpartisan actors, allowing them to take 
unpopular positions without worrying about straying from the “party-line.” Due to this, front-line 
bureaucrats might be more accountable by responding to changing conditions and the needs of 
the public (e.g. preventing flooding damage due to climate change) than elected officials who are 
pressured to follow partisan commitments. In the case of flood management and drought 
management policy, front-line bureaucrats are sensitive to changes in flood or drought frequency 
and severity (including those due to climate change) as well as public attitudes about acceptable 
levels of risk. This makes them more likely to consider promoting or blocking flood or drought-
related climate adaptation efforts to fit with the community’s needs. Since they are more 
removed from partisan consequences, the polarized debate around climate change is less likely to 
influence how they act.  
Due to the characteristics discussed above: (1) responsiveness to the public and to 
changing on-the-ground conditions, (2) awareness of signals from superior governments, and (3) 
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protection from partisan or electoral consequences of policy positions, I offer the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Front-line local bureaucrats are more likely than elected officials 
to introduce climate adaptation into the local agenda. 
Hypothesis 2: Bureaucrats with a special area of focus – e.g. water managers, 
floodplain managers, etc. – are more likely than general-focus bureaucrats – e.g. 
city managers – to suggest integrating climate adaptation into existing policy 
areas. 
However, just because they can take more politically controversial positions – like introducing 
climate change adaptation onto the local agenda – does not mean that they will. The following 
sections argue that bureaucrats’ actions are shaped by their institutional environment, specifically 
the amount of autonomy they have in relation to their superiors (the principal in a principal-agent 
relationship) and the amount of agreement there is in the policymaking community that climate 
change is real and the locality should adapt to it. 
4. Local Bureaucrats’ Influence: Expertise and Autonomy  
In the few studies that look at the conditions under which bureaucrats act as policy 
advocates and introduce agenda items, scholars consistently find that autonomy mixed with 
personal or professional motivations shape bureaucratic action. Examples of studies include 
Teske and Schenider’s study of city managers (1994), Teodoro’s examination of the link 
between career motivations and bureaucratic innovation (2011), and Carpenter’s in-depth 
examination of bureaucratic-led policy innovation during the Progressive Era in the United 
States (2001). Autonomy comes from personal experience and knowledge as well as structural 
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independence. Personal experience and knowledge-based autonomy come from a variety of 
sources including professionalization standards related to their expertise, training, and 
educational background (Teodoro, 2014) as well as ideology (O'Leary, 2006). Structural 
autonomy comes from policies and institutions like administrative procedures (McCubbins, Noll, 
& Weingast, 1987), who has hiring or firing power, where funding for a program or agency 
comes from, and agency structure (Huber & Shipan, 2002).  
An important implication of the bureaucratic behavior literature is that when bureaucrats 
have autonomy, they are more likely to influence the shape of policy (Carpenter, 2001; Lin, 
2000; Lipsky, 2010; Teodoro, 2011). Lipsky’s study on street-level bureaucrats demonstrates 
that the bureaucrats working at the street-level or on the front lines often have significant 
autonomy in shaping policy implementation (2010). By combining the lessons of the 
entrepreneurship literature (Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Kingdon, 1995), bureaucratic 
entrepreneurship studies (Teske & Schneider, 1994; Teodoro, 2011; Carpenter, 2001) and the 
literature on street-level bureaucratic discretion, this project argues that front-line bureaucrats are 
capable of acting as agenda-setters and policy advocates. This is not to say that bureaucrats 
create policies singlehandedly. Local bureaucrats are saddled with high institutional obstacles as 
the U.S. democratic system gives law-making power to elected officials and not the bureaucrats 
whose primary responsibility is to implement laws (Waterman, Rouse, & Wright, 1998; Wood & 
Waterman, 1991; McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1987). However, they can introduce new goals 
into pre-existing policy areas, like integrating climate adaptation into existing floodplain 
management policy. 
I expect local hazard mitigation administrators to be especially well situated to introduce 
climate adaptation into local policies for two reasons. First, these bureaucrats cultivate autonomy 
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using their expertise and their institutional position. They monitor climate and weather in order 
to predict or prepare for disasters like floods, which makes them more likely to be aware of and 
understand the science and debates concerning climate change. Additionally, these bureaucrats 
work with federal agencies like NOAA and the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) which disseminate information about climate change on their websites and in 
communication with local governments (NOAA, 2016; FEMA, 2016; FEMA, 2013). Local 
bureaucrats’ attention to these issues combined with their expertise and training prepares them to 
implement policies addressing hazard mitigation, but it also enables them to serve as experts and 
agenda setters in the formulation of new policies.  
Second, bureaucrats working on climate-related disaster management policies will likely 
be motivated by professional ambitions. To minimize blame from politicians, advocacy groups, 
and the public when problems arise that are not adequately addressed (Boin, McConnell, & Hart, 
2008; Hood, 2002), we would expect bureaucrats to try to understand the many causes and 
consequences of phenomenon related to their work. In the case of managing climate-related 
disasters like flooding and drought, bureaucrats would view climate change as an important 
threat multiplier (i.e. climate change will make disasters worse). Simply put, bureaucrats want to 
be successful at their jobs and avoid blame (Hood, 2002), and this may lead them to integrate 
climate change adaptation into existing policies even in the face of political polarization. This 
leads to the third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Local bureaucrats drive climate adaptation by providing issue-
specific expertise about potential harms. 
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5. Bureaucrats and Problem Definitions 
Like any other policy entrepreneur, local bureaucrats have the ability to shape the 
political agenda by offering particular definitions of public problems. Problem definitions frame 
issues to convey information about the issue’s severity, frequency, temporal proximity, 
geographic proximity, who or what caused the problem, and who is responsible to remedy the 
problem (Rochefort & Cobb, 1994; Stone, 2002). After becoming aware of climate change’s 
potential impacts in their communities, local bureaucrats can identify climate change as a driver 
of local disasters, implying that climate change adaptation is needed in addition to existing 
disaster prevention goals. Policy entrepreneurs do not need to invent a new problem definition, 
they can employ existing problem definitions that work toward their goals. For instance, local 
bureaucrats can look at problem definitions in superior governments as signals describing how 
they should act vis-à-vis a new policy area. In the case of climate change, signals from FEMA or 
state governments influence how local bureaucrats perceive the importance of including climate 
change as a threat multiplier for floods or droughts. These signals are important to local 
bureaucrats because FEMA and state governments determine grant funding levels for local 
hazard mitigation planning (discussed more below in Chapter 1, Section 7). 
A possible problem definition would likely (1) define climate change as a significant 
threat or threat multiplier to existing disasters like floods or droughts; (2) claim that local 
adaptation is possible; and (3) argue that local government should get involved. In this way, local 
bureaucrats highlight deficiencies in current policies and suggest routes for fixing those 
deficiencies. This problem definition frames the political conflict by describing what the conflict 
is about: minimizing risk from climate change. It describes who or what is to blame for a 
problem (climate change), what solutions are appropriate (using existing policies to address the 
17 
 
new climate change threat), and how much we should care (Rochefort & Cobb, 1994). In sum, 
local bureaucrats can use problem definitions which link climate change to existing flood or 
drought management concerns to push for local policy change. 
Hypothesis 4: Local bureaucrats drive climate adaptation by presenting 
arguments that climate change predictions can be integrated into existing policies 
rather than suggesting adaptation should be pursued through new policy areas. 
However, problem definitions are not infinitely powerful ideas that can be employed in a 
Machiavellian manner by politicians or bureaucrats. Often, problem definitions are deemed 
acceptable based on ideological or partisan attitudes and fundamental disagreements about one or 
more aspects of a problem definition arise. Disagreements emerge concerning the cause of a 
problem, its severity, its proximity (temporally and geographically), whether government is 
capable of addressing it, and if proposed solutions are appropriate and efficacious (Rochefort & 
Cobb, 1994). For the problem definition above, each of the elements is influenced by ideological 
and partisan attitudes concerning the validity of climate change and the appropriate role of 
government. Republican leaders often deny climate change is happening, claim it is not a 
problem, or argue that government should not be involved in addressing it (Antonio & Brulle, 
2011; McCright & Dunlap, 2011). Furthermore, liberals and conservatives fundamentally 
disagree about the appropriate role of government in addressing climate change (Leiserowitz, 
Maibach, Ropser-Renouf, & Hmielowski, 2011). 
While bureaucrats do not face the same pressures from political parties to “tow the party 
line” that elected officials might, the fundamental disagreements a problem definition can shape 
how bureaucrats act to influence policy. If key actors like elected politicians and powerful 
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community groups agree with the bureaucrats’ problem definition, change can be facilitated 
through those positions. However, if these actors disagree, the policy can be gridlocked and 
stasis becomes the default. Therefore, to avoid gridlock, bureaucrats might choose less overt 
methods of policy change like implementation discretion (Lipsky, 2010; Lin, 2000) or guerilla 
behaviors (O'Leary, 2006). What motivates bureaucrats to choose between different types of 
action is discussed in the next section. 
6. Modeling How Bureaucrats Change Policy 
As discussed above, autonomy and problem definition agreement both independently 
influence if and how bureaucrats act to change climate change adaptation policy. (Autonomy 
describes the bureaucrats autonomy in their position rather than just on the issue of climate 
adaptation.) I propose they interact to shape the type of action local bureaucrats take to influence 
policy change. As Figure 1 shows, the interaction of these variables leads to four distinct or 
“pure-types10” of actions: defiant behavior, cooperative action, politician-led action, and non-
confrontational behavior. While each of these behaviors has been described in the literature, no 
studies attempt to explain why a bureaucrat would choose to act defiantly rather than non-
confrontationally. By developing and testing this typology of action, this study attempts to 
explain the variation in bureaucratic behavior rather than studying the different categories in 
isolation.   
Defiant Behavior is likely to arise in a situation with high autonomy and low problem 
definition agreement between politicians and bureaucrats. In these instances, we would expect to 
see bureaucrats capitalize on their autonomy to actively challenge politicians, leading to conflict. 
                                                 
10 These categories are referred to as pure-types because administrative independence and political agreement are 
both continuous scales rather than dichotomous categories. However, theorizing about the pure-types helps us 
conceptualize differences between low and high values for each dimension. 
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Bureaucrats might choose less overt pathways to change policy but would still be doing so 
openly rather than in secret. Substantive policy changes are unlikely, but changes controlled by 
the administrators are possible. These include implementation decisions like the choice of 
measurement tools, the prioritization of tasks, and allocation of (human) resources (May & 
Winter, 2007; Rourke, 1979; Carpenter, 2010). Defiant behavior is likely to manifest itself in 
informal spaces including conversations between the local bureaucrat and citizens affected by 
policies as well as policies that are controlled by bureaucrats including departmental policies. 
Figure 1: Forms of Bureaucratic Behavior to Integrate Climate Change Adaptation into 
Existing Policies 
 
  Problem Definition Agreement  
  Low High 
Bureaucratic 
Autonomy 
Low  
Non-Confrontational 
Behavior 
 
example: guerilla bureaucrats, 
disgruntled bureaucrats 
Politician-Led Action 
 
example: traditional legislative 
or executive policymaking 
High 
Defiant Behavior 
 
examples: autonomous agencies, 
whistleblowers 
 
Cooperative Action 
 
example: collaborative 
governance 
 
 
Bureaucrats cannot defiantly pass new ordinances or write management plans without the 
cooperation of superiors, so we would not expect to see defiant behavior show up in ordinances 
or management plans that must be approved by superiors.  
Cooperative Action is likely to arise in a situation with high bureaucratic autonomy and 
high problem definition agreement. In these cases, we would expect bureaucrats and politicians 
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to work together to change policy. Bureaucrats can work with local politicians or with state-level 
politicians depending upon which principal-agent relationship we are considering. Policy change 
would likely occur through political (legislative or executive) channels to capitalize on elected 
official support but could also occur through bureaucratic rule changes endorsed by elected 
officials. Since there is high bureaucratic independence, buy-in from bureaucrats is crucial to 
ensure implementation.  
Politician-Led Action is likely to arise in a situation with low bureaucratic independence 
and high problem definition agreement. In these instances, politicians would lead reform efforts, 
with support (i.e. no defiance) from bureaucrats. Policy integration is expected to occur through 
political channels rather than through administrative rule changes. This is the more traditional 
legislative-executive route to policy change.  
Non-Confrontational Behavior is the type of bureaucratic behavior (if any) that will 
likely occur in a situation with low bureaucratic autonomy and low problem definition 
agreement. If bureaucrat-driven attempts at policy change occur, bureaucrats would likely avoid 
confrontation with politicians.  If politicians seek policy change, bureaucrats can “drag their 
feet” or engage in other tactics to prevent policy implementation which effectively prevents 
policy change (O'Leary, 2006).  Therefore, no policy change is expected because both politicians 
and bureaucrats can effectively stall change.  This project, then, will test the following: 
Hypothesis 5: If a bureaucrat acts to integrate climate change into existing 
policy, the form their action takes will depend upon their autonomy and the extent 
of problem definition agreement in the policymaking community. 
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Hypothesis 5a: When the bureaucrat is autonomous and there is low problem 
definition agreement in the policymaking community, they will act defiantly. 
Hypothesis 5b: When the bureaucrat is autonomous and there is high problem 
definition agreement, they will cooperate with politicians and other policymakers. 
Hypothesis 5c: When the bureaucrat is not autonomous and there is high problem 
definition agreement, politicians will lead policy development. 
Hypothesis 5d: When the bureaucrat is not autonomous and there is low problem 
definition agreement, they will either act non-confrontationally or not act at all. 
7. Managing Floods and Droughts: An Intergovernmental Tangle  
The model presented above (Figure 1) defines bureaucratic action in relation to the 
bureaucrat’s principal. For instance, when an autonomous bureaucrat disagrees with her 
principal, her action is defiant. When they agree, it is cooperative. However, the 
intergovernmental nature of flood and drought management policy means that local bureaucrats 
who implement intergovernmental policies are subject to multiple principals11 who had different 
levels of influence and expertise (see the argument Whitford (2005) makes about multiple 
principals).  
In terms of influence over local bureaucrats, federal and state principals have the power 
of the purse and local principals have hiring and firing power. For example, the Stafford Act (42 
U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) distributes funds to local governments that have recently experienced a 
disaster so they might take measures to mitigate future disasters. While the program is 
                                                 
11 Figure 2 maps these relationships. 
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administered through FEMA and state disaster management agencies,12 the mitigation activities 
are planned and implemented by local bureaucrats including city or county engineers, public 
works directors, and building code enforcement officers. The federal and state governments 
create rules and standards, but do not employ the people who enforce them. Instead, FEMA uses 
grants to stipulate what (at minimum) local policies should include. States can also add 
requirements to FEMA’s policies that local governments must follow in order to get funds. 
Without these grants, most local governments could not possibly fund any disaster mitigation, 
and even the largest local governments would not be able to afford recovery efforts. So, the 
federal government influences local bureaucratic action by controlling funding.  
In a way, this reinforces what Birkland and Waterman (2008) identify as the dominant 
pattern where local governments are first responders in natural disasters but state and federal 
governments can help overcome the limitations of small government (funding and coordination 
across jurisdictions). However, they do not make hiring or firing decisions; this power is given to 
local principals. Therefore, the multi-level implementation of disaster mitigation and planning 
policies has insulated bureaucrats from oversight from federal politicians and made bureaucrats 
more answerable to local preferences (akin to Whitford, 2002). If these principals all agreed, 
then bureaucrats’ decision-making environment would be clear. However, in the area of climate 
change adaptation, this is not the case. 
To understand if local bureaucrats will integrate climate change adaptation into existing 
policies, we need to understand how the principals (federal, state, and local) and bureaucrats 
view a problem. Often, federal, state, and local principals’ goals diverge. For instance, FEMA 
                                                 
12 FEMA provides funding to state governments who distribute it to local governments. The federal government 
does not directly provide grants to local governments through this program. 
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has been encouraging local governments to engage in climate adaptation (FEMA, 2013; FEMA, 
2016) but some state governments like those in Florida and North Carolina wrote rules and 
created laws discouraging or preventing local action (Korten, 2015; Rawlins, 2012). Local 
governments’ attitudes towards climate change adaptation vary as well. As strategic political 
actors, local bureaucrats shape their behavior based on the level of agreement they perceive in a 
policy area. When agreement is high, they are likely to work with the principals they agree with; 
but when there is disagreement, bureaucrats are likely to find other pathways to shape policy. 
Therefore, we would expect local bureaucrats who think that climate change is a threat to align 
their actions with federal principals and try to bypass state influence. On the other hand, local 
bureaucrats who think climate change is not a threat may align their actions with state principals 
if those principals reject adaptation policies. As a result, a locality might be cooperating with 
their federal principals but defying their state principals when incorporating climate adaptation 
into local hazard mitigation.  
Additionally, how we understand autonomy changes based on which principal we are 
talking about. Regardless of who their principal is, autonomous bureaucrats are more likely to 
follow personal motivations or internal pressures when deciding how to act. Yet, autonomy from 
state or federal principals does not come from establishing expertise because local disaster 
managers and federal disaster managers have similar knowledge bases. Instead it largely comes 
from fiscal independence and local government independence from the state. If a local 
government can raise funds for flood management on its own (and the local bureaucrat has 
expertise in flood management), then local bureaucrats have a high amount of independence to 
shape policy. Or, if a local government does not need state approval to create a new policy 
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initiative (i.e. they have home rule13), then we would expect to see local bureaucrats using their 
expertise at the local level to shape policy. The more dependent the local government is on 
superior governments for either funding or legislative authority, the less autonomy bureaucrats 
have to shape policies. Therefore, the institutional position of the principal changes both how we 
understand problem definition agreement and autonomy. Throughout this dissertation, special 
attention will be paid to who the principal is in any given relationship.  
Figure 2 (below) shows the relationship between local bureaucrats and their principals at 
each level of government. As the figure shows, disaster management policy is shaped by an 
intergovernmental web of policies and actors – all of which local bureaucrats respond to. 
                                                 
13 “Home rule” policies mean that local governments exist separately of the state government and are not tied to the 
state’s wishes and policies, except through grants or regulations, much like the relationship of the 50 states and the 
U.S. federal government (Wolman, McManmon, Bell, & Brunori, 2008; Zimmerman J. F., 2012).  
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Finally, we must understand the intergovernmental context of policy development 
because local governments are often considered appendages of their state governments: they do 
not exist without state approval and they exist to enact state goals. Called Dillon’s Rule, this 
arrangement is prevalent in most states. However, a minority of states operate under ‘home rule’ 
arrangements where cities and counties are essentially independent from the state, allowing them 
to set different (and sometimes opposing) political goals. We can also think of this as local 
governments having high autonomy or low autonomy in terms of creating and implementing 
sets additional policy 
requirements and provides/ 
distributes federal funding 
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Figure 2: Principal-Agent Relationships for Local Implementation of Disaster Mitigation 
Policy  
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their own policies (Wolman, McManmon, Bell, & Brunori, 2008). The character of the state-to-
local relationship shapes how local governments act because states determine local government 
size, funding sources, and required policy initiatives (Zimmerman J. F., 2012). Even in home 
rule states, the state government influences local behavior much in the same way the U.S. federal 
government influences how states act. State governments in home rule states can set minimum 
policy requirements, provide grants, pass unfunded mandates, etc. to shape local action. Thus, 
even though local disaster management policy is answerable to federal standards, local 
governments must answer to state governments first and foremost. While there might be 
differences in political relationships between localities in home rule states and those in Dillon’s 
Rule states, we would expect local governments to work with (or at least not actively against) the 
wishes of state governments. This leads to the last hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: When state governments oppose climate change action, local 
bureaucrats are less likely to develop climate change adaptation policy for fear of 
losing an important source of disaster mitigation or relief funding. 
8. Plan for the Dissertation 
In the following chapters, the six hypotheses presented above will be evaluated using 
case studies of local governments and front-line bureaucrats in communities that are at high-risk 
of climate-related disasters. Chapter 2 will discuss the methods used to choose cases, collect 
data, and analyze the data.  
Chapter 3 addresses the question: Do local bureaucrats play a driving role in shaping 
local communities’ climate adaptation plans? In this chapter, I will establish if climate change is 
on the local agenda and trace who introduced it. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are evaluated to see if 
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bureaucrats introduce climate change adaptation instead of politicians and if special-focus 
bureaucrats (like emergency managers) introduce climate adaptation instead of general-focus 
bureaucrats (like city managers). Chapter 4 addresses if and how bureaucrats choose to act. It 
specifically looks at how autonomy and problem definition agreement shape bureaucratic action 
to evaluate hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 (including 5a, 5b, 5c, and 5d).  
Chapter 5 addresses the intergovernmental context for disaster management and climate 
adaptation policy. This chapter discusses how the web of laws and policies from the federal 
government and state governments shapes local bureaucratic behavior. Additionally, it considers 
how bureaucrats negotiate conflicting orders from the federal and state governments – especially 
when state governments discourage climate adaptation.14 Finally, Chapter 6 presents conclusions 
and future directions for research into local bureaucratic behavior and local climate adaptation. 
  
                                                 
14 The Obama Administration was in office during the entirety of the data collection for this project. During the 
Obama Administration, climate change adaptation was encouraged by FEMA. Therefore, disagreements between the 
federal and state governments can only arise when state governments do not think climate change is a threat because 
the Obama Administration consistently identified it as one. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHODS 
To test the hypotheses for this project, I use the method of structure-focused comparisons 
described by George and Bennett (2005). Structure-focused comparisons give the researcher the 
ability to examine a variety of cases in a systematic fashion. It capitalizes on the richness of 
qualitative data while providing a replicable test of the hypotheses. The research design for this 
project is guided by George and Bennett’s description of structured-focused comparisons, 
although it requires a slight modification when it comes to case selection. As George and Bennett 
argue, researchers should not only focus on cases that have a large quantity of data that is easily 
accessed (p. 69) but focus on theoretically interesting and important cases. For the purpose of 
this study, I am interested in looking at local bureaucrats responding to the threat of climate 
change. Unfortunately, there is no database of local bureaucratic behavior or action on climate 
change upon which to base my case selection. Therefore, this study takes a new approach for 
choosing cases. I use geographic informational systems (GIS) analysis of climate risk to choose 
cases. This avoids selecting cases on the dependent variable (form of bureaucratic action on 
climate change adaptation), but the larger number of cases (18 communities and 30 local 
bureaucrats in those communities) increases the chances of capturing variation on the dependent 
variable (explained in more detail below). 
Structured-focused comparisons allow for exploring the hypotheses presented here as 
well as any unexpected variables or mechanisms at play in local government policy 
development. Like all non-experimental research, it is not possible to control for all variables 
except those of interest. However, the larger number of cases (18) allows for finding most-
similar comparisons between cases as well as most-different comparisons within the same study. 
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The cases are built using a large quantity of government documents, media reports,15 and 
interviews with local officials. To make sense of these documents, this project also uses 
qualitative content analysis as a strategy for sifting through the high volume of data (Schreier, 
2014; Mayring, 2000).  
In the following sections, I describe the case selection strategy. Then, I describe the 
variables and measurement strategies employed to test each hypothesis. Third, I discuss the data 
collection strategy. Fourth, I outline how qualitative content analysis is used to code the data. 
Finally, I discuss limits to generalization from this study. 
1. Choosing Cases 
When developing structured-focused comparisons, the first and most important step is to 
identify appropriate cases. As George and Bennett describe, the first step in choosing cases is to 
clearly identify the universe of cases. In this study, the universe of cases is local bureaucrats who 
work on existing policies that will be affected by climate change in communities at risk of 
climate-related disasters.  
This study looks specifically at flood management and drought management because they 
are both policy areas where climate adaptation goals can be achieved by front-line bureaucrats. 
For instance, a local flood manager can suggest to builders to move structures further from 
floodable waters or build the structure higher off the ground to prevent flooding damages. 
Similarly, a drought manager might plan water storage goals in line with more severe droughts 
predicted under climate change. Furthermore, these policies are ideal cases to study because 
front-line bureaucrats in these policy areas are employed by local governments but they often 
                                                 
15 All total, this project has upwards of 1,000 documents between meeting minutes, government reports, and news 
articles for each of the 18 communities (totaling over 20,000 documents for the entire project). 
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implement intergovernmental policies like those run through FEMA and state emergency 
management and mitigation policies.  Thus, studying the intergovernmental versus intra-
governmental tension is possible with these policy areas. 
To study the variation in front-line bureaucratic behavior, this project looks at local 
governments in five sites across the US.  The five sites represent areas at high risk from climate 
change-related flooding or drought.  Within each site, several local governments were selected 
for case analysis.  This allows both within-site and across-site comparisons.  The case studies for 
this project will provide rich data to understand how relationships between bureaucrats and their 
superiors shape how bureaucrats consider (or disregard) climate adaptation as an influence on 
flood or drought management.  The local governments selected for study are at high risk of 
climate-related flooding or drought, making it more likely that climate adaptation is on the 
agenda for the individual bureaucrat or the entire community.  I select cases based on climate 
risk rather than the existence of adaptation policies so this project includes cases where action 
was taken and cases where no action was taken.   
Specific sites for data collection were chosen based on high predicted risk from climate 
change related flooding and drought.  To capture this risk, I combined climate change prediction 
data from the National Center for Atmospheric Research (2014) with the United State Geological 
Survey's (2014) coastal vulnerability index to show areas in the contiguous US that are at a 
greater risk of climate change-related flooding and drought.  Climate anomalies (i.e. how 
different the future is from the historical average) were calculated for four variables: total 
precipitation, atmospheric water vapor (precipitable water), soil moisture, and moisture in the top 
10 centimeters of soil.  Using ArcGIS, a county-level average for these four variables was 
calculated.  The climate anomalies were then standardized so these measures could be combined 
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to find areas of high drought risk (low precipitation and low soil moisture) or high flood risk 
(high precipitation and high soil moisture).  Then, the climate prediction models and coastal 
vulnerability measures were displayed together to guide study site selection.   
Figure 3: Site Selection for Case Studies 
 
The resulting map displays several areas at high risk of drought (red or orange indicating 
low standardized average climate anomaly) or flooding (teal or blue indicating high standardized 
average climate anomaly or high coastal vulnerability).  From these regions, five sites for study 
emerge: (1) coastal flooding and increased precipitation on the North Carolina coast, (2) inland 
flooding in the Savannah River basin in South Carolina, (3) a combination of sea-level flooding 
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and decreased precipitation (freshwater) or drought in central Florida, (4) drought in the Carson 
City, Nevada border area, and (5) drought in central Washington state (see Figure 3)16.   
From these sites, cases were chosen based on two criteria. First, to be included in the 
study, the county or city government needed to be sufficiently large to have a professionalized 
bureaucracy dedicated to addressing flooding or drought concerns. While not a perfect 
relationship, areas with larger populations are more likely to have larger city or county 
governments. Therefore, having a city with a population of 15,000 or more people was a 
requirement to be considered in the study. Cities with a population of less than 15,000 were 
dropped as well as counties that had no cities with a population of 15,000 or greater.  
This yielded an initial list of potential cases for each site: 
 
• Florida: five cities and three counties  
• Nevada: two cities and one county (one city – Carson – is a combined city/county) 
• North Carolina: three cities and two counties 
• South Carolina: seven cities and four counties 
• Washington: four cities and three counties 
From this list, any site that had three or more potential cases was trimmed down to three 
cases using a random number generator. For instance, South Carolina had seven cities and four 
                                                 
16 Climate risk could have been operationalized to reflect estimated costs of climate change in the community. 
However, these data were not available at the local level until Hsaing et al published a study in Science in summer 
2017 (after data collection for this project concluded). The potential loss of life and economic costs of climate 
change, however, are influenced by an area’s population density and its current economic capacity. Areas with 
higher population density are at higher risk of loss of life from severe weather. Areas with larger economies can 
divert funds to managing risk from severe weather and other consequences of climate change, effectively reducing 
their climate risk. As Hsaing et al found, this means that areas with weaker economies and more spread out 
populations – i.e. rural counties – are at higher risk of climate change damage. Therefore, future studies should take 
into account economic risks and mortality risks from studies like that by Hsaing et al. However, this information 
should be combined with data on climate threats like floods and droughts to capture a fuller image of climate risk.  
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counties as potential cases, the cities were assigned a random number and one through three were 
chosen for study. Similarly, the four counties were assigned random numbers and numbers one 
through three were chosen for study. Therefore, for each site we are left with the following 
number of potential cases: 
• Florida: three cities and three counties  
• Nevada: two cities and one county (one city – Carson – is a combined city/county) 
• North Carolina: three cities and two counties 
• South Carolina: three cities and three counties 
• Washington: three cities and three counties 
Each of the 14 cities and 12 counties was contacted for interviews. Of the 26 total potential 
cases, eight did not respond to any interview requests.17 As interview data is considered vital for 
understanding the role of bureaucrats in developing climate adaptation policy, cases with no 
response were dropped. The final list of 18 communities is below: 
• Florida: Fort Pierce (city), Martin (county), St. Lucie (county) 
• Nevada: Carson City (county/city), Fernley (city) 
• North Carolina: Elizabeth City (city), Havelock (city), New Bern (city), Pasquotank 
(county), Craven (county) 
• South Carolina: Greer (city), Mauldin (city), Greenville (county), Oconee (county) 
• Washington18: Grant (county), Yakima (city), Kittitas (county), Yakima (county)  
Cases were chosen to control for potential alternative explanations including the severity 
of expected effects of climate change (all cases have severe expected effects) and size of 
                                                 
17 The strategies for contacting interview subjects and the interview protocol are described below (Section 3) 
18 Yakima and Kittitas Counties (and the localities therein) are part of a multi-jurisdictional effort to regulate the 
Yakima River Basin called the Yakima River Basin Integrated Plan (hereafter “Integrated Plan”). While they are 
treated as separate cases for this analysis, these governments often collaborate through the Integrated Plan. 
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jurisdiction which is related to several other variables.19 These include economic status 
(measured by median income, property values, and employment rate.) Additionally, local 
attitudes concerning climate change (public opinion) and government structure (e.g. most local 
governments are run through a manager-council form of government) might account for 
differences in local climate adaptation efforts. However, these variables do not greatly vary 
nationwide or in the cases tested here.  Therefore, these too are controlled for as potential 
explanations. Specific data for the control variables are presented in tables in Appendix D. 
The total number of cases in this project allows for both within-site comparisons and 
cross-site comparisons. As George and Bennett argue: 
“…a study that includes many cases may allow for several different types of 
comparisons. One case might be most similar to another and both may be least 
similar to a third case. As noted below, case selection is an opportunistic as well 
as structured process – researchers should look for whether the addition of one or 
a few cases to a study might provide useful comparisons or allow inferences on 
additional types of cases,” (2005, p. 83). 
These 18 cases allow for several types of comparisons, capitalizing on similarities on the 
following dimensions. Cases in the same state have similarities which include the 
attitudes of state leaders, experiences with prior disasters (at least those that were 
sufficiently large to hit an entire region in a state), and proximity to a local climate leader 
like Miami, Seattle, or New York City. The cases can also be compared on a variety of 
other dimensions including population size, economic strength, budget size, attitudes of 
local leaders, number or severity of prior disasters (see Appendix D for these 
comparisons). 
                                                 
19 Although there is not a perfect correlation between the size of a jurisdiction and its economic status, the 
differences are not overwhelming. For instance, we are not comparing a small town in New York State to New York 
City’s economic power.  
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2. Variables and Measurement 
As George and Bennett stress, structured-focused comparisons work best when each case 
is interrogated using the same variables to standardize data collection and comparisons (2005, p. 
67). To test the six hypotheses in this project, six main variables of interest are considered: 
1. Agenda-setter: Who introduces climate change adaptation onto the local agenda, 
bureaucrats or elected officials? (Independent variable). 
2. Status of climate change adaptation policy: Integration of climate change into existing 
policies; separate initiative to address climate change adaptation (Dependent variable). 
3. Bureaucratic background: Training and current responsibility of bureaucrats who 
address flooding or drought in their jobs (Independent variable). 
4. Bureaucratic autonomy: Bureaucratic independence from her superior (Independent 
variable). 
5. Problem definition agreement: Agreement concerning the need climate change 
adaptation between the bureaucrat and her superior; to build this measure, two sub-
measurements are required: (Independent variable). 
a. Bureaucrat’s argument about climate change adaptation: How the bureaucrat 
frames the need for local adaptation (and the path by which adaptation should be 
achieved).  
b. Principal’s argument about climate change adaptation: If and how the 
principal frames the need for local adaptation (and the path by which adaptation 
should be achieved). 
6. Bureaucratic action: How bureaucrats act to address climate change (Dependent 
variable) 
 
Table 1 on the next page shows which variables will be used to test each of the six 
hypotheses in the project. In the following sections, I describe how each variable is measured 
including which data will be used to craft the measures and how different values for each 
variable are determined. 
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Table 1: Variables Used to Test Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Variables 
1. Front-line local bureaucrats are more likely than 
elected officials to introduce climate adaptation 
into the local agenda. 
• Agenda-setter 
• Bureaucratic action 
2. Bureaucrats with a special area of focus are more 
likely than general-focus bureaucrats to suggest 
integrating climate adaptation into existing policy 
areas. 
• Agenda-setter 
• Bureaucratic background 
• Bureaucratic action 
3. Local bureaucrats drive climate adaptation by 
providing issue-specific expertise about potential 
harms. 
• Bureaucratic autonomy (specifically expertise-
based autonomy) 
• Bureaucratic action 
4. Local bureaucrats drive climate adaptation by 
arguing that climate change predictions can be 
integrated into existing policies. 
• Bureaucrat’s argument about climate change 
adaptation (part of measure for problem definition 
agreement) 
• Bureaucratic action 
5. If a bureaucrat acts to integrate climate change 
into existing policy, the form their action takes 
will depend upon their autonomy and the extent of 
problem definition agreement in the policymaking 
community. 
5a. When the bureaucrat is autonomous and 
there is low problem definition agreement in 
the policymaking community, they will act 
defiantly. 
5b. When the bureaucrat is autonomous and 
there is high problem definition agreement, 
they will cooperate with politicians and other 
policymakers. 
5c. When the bureaucrat is not autonomous and 
there is high problem definition agreement, 
politicians will lead policy development. 
5d. When the bureaucrat is not autonomous and 
there is low problem definition agreement, 
they will either act non-confrontationally or 
not act at all. 
• Bureaucratic autonomy 
• Problem definition agreement 
• Bureaucratic action 
 
 
6. When state governments oppose climate change 
action, local bureaucrats are less likely to act for 
fear of losing an important source of disaster 
mitigation or relief funding. 
• Principal’s argument about climate change 
adaptation (part of measure for problem definition 
agreement) –for state government principals 
• Bureaucratic action 
• Status of climate change adaptation policy 
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Additional data were used to supplement these measures, including statements made by 
policymakers, budget information (especially funding for disaster mitigation), and 
characterizations of policymakers’ action in the local press. These data are supplements to the six 
main variables of interest listed above. In the following sections, I describe how these six main 
variables of interest are used in this study. 
2.1 Agenda-Setter 
Not all agenda-setters are created equal. The identity of the individual who brings an 
issue onto the policymaking agenda can shape the eventual outcome of the policy. This argument 
is woven through the literature on policy entrepreneurs (see Kingdon, 1995; Mintrom, 1997 and 
subsequent work; Schneider, Teske and Mintrom, 1995). Constructing a measure of agenda-
setters and policy entrepreneurs, then, is an important step for this project. This measure has two 
parts. First, I determine if and when climate change is on the local agenda20. This part of the 
measure attempts to identify the first time the issue was discussed either formally or informally. 
Second, I identify the individual or individuals who introduced the issue onto the agenda.  
Agenda setting can occur during official meetings where records are kept, but it can also 
happen during informal discussions among policymakers. Additionally, a policy entrepreneur 
often advocates for her policy over an extended time. Thus, if an individual is repeatedly 
discussing climate change adaptation, this too will identify her as an agenda-setter. However, a 
distinction should be made between agenda setters who repeatedly advocate for an issue or 
policy response and those who casually address the issue once or twice.  
                                                 
20 If and when climate adaptation reaches the agenda is an element in both the variable capturing who the agenda-
setter is and the status of climate change adaptation policy. For clarity, the agenda-setter variable is measuring the 
identity of the actor and not the action. The action is captured in the status of climate change adaptation policy 
variable. 
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Several data sources will be used to get the best possible measure of who introduced 
climate adaptation onto the agenda. Data for this measure come from government reports, 
meeting minutes, media articles, and interviews.21 As Flescher showed in his article on local 
bureaucrats using euphemisms to address climate change (2014), a simple search for “climate 
change” would miss these euphemisms. Therefore, this project used Atlas.ti to search for climate 
change as well as flooding, and drought in the documents. The areas that contain these search 
terms (see Appendix A for list of search strings) were then manually coded to determine if 
climate change is being addressed (see Appendix B for codebook). 
Once mentions of climate change were identified, the next step was to determine who 
brought the issue on to the agenda. Members of the public, members of the media, members of 
interest groups, and members of the government can all introduce issues on the local government 
agenda. Within the group of members of the local government, I distinguish elected officials 
from hired or appointed public bureaucrats. Public bureaucrats are individuals employed by a 
government who did not arrive at their position through a public election. The growing use of 
contractors for government service muddles this distinction somewhat, but if a local government 
chooses to outsource their disaster management or planning efforts, the contractor will have 
similar expertise and autonomy (even more autonomy than a typical bureaucrat). They might 
lack the same quality of access to the elected officials, but they will likely engage in similar 
activities like meeting with elected officials and presenting plans and updates at local meetings 
that government-employed bureaucrats do. Data for this measure come from local government 
websites which identify elected officials and employees of the local government. Contractors 
working for local governments are often identified on government websites as well.  
                                                 
21 A description of the data collection procedures is below (Section 3) 
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2.2 Status of Climate Adaptation Policy 
Policy scholars widely recognize that public policy encompasses both what governments 
decide to do as well as what they decide not to do. Therefore, every local government either has 
a policy to address climate change adaptation or does not have a policy to address climate change 
adaptation (either explicitly stated or implied by a lack of policy and discussion).  
However, it is not a fair evaluation of government policy to group purposeful inaction 
with lack of discussion of the issue altogether (Dye, 2010). Therefore, identifying the status of 
climate adaptation policy requires two steps. The first step is determined during the previous 
measure on agenda-setters: is climate change on the agenda? If climate change is not on the  
Table 2: Status of Climate Change Policy on Local Agendas 
Policy Status Description Indicators 
No action 
Decided not to address climate change 
adaptation 
Discussions proposing climate change 
action existed and either no follow up OR 
an active decision not to act 
On the agenda 
Climate change adaptation is being 
discussed by members of the local 
government and policymaking community 
Climate adaptation is mentioned by 
members of local government, even if it is 
dismissed  
Policy 
formulation 
Crafting policies to address climate 
adaptation, although not necessarily 
adopting any 
Elected officials or bureaucrats discussing 
climate adaptation and strategies to achieve 
it 
Policy adoption 
Policy has been approved by the necessarily 
players in local government (most likely 
elected officials, but could be a 
discretionary policy adopted by 
bureaucrats) 
Policy is “on the books” – written as a local 
law/ordinance or put into a planning 
document that is used to guide local 
government choices 
Implementation 
of an adaptation 
policy 
A plan is in place and the local government 
is creating programs or developing 
infrastructure to respond  
Developing infrastructure, hiring adaptation 
planners, creating systems, etc. Investing 
and implementing a policy to address 
climate change 
Categories based on Anderson, Brady, and Bullock III (1978). Not including evaluation because adaptation 
policy is in its infancy. 
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agenda, then this is distinguishable from a policy of inaction on climate adaptation. If climate 
change is on the agenda, we can progress to the second measure which measures the state of the 
policy as shown in the range of options in Table 2 (above). Data for this measure come from 
analyzing government documents (meeting minutes, planning documents, and reports), media 
coverage of local government, and interviews with government officials. 
2.3 Bureaucratic Background  
Bureaucrats’ training and expertise can shape how they act (Lipsky, 2010; Teodoro, 
2011). Information on bureaucrats that will be helpful for this analysis include education and 
training, length of tenure in local government they currently work for, and time in current 
position. Education and training is operationalized by looking at their professional training (i.e. 
disaster management specific training, engineering training, or natural science/environmental 
science training). 
As several interview subjects chose not to be identified, this information was generalized 
to protect confidentiality of interview participants. For instance, education and training was 
described as either (a) general administrative or public policy background or (b) specific policy 
area expertise. Their length of tenure in their current job was described as either five or fewer 
years or more than five years. While more a specific measure would contribute to a richer and 
fuller analysis, it would compromise the confidentiality assured to the interview participants. 
Data for these measures came from interviews with bureaucrats, personal biographies on local 
government websites, and resume websites like LinkedIn.  
2.4 Bureaucratic Autonomy 
The bureaucratic politics literature identified several ways that bureaucrats establish 
autonomy or independence from their political superiors. In this project, I employ several 
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different measures of bureaucratic autonomy in order to provide a clearer and more 
comprehensive picture of the independence that bureaucrats can exert. For instance, autonomy 
built by expertise might yield different results than autonomy derived from structural rules and 
protections.  
First, bureaucrats can establish autonomy through their expertise. This is an expected 
outcome, especially when the politician-bureaucrat relationship is viewed through the 
perspective of a principal-agent relationship. Asymmetric information in the principal-agent 
relationship means that as agents, bureaucrats have specified knowledge (Weber, 1922; Altfeld 
& Miller, 1984). We would expect bureaucrats with merit-based appointments to have 
specialized training and knowledge that politicians do not. However, because local bureaucrats 
answer to principals at multiple levels of government and with different types of expertise, 
including non-elected principals like FEMA or state emergency management agencies as well as 
elected officials, the form asymmetric information takes should be modified for the specific 
principal-agent relationship. Below (Table 3) I identify the different groups of principals that 
local disaster managers answer to and what type of expertise, information, or knowledge they 
likely have in common with the bureaucrat. 
Federal and state principals are also knowledgeable about emergency management 
practices and FEMA requirements. State emergency management agencies have similar 
knowledge about emergency management practices, FEMA requirements, and any additional 
state requirements. However, the federal government and the state government do not have 
specific knowledge about local conditions. 
Local elected officials and local bureaucrats share knowledge about their communities, 
the local political scene (budget and staff constraints, current debates, etc.), and present and past 
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disasters. However, we would not expect local elected officials to have specialized knowledge 
about disaster management policy implementation or even FEMA or state emergency 
management agency requirements. 
Table 3: Sources of Bureaucratic Autonomy vis-à-vis Superiors 
Principal 
Information in Common with 
Bureaucrat 
Bureaucrat’s Specialized Knowledge 
vis-à-vis their Principal 
FEMA/Federal 
Government 
• Emergency management practices 
• Policy requirements of FEMA’s programs 
(Stafford Disaster Act, NFIP) 
• Local Community 
• Local Conditions (present and past 
disasters) 
• Local politics 
State 
Emergency 
Management 
Agency/State 
Government 
• Emergency management practices 
• Policy requirements of FEMA’s programs 
(Stafford Disaster Act, NFIP) 
• Additional state emergency management 
requirements 
• Local Community 
• Local Conditions (present and past 
disasters) 
• Local politics 
Local Elected 
Officials 
• Local Community 
• Local Conditions (present and past 
disasters) 
• Local politics 
• Emergency management practices 
• Policy requirements of FEMA’s programs 
(Stafford Disaster Act, NFIP) 
• Additional state emergency management 
requirements 
To measure differences in expertise, I used several types of data: 
1. Interviews with bureaucrats, asking if they think of themselves as experts and what types 
of expertise they bring to the table. 
2. Education, training, and personal background of bureaucrats and local principals. 
3. Reports written by local bureaucrats: information provided in reports (i.e. specific to the 
locality, about emergency management, etc.) reflecting the expertise of writer. 
4. Reports, guide books, manuals written by FEMA or state emergency management 
agencies: information provided in reports reflecting the expertise of writer. 
5. Types of information local bureaucrats provide when reporting at meetings for the local 
elected officials. 
When the measures of expertise do not match the principal, we can conclude that the 
bureaucrats have expertise-based independence. This does not mean that they use it to act on 
climate change adaptation, but it leaves open the possibility. These measures are meant to be 
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completely separate of their actions on climate change adaptation to prevent the problem of 
endogeneity.  
A second measure of bureaucratic independence comes from structural independence. 
Again, because local bureaucrats answer to three sets of principals at different levels of 
government, structural independence is level-dependent. One measure of structural independence 
is if the bureaucrat runs their own department or is a member of a separate department that is 
mandated with running programs. If bureaucrats have autonomy over their own department or 
program implementation, they have structural authority to make decisions separately from the 
elected officials. For example, if the local bureaucrat is a department head or part of a separate 
emergency management department where she can make her own decisions on implementation 
or running a program, she has structural autonomy. 
Structural independence also comes from fiscal independence. At the local level, fiscal 
independence can be identified if they run their own budget. The data for this can be found in 
local budgets. At the state and federal level, local bureaucrats can be said to have fiscal 
independence if they can raise money at the local level through levies, fees, or taxes in sufficient 
quantity to respond to disasters on their own. Data for this measure come from measures of local 
fiscal independence and the number of grants received for disaster management. 
A third measure of independence comes from who holds hiring and firing power. For all 
the cases, only the local principals will have hiring and firing power. While this does not vary 
when we are discussing local principals for each case, there is variation when comparing a 
situation with a local principal to one with a state- or federal-principal. Thus, this measure 
provides a useful distinction for those comparisons. 
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The fourth and final type of independence comes from bureaucrats exercising discretion 
in their work. While bureaucrats can exercise discretion often during their work (Lin, 2000; 
O'Leary, 2006; Lipsky, 2010), we get a sense of their opportunity to do so by looking at the 
programs and policies they implement and what extent of influence they have in writing planning 
documents or dealing with citizens. Data for this measure come from interviews, bureaucrats’ 
job descriptions (often found on government websites and local ordinances), and planning 
documents. 
2.5 Problem Definition Agreement  
As Rochefort and Cobb (1994), and Stone (2002) show, defining problems involves 
several elements and disagreement can arise for each dimensions of the problem definition22. 
First, policymakers can disagree if climate change is the reason why the local government needs 
to adapt their flood or drought management policy to respond to changing conditions. In other 
words, is climate change the cause – or at least one important cause – for their need to adapt? 
Second, there can be disagreement about whether the local government can address or 
should address climate adaptation. In other words, is the local government the correct scale for 
action? While disaster management has historically been the purview of local government, the 
growing role of state and federal governments in providing grants has increased their influence 
over the shape of local policy (Birkland & Waterman, 2008). As a response, local governments 
increasingly rely on the federal and state governments to respond to new threats. Local 
governments might hesitate to take on climate change because it is framed as a global problem 
                                                 
22 Rochefort and Cobb’s problem definition concept is used throughout this project as the basis for the problem 
definition measure. It can also be understood as issue definition or problem definition. I use the term problem 
definition to refer to Rochefort and Cobb’s concept which highlights several dimensions including temporal 
proximity, geographic proximity, problem cause, severity, and who is responsible for fixing the problem. 
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requiring global solutions. Although this rhetoric largely surrounds questions of mitigation, 
adaptation is increasingly part of the global conversation through the United Nations Climate 
Adaptation Fund for developing nations and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) Second Working Group which focuses on adaptation. Therefore, the question concerning 
who should respond is unsettled and grounds for disagreement. 
Third, disagreement can arise around the issue of proximity. As Rochefort and Cobb 
(1994) show proximity refers both to geographic proximity and temporal proximity. These 
dimensions of problem definition answer the questions: Is climate change going to make natural 
disasters worse here (within the local government’s jurisdiction) as opposed to elsewhere? Is 
climate change going to be an issue now or in the near future as opposed to a long time from 
now?23 
Fourth, there can be disagreement on the question of problem severity. This asks: Is 
climate change going to be a severe problem or a mild one? The case selection strategy controls 
for the predicted level of severity, but objective severity does not necessarily match subjective 
judgments of severity. As problem definitions are more a matter of perception, then it is possible 
that even within places at high risk of climate related flooding or drought that there would be 
disagreement on this dimension.  
To measure problem definition, I use statements made by policymakers – bureaucrats and 
elected politicians – about climate change. For bureaucrats, this largely comes from interviews 
and meeting minutes; for their principals, I use statements from media coverage, meeting 
                                                 
23 It is important to notes that answers to these questions are political as well as empirical. Political, social, and 
economic motivations shape how information is received and process by political actors (Jones B. D., 1994) 
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minutes, press releases, and reports.24 As opinions about scale, proximity and severity all rely on 
agreeing that climate change requires adaptation, that question must be answered first. If the 
individual or organization expressed that climate change requires adaptation, then questions 
about scale, geographic proximity, temporal proximity and severity were asked. If, however, the 
individual or organization expresses that climate change is not happening or will not require 
adaptation, then we would not expect them to make further statements about other dimensions of 
the problem definition. The flow chart (Figure 3, below) was used to identify the elements of 
problem definition. 
 
Then, a measure of problem definition agreement was constructed between the bureaucrat 
and their principal.  Agreement is measured on five dimensions: (1) climate change is the reason 
why local flood or drought policy should be changed, (2) the local government is the right scale 
                                                 
24 Ideally, interviews would have been conducted with all elected officials. However, many did not respond to 
interview requests. Of those that did, most pointed the researcher to speak with the local bureaucrats who managed 
flooding and drought policy instead of completing an interview themselves. This is a limitation, but it also speaks to 
the dominance local bureaucrats have over these policy areas. Other data sources like meeting minutes and news 
coverage supplemented the missing data interviews would have provided for this measure. 
Identifying climate change as a 
cause for the need to adapt 
No Step 1 STOP 
Severity Scale Geographic Proximity Temporal Proximity Step 2 
Y
es
 
Figure 3: Problem Definition Agreement for Climate Change Adaptation Flow-
Chart 
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for adapting to climate change, (3) climate change is geographically proximate, (4) climate 
change is temporally proximate, and (5) climate change will be severe. For each element, 
agreement received a score of 1 and disagreement received a score of -1. When there was not 
opinion (from a bureaucrat or elected official), disagreement was assumed because when 
someone does not have an opinion, they likely require persuasion (like someone who disagrees 
with you).  
2.6 Bureaucratic Action 
Measuring bureaucratic action was achieved through interviews with bureaucrats, and 
when possible, the results were confirmed with meeting minutes, planning documents, and media 
reports. (If bureaucrats are acting in a non-confrontational manner, it is unlikely their actions 
would be reflected in media coverage, meeting minutes or official documents.) 
In order to determine bureaucratic action, the following types of questions were asked of 
interview subjects after they acknowledged that climate change is a problem they will need to 
address. The questions were: 
1. Did you discuss climate change when crafting planning documents, like emergency 
management plans, land use plans, comprehensive plans, etc.? 
a. If so, why? 
b. Who introduced the idea? 
2. Do you think the policies need to be changed? 
3. Are you working with others to address climate change? 
4. Did you introduce the idea of climate change adaptation onto the agenda? 
These questions were used to guide analysis of meeting minutes and media reports. 
Distinguishing between the different types of action presented in Chapter 1 was based on this 
series of coding questions shown in Figure 4 (below). 
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3. Data Collection 
Data for this project came from three types of sources: (a) interviews with local 
bureaucrats and other players in the policymaking community, (b) government documents, and 
(c) media articles.  
3.1 Interviews  
Selecting interview participants for each community began by identifying a list of local 
bureaucrats whose work was related to flood or drought management, as shown on local 
government websites. These individuals were contacted by either email or telephone asking for 
an interview on local flood or drought management practices and policies. (Copies of Internal 
1. Did the bureaucrat work 
with her superior? 
2. Did the bureaucrat introduce the 
idea of climate change action? 
3. Did the superior say not to act 
to address climate change? 
Yes No 
Cooperative 
Action 
Politician-Led 
Action 
Defiant 
Behavior 
Non-
Confrontational 
Behavior 
Figure 4: Type of Bureaucratic Behavior Flow Chart 
No No Yes Yes 
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Review Board approved emails and phone scripts are in Appendix C.) By framing the interview 
requests broadly – flood and drought management policy instead of climate change adaptation 
affecting flood and drought management policy – I avoided priming the respondents to think 
about or talk about climate change if they would not have otherwise. Furthermore, it allowed me 
to speak to people who might have otherwise refused the request because climate change is a 
taboo subject in their state. 
Often, the first people contacted in a locality would redirect me to someone else who 
knew more about the policy or was more involved in implementing the policy.25 Anyone who did 
not reply to the first request for an interview was contacted again, but no more than three 
additional times.  
Interviews lasted an average of 44 minutes and ranged from the shortest interview at 12 
minutes to the longest lasting one hour and 14 minutes. The length of interview varied based on 
how much information the interviewee wanted to share and how developed the local climate 
adaptation policy was. Interviews were semi-structured and covered the following topics: 
describing (a) the subject’s work for the local government, (b) existing flood or drought 
management policy, (c) bureaucratic autonomy and expertise in the local government, (d) 
challenges for flood and drought management success, (e) the local governments’ (and the 
bureaucrats’) relationship with local elected officials, state-level government, and the federal 
government, and (f) attitudes about the issue of climate change. Climate change was left as a last 
topic unless the interviewee brought up the issue independently of the researcher’s questions. 
This was meant to allow participants to identify climate change without prompting. Furthermore, 
                                                 
25 This is the primary reason many elected officials refused interview requests when a reason was provided to the 
researcher. 
50 
 
interviewees who identified climate change independently demonstrated that the issue is higher 
on their personal agenda than interview subjects that had to be prompted. 
Interviews were transcribed verbatim using TranscriberPro software. All except one 
interview was recorded using an audio recording device. For one interview where audio 
recording was not used at the request of the interviewee, I took extensive notes which were typed 
for use in analysis. Any section containing a personal story, like a story about family members or 
personal vacations, was removed. Additionally, any interviewee who requested to make their 
comments confidentially had personal references removed to protect their identity, including 
names and job titles.26 
3.2 Government Documents 
All local governments studied in this project had online data and document repositories 
which included meeting minutes, planning documents, and budgets. For each case, as many 
documents and webpages as possible that related to flood or drought management or the 
bureaucrats of interest were collected. This process was intended to collect more documents than 
would eventually be used in analysis in order to avoid missing anything relevant to climate 
adaptation, flood management, or drought management.  
I used the following process to identify and collect documents. First, all meeting minutes 
for the local elected council from 2010 to 2016 were downloaded, and when possible additional 
meetings from years before 2010 were obtained. Not all local governments had this entire time 
period available in digital form, so I contacted the local government to have the files sent to me. 
As climate adaptation in local U.S. governments is a relatively new issue, missing documents 
                                                 
26 The interview protocol was developed, tested, and refined through three test cases: Troy, New York, Manchester, 
Vermont, and Pittsburgh, Massachusetts. These interviews were conducted in the fall and spring of 2014 and 2015.  
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from before 2010 was not seen as an obstacle for thorough data collection. Even large, climate-
friendly local governments had not begun to plan for climate change adaptation until the late 
2000s. Climate adaptation pioneers Chicago, Illinois published their plan in 2008, King County, 
Washington (Seattle-Tacoma) published their plan in 2009, and New York City, New York 
created their climate adaptation plan in 2013 (C2ES, 2015; Georgetown Climate Center, 2015). 
Second, all local planning documents were downloaded. These include land use plans, 
comprehensive plans, economic plans, and emergency management plans. Often, local 
government websites have a section devoted to planning documents. However, when this did not 
exist, I looked for links to planning documents on the webpages for each department. When 
available, old and new versions of planning documents were obtained. When planning 
documents were not available electronically, I requested them from the local government records 
office. Third, I downloaded all local budgets available from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2016. 
Like meeting minutes, budgets for this time period were not always available. Therefore, budgets 
from at least 2010 to 2016 were downloaded. Fourth, I downloaded the local laws of each city or 
county. Often called “Codes of Ordinances” or “Municipal Codes,” these were sometimes 
managed by the local government, but many were managed by a third-party organization called 
Municode.  
Fifth, I created PDF versions of any webpage related to flooding or drought, climate 
change, or any of the bureaucrats of interest. When there was no profile for a bureaucrat 
available on the website, I looked for one from LinkedIn.com, a professional social media 
website where members post resumes which include employment and educational background. 
Sixth and finally, if a website had a search function, I used it to find documents with the key 
terms “flood,” “drought,” or “climate.” Any new documents identified in this fashion were also 
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downloaded. If a local government had something like a newsletter that was identified through 
this search, I then downloaded any available version of the newsletter from 2000 to 2016. 
3.3 Media Articles 
While interviews and government documents provide good data to test the hypotheses 
presented here, both sources originate from the local government. Therefore, using local media 
coverage provides an important perspective which covers community attitudes and responses to 
local government actions and does not reflect government bias. However, the declining number 
of local newspapers and resources for the local papers that have persisted makes it difficult to 
find thorough coverage of local governments (Farhl, 2014). Thus, media coverage will be used to 
confirm or add to findings from interviews and government documents but does not represent a 
strong enough data source on its own. 
Media articles were collected using the Access World News Database. First, I identified 
which publications covered the local community. Articles were identified for collection by 
searching for climate, or flood, or drought. Before downloading the article, I checked for false 
positives like “business climate,” or “a flood of responses.” Often one news media organization 
covers an entire county, so some publications were used for multiple cases. However, when this 
was the case, searches included the name of the local jurisdiction to make sure articles were 
appropriate for each community.  
4. Qualitative Content Analysis: Computer-Guided and Manual Coding 
Qualitative content analysis (QCA) was the coding strategy used to measure each of the 
six variables. According to Margrit Schreier and Phillip Mayring – two prominent methods 
scholars – QCA allows the researcher to deal with a high quantity of qualitative data in a way 
that does not lose sight of the information contained and its context (Mayring, 2000; Schreier, 
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2014). While not specified in George and Bennett’s description of structured-focused 
comparisons, QCA provides an excellent approach for making sense of the large quantity of data 
for each case. Schreier (2014) presents a series of eight steps which complement the steps 
presented by George and Bennett (2005). Steps 1 and 2 instruct the researcher to determine 
research questions and select material (described above). In step 3, the researcher builds a coding 
frame or a codebook. For step 4, the material is segmented. This is the process of choosing which 
portions of the data to focus on for analysis. In step 5, the codebook is tested on a small segment 
of the data. The sixth step is when the codebook is revised. Then during the seventh step, the 
data are analyzed in their entirety. Below I describe how the codebook was developed and 
refined (steps 3, 5, 6 and 7) and how the documents are curated for manual coding (step 4). Step 
8 is the presentation of findings. 
4.1 Developing the Codebook 
This project relies predominantly on a deductive coding scheme. Decisions about coding 
were made prior to analysis and are driven by the theory presented in Chapter 1. The codebook is 
presented in Appendix B. However, I acknowledge that the complexities of social reality are 
difficult to anticipate or fully describe. To accommodate this, the codebook was tested and 
subsequently refined. The test was performed on a subset of the data: Pasquotank County, North 
Carolina; the City of Elizabeth City, North Carolina; and Martin County, Florida. These three 
cases represent both counties and a city in two states in order to capture as much variety as could 
be anticipated for testing the codebook. 
After the codebook was finalized, data for all cases were analyzed including the three 
cases used to test the codebook. Repeating the analysis on these cases serves two purposes: (1) it 
allows for conformity in coding across cases, especially as it regards any changes made to the 
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codebook during testing, and (2) it tests for reliability. Recoding yielded highly similar results 
with no substantive interpretation changes. For instance, when recoding one county, problem 
definition agreement between the elected officials and bureaucrats was measured at an eight 
during the first code but a 7 on the second code. This did not change the substantive 
interpretation of the result.   
4.2 Curating Documents for Manual Coding 
The data collection strategy employed in this project purposefully over-collected 
documents to build the cases. By collecting more documents than might apply, it minimizes the 
likelihood that a discussion about climate change adaptation – however minute – is missed. 
However, this requires that the extraneous documents are sorted out. To achieve this, I use 
computer-assisted coding through Atlas.ti27 to identify documents with key words or phrases that 
relate to the variables of interest (see Chapter 2, Section 2; search strings listed in Appendix A). 
Any document not containing one of the search terms related to climate change adaptation, 
flooding, drought, and the bureaucrats of interest were not analyzed.  
Once the quantity of documents was pared down, manual coding was used to determine 
specific measures. The manual coding is guided by the codebook (see Appendix B) When 
questions arose concerning the coding decision, the decision was made conservatively (i.e. in a 
way that would underestimate theorized effects). For instance, when coding for bureaucratic 
autonomy, the coding decision was made for less expertise. 
                                                 
27 Atlas.ti is a computer program that allows researchers to automatically and manually code qualitative data 
including written documents, pictures, audio files, and video.  
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5. Limits to Generalizability 
The 18 cases included in this study are not intended to be representative of all local 
governments. There are limits to the generalizability of the findings from this study that I 
acknowledge. First, the findings do not apply equally to bureaucrats in all local governments. 
The choice to focus on small-to-medium-sized localities was an intentional one because the 
dynamics of a smaller municipality do not match those of a mega-city like New York City or Los 
Angeles or a very small community. Many other researchers focus on dynamics in large cities 
(for examples see Bhullar, 2013 (Singapore); Gremillion, 2011 (large U.S. cities); Zimmerman & 
Faris, 2011 (large U.S. cities)) and these are important studies. However, the effects of climate 
change are being felt and will be felt by smaller communities with smaller populations and fewer 
government resources. Local bureaucrats are likely to play a larger policy-shaping role in a small 
or medium sized government than one that serves a population of millions of residents with 
professionalized elected officials who have their own advisory staffs. Conversely, these results 
should not be applied to bureaucrats in very small localities. Bureaucrats in these communities 
often take on many jobs and do not have the same types of expertise or amount of resources that 
those studied here do. Additionally, as described above in justifying the size cut-off for choosing 
cases, smaller communities often do not provide the services studied here like drought 
management or flood control. Instead, these are contracted out to larger governments with the 
resources to address these concerns.28 
                                                 
28 Unfortunately, scholars do not often devote time studying very small governments (i.e. communities with fewer 
than 10,000 residents). This represents a gap in our understanding of local government behavior, although the 
importance of filling it is up for discussion. Small communities might provide interesting cases for understanding 
the social world, but often they provide few services and rely on contractors and collaboration with other (larger) 
governments to provide services (see articles on the “Hollow State” including Milward and Provan (2000) and Terry 
(2005)). 
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Second, these findings do not apply to communities with no climate change-related 
threats. With the progression of climate change and the wide-ranging predicted impacts, this is 
admittedly a very small group of localities.  
However, I argue that there are important lessons which can be derived from this study to 
apply beyond the case of climate change adaptation to other issues where local governments face 
growing on-the-ground problems but state and the federal government are stymied from acting 
due to political disagreement and polarization. Similar issues might include vaccinations, natural 
gas extraction (fracking), school vouchers, and rights for transgender individuals. In all of these 
policy areas, local officials are dealing with implementing policies and navigating these 
problems while state and federal politicians disagree about how the policies should be shaped, 
what the role of the government should be, and if the problems are even real. 
Third, the findings should be limited to local governments in federalized systems. The 
division of labor, expertise, and funding is central to the theory and findings presented here. 
Similarly, political systems without a professionalized bureaucracy are not sufficiently similar to 
warrant generalization of these findings.  
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CHAPTER 3: DO LOCAL BUREAUCRATS SHAPE LOCAL CLIMATE ADAPTATION PLANNING? 
In order to answer the question, “How do local bureaucrats shape local climate adaptation 
planning?” we must first establish if they do. This essentially is a question of local bureaucrats’ 
agenda-setting power. As this chapter will show, local bureaucrats are not the only players in 
local policymaking circles who bring climate adaptation onto the local agenda. Like state, 
national, and international policy agendas, a wide range of actors work to put issues onto the 
agenda (Cobb & Elder, 1983; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994; Mortensen & Seeberg, 2016) and work 
to prevent issues from reaching the decision agenda (Cobb & Ross, 1997). However, bureaucrats 
occupy a key space in local policymaking – they fulfill the roles of policy implementer as well as 
policy advisor to local elected officials (much like staff for members of congress or governors). 
In their role as advisors, local bureaucrats provide elected officials with (a) policies for approval 
(b) suggestions about how policies should be crafted to meet requirements from superior 
governments or legal requirements, (c) research and data germane to policy decisions, and (d) 
information about issues that are not typically the concern of local citizens or the local media. 
Access to local politicians and influence over the agenda puts local bureaucrats in a key position 
to shape the agenda and consequently influence policy. 
In this chapter, I look at several ways to answer the question: Do bureaucrats shape the 
local agenda on climate change adaptation? To begin, I look to see if bureaucrats bring the issue 
of climate adaptation onto the local agenda first. Answering this “first mover” question addresses 
if bureaucrats are creating interest in adaptation by introducing the issue; if they do not introduce 
the issue it indicates that they are likely responding to a pre-existing concern in the community. 
However, a single mention is not enough to claim that climate adaptation is part of an ongoing 
conversation at the local level. Therefore, I also look to see if local bureaucrats are responsible 
58 
 
for increasing attention to the issue beyond a single mention. Here, I operationalize this by 
determining if climate was discussed by at least two individuals on two separate occasions within 
a 30-day period.29 Identifying multiple mentions attests to the rising salience of the issues being 
addressed. If only one person is discussing climate adaptation, and there are no responses to 
those statements, the issue has not been fully integrated into the local agenda. Policy agenda 
scholars from Downs’ issue attention cycle (1972) to Baumgartner and Jones’ punctuated 
equilibrium (2009) have paid considerable attention to how issue rise and fall in prominence on 
the agenda. However, I am not aware of any scholars who examined the first mentions of issues 
– especially issues like climate adaptation – that have not risen to a point where they dominate 
attention. For the purposes of this project, differentiating between a simple mention and multiple 
mentions is sufficient. Climate adaptation remains a low salience issue in most local 
governments. 
Next, I examine where local bureaucrats discuss climate adaptation because local agendas 
are multifaceted – comprised of public meetings with elected officials, meetings among 
government officials without public participation, and discussions between government actors.30 
In these different settings, I look to see where local bureaucrats discuss climate adaptation and I 
connect these spaces to bureaucrats’ institutional power and the control they can exert. In the 
order they appear in this chapter, I examine: public meetings with elected officials (section 2), 
policy documents written by local bureaucrats31 (section 3), conversations or research efforts 
                                                 
29 A month was chosen to allow for the variation in meeting schedules and activity levels of different jurisdictions. 
Jurisdictions that meet biweekly would then be discussing an issue at two back-to-back meetings in order to qualify. 
Any longer period might miss-measure jurisdictions that meet at a more frequent interval, like weekly meetings. For 
a more detailed discussion of methods, see Chapter 2 and the Appendix B: Codebook. 
30 Includes conversations between (a) an elected official and an elected official, (b) an elected official and a 
bureaucrat, and (c) between bureaucrats. 
31 As a reflection of meetings among government officials without public participation. 
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initiated by elected officials where bureaucrats complete the research and fill in the details 
(section 4), and conversations between bureaucrats and other members of local government 
(section 5).  
I find that bureaucrats are not always the first or the only actors in local governments to 
bring climate adaptation onto the local agenda. However, they are the actors in local government 
who develop climate adaptation ideas into concrete (actionable) policies by (a) including climate 
adaptation in policy documents they write, (b) following-up on elected officials’ suggestions to 
consider climate adaptation solutions, and (c) bringing up the issue in conversations with 
coworkers. I do not find much evidence in my cases that local bureaucrats use public meetings to 
discuss climate adaptation. Consequently, there is support for hypothesis 1: Front-line local 
bureaucrats are more likely than elected officials to introduce climate adaptation into the local 
agenda, although elected officials are still important players in this process. 
This chapter also addresses hypothesis 2: Bureaucrats with a special area of focus – i.e. 
water managers, floodplain managers, etc. – are more likely than general-focus bureaucrats – 
i.e. city managers – to suggest integrating climate adaptation into existing policy areas. In order 
to discuss differences between general-focus bureaucrats and specific-focus bureaucrats, all of 
the bureaucrats discussed in this chapter are listed in Table 7: Special- or General-Focus 
Bureaucrats.32 Hypothesis 2 is supported because there are many more special-focus bureaucrats 
working on integrating climate adaptation into local policies. Their positions include: planners, 
emergency managers, floodplain managers, water (and irrigation) managers, engineers, and 
public works and utilities specialists. This indicates that climate adaptation is less of a political 
issue in many of these localities and more of a technical challenge for the local government to 
                                                 
32 For more information about the coding system used, see the Codebook, Appendix B. 
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address. This distance from the polarized and partisan nature of climate change politics helps to 
explain why climate adaptation is being considered in many conservative areas of the country 
represented in these cases. However, it is not the only explanation because, as cases from North 
Carolina will show, the polarized nature of climate change politics does impact local government 
actions in some areas. 
1. Agenda-Setters 
In this section, I look generally at who introduces the issue of climate adaptation onto the 
agenda in the local community.  First, I look at the individual who initially mentions climate 
adaptation. Second, I look at who is involved in increasing climate adaptation’s salience by 
discussing the issue beyond the first mention. 
1.1 Do Local Bureaucrats Introduce Climate Adaptation onto the Agenda? 
As Table 4: First on the Agenda shows, local bureaucrats do introduce the issue of 
climate adaptation onto the agenda first. In half of the cases in this study (9 of 18), a local 
bureaucrat is responsible for the first mention of climate adaptation on the local agenda.33 
Comparatively, in only one of the 18 did cases local citizens bring the issue onto the agenda first 
and in five of the 18 cases elected officials brought climate adaptation onto the agenda first.34 
 
 
                                                 
33 In three cases climate adaptation was not on the agenda: The City of Greer, SC, the City of Mauldin, SC, and 
Oconee County, SC. 
34 Count does not include the City of Havelock, NC where local citizens and local elected officials advised in the 
creation of the Comprehensive Land Use Plan but were not responsible for drafting portions. 
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Table 4: First on the Agenda 
State Case First on the Agenda Identity of Individual(s) 
Position of 
Individual(s) 
N
o
rt
h
 C
a
ro
li
n
a
 
Craven 
County 
November 19, 2007 
Board of 
Commissioners 
Meeting 
County Commissioner M. Renée Sisk 
Local Elected 
Official 
City of 
Elizabeth 
City 
May 12, 2008  City 
Council Meeting 
Councilwoman L. Anita Hummer 
Local Elected 
Official 
City of 
Havelock 
June 15, 2009 
Comprehensive Land 
Use Plan 
Written by Planning Director Scott Chase, 
Consultants Matt Noonkester and Erin 
Musiol, with comments and guidance 
from the Board of Commissioners and 
Citizen Advisory Committee 
Local 
Bureaucrat with 
guidance from 
Local Elected 
Officials and 
Local Citizens 
City of 
New Bern 
December 13, 2011 
Board of Aldermen 
Meeting 
Mike Avery, Director of Planning & 
Inspections 
Local 
Bureaucrat 
Pasquotank 
County 
February 21, 2011 
Board of 
Commissioners 
Meeting 
Board of Commissioners Chairman Lloyd 
Griffin 
Local Elected 
Official 
F
lo
ri
d
a
 
City of Fort 
Pierce 
Not on the public 
agenda; mentioned as a 
concern in interview 
January 29, 2016 
Marc Meyers and FL-Local Bureaucrat-
762 
Local 
Bureaucrats 
Martin 
County 
November 2013 in the 
Comprehensive 
Emergency 
Management Plan 
Written by the Emergency Management 
Department with input from all Martin 
County Departments, Martin County 
Constitutional Offices, the Martin County 
School Board, County municipalities and 
quasi- and non-governmental agencies 
involved in emergency preparedness  
Local 
Bureaucrats 
St. Lucie 
County 
March 2010 in the 
Local Mitigation 
Strategy 
St. Lucie County Grants / Disaster 
Recovery Department 
Local 
Bureaucrats 
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Table 4: First on the Agenda 
State Case First on the Agenda Identity of Individual(s) 
Position of 
Individual(s) 
N
ev
a
d
a
 
Carson City 
February 15, 2006 
Board of Supervisors 
Meeting 
Supervisor Pete Livermore 
Local Elected 
Officials 
City of 
Fernley 
August 2014 
University of Nevada 
Reno Water for the 
Seasons 
Dr. Maureen McCarthy (Project Director), 
and team of academics and hydrologists 
Local Citizens 
S
o
u
th
 
C
a
ro
li
n
a
 
Greenville 
County 
January 2015 
Greenville County 
Multi-Jurisdictional 
Hazard Mitigation Plan 
Greenville County Floodplain 
Administrator Robert Hall; Greenville 
County Codes Enforcement Teresa Barber 
and representatives of city governments 
Local 
Bureaucrats 
W
a
sh
in
g
to
n
 
Grant 
County 
May 2, 2007 in “Area 
water managers 
respond to declining 
snowpack concern” in 
the Moses Lake 
Columbia Basin Herald 
General manager for the Grant County 
Public Utilities District Tim Culbertson; 
East Columbia Basin Irrigation District 
Manager Dick Erickson 
Local 
Bureaucrats 
Kittitas 
County 
October 2012 Kittitas 
County Hazard 
Mitigation Plan 
Christina Wollman, Hazard Mitigation 
Plan Project Manager; Kirk Holmes, 
Public Works Director; Jason Eklund, 
Information Services; Fred Slyfield, 
Emergency Management Specialist; Joe 
Gilbert, Public Health; and Tetra Tech 
Engineering and Architecture Services 
Local 
Bureaucrats and 
Local 
Consultants 
City of 
Yakima 
June 2011 City of 
Yakima Water System 
Report 
Thomas E. Coleman, P.E. Consulting 
Services; David Brown Water/Irrigation 
Manager 
Local 
Bureaucrats and 
Local 
Consultants 
Yakima 
County 
December 29, 2009 
“County 
commissioners approve 
of Yakima basin water 
plan” in the Yakima 
Herald-Republic 
Yakima, Kittitas and Benton County 
Commissioners 
Local Elected 
Officials 
Note: The following cases did not have climate adaptation on the agenda: the City of Greer, SC, the City of Mauldin, SC, and 
Oconee County, SC. 
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Local bureaucrats were not the only actors who introduced climate adaptation on the local 
agenda. However, in half of the 18 cases, local bureaucrats introduced the issue first. 
1.2 Do Local Bureaucrats Increase the Salience of Climate Adaptation on the Agenda? 
When looking at which actors worked to raise the salience of climate adaptation on the 
local agenda, the story looks somewhat different. As shown in Table 5, climate adaptation rose 
on the agenda in only seven cases, indicating that in most areas adaptation is only discussed 
occasionally. Of those seven cases, four had bureaucrats involved in raising the salience of the 
issue on the agenda: Pasquotank County, NC, Martin County, FL, Greenville County, SC, and 
Kittitas County, WA. Comparatively, in four cases local citizens increased the issue’s salience 
(Elizabeth City, NC, Pasquotank County, NC, St. Lucie County, FL, and Carson City, NV) and 
local elected officials increased the issue’s salience in two cases (Elizabeth City, NC and Kittitas 
County, WA).35 
These counts give us a rough picture of the role that bureaucrats play in introducing the 
issue of climate adaptation onto the local agenda. However, it is an imperfect picture because the 
numbers do not illuminate the methods chosen to introduce the issue of climate adaptation or the 
potential impacts of that choice. In the next sections, I examine four different pathways 
bureaucrats use to introduce or shape discussions and policymaking for climate change 
adaptation in their local governments. 
                                                 
35To be described as rising on the agenda, climate adaptation needed at least two mentions from two different 
individuals. For many cases, these two people were not in the same category (elected official, bureaucrat, or citizen). 
Therefore, the total number does not add up to seven.  
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Table 5: Climate Adaptation Rising on the Agenda 
State Case 
Dates of Two Mentions of Climate 
Adaptation 
Identity of 
Individual(s) who 
Discussed Climate 
Adaptation 
Position of 
Individual(s) 
N
o
rt
h
 C
a
ro
li
n
a
 
City of 
Elizabeth 
City 
January 25, 2016 City Council Work 
Session Minutes 
UNC College Students Local Citizens 
January 29, 2016 City Manager’s FYI 
City Manager Richard 
Olson 
Local 
Bureaucrats 
Pasquotank 
County 
November 16, 2015 Board of 
Commissioners Meeting 
UNC Students presenting 
report on sea level rise 
Local Citizens 
December 7, 2015 Board of 
Commissioners Meeting 
Floodplain Manager 
Shelley Cox 
Local 
Bureaucrat 
F
lo
ri
d
a
 
Martin 
County 
No two mentions are within a month; 
however the interviews indicated that 
there was an ongoing effort by 
bureaucrats to craft a climate change 
adaptation strategy that is at its 
formative stages 
Anne Murray 
Local 
Bureaucrat 
Kathy Fitzpatrick 
Local 
Bureaucrat 
Deborah Drum 
Local 
Bureaucrat 
St. Lucie 
County 
October 1, 2013 Board of County 
Commissioners Meeting 
Richard Sylvestri, 
Stockard Holand 
Local Citizens 
October 15, 2013 Board of County 
Commissioners Meeting 
Richard Sylvestri, David 
Luke, Jerry Beekler, Rick 
Modine, Howard Fine 
Local Citizens 
N
ev
a
d
a
 
Carson City 
February 7, 2008 Carson City Board of 
Supervisors Meeting 
Nevada Division of 
Forestry Fire Management 
Officer Michael Klug 
State 
Bureaucrat 
February 16, 2008 “The time is now to 
begin thinking about Nevada’s water 
future” in the Carson City Nevada 
Appeal 
Fred Kessler, general 
contractor 
Local Citizen 
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Table 5: Climate Adaptation Rising on the Agenda 
State Case 
Dates of Two Mentions of Climate 
Adaptation 
Identity of 
Individual(s) who 
Discussed Climate 
Adaptation 
Position of 
Individual(s) 
S
o
u
th
 
C
a
ro
li
n
a
 
Greenville 
County 
Low salience on a public agenda; 
interviews indicate that it is an ongoing 
conversation among bureaucrats in 
hazard mitigation 
Paula Gucker 
Local 
Bureaucrat 
James Bishop 
Local 
Bureaucrat 
W
a
sh
in
g
to
n
 
Kittitas 
County 
May 18, 2015 “Basinwide water plan 
aims for long-range solution” in the 
Ellensburg Daily Record 
Urban Eberhart Kittitas 
Reclamation Board 
Director (also participant 
in the Yakima Integrated 
Plan) 
Local 
Bureaucrat 
April 11, 2015 “Residents, county at 
odds over Lake Kachess reservoir” in 
the Ellensburg Daily Record 
Gary Berndt County 
Commissioner 
Local Elected 
Official 
Note: The following cases did not have climate adaptation on the agenda: The City of Greer, SC, the City of Mauldin, SC, 
and Oconee County SC.  The following cases had climate change on the agenda, but it was discussed infrequently enough that 
it was deemed to be low salience: Craven County, NC, the City of Havelock, NC, the City of New Bern, NC, the City of Fort 
Pierce, FL, the City of Fernley, NV, Grant County, WA, the City of Yakima, WA, and Yakima County, WA. 
2. Introduce Climate Adaptation during a Public Meeting  
The most direct (and public) way that an issue can be introduced onto the local agenda is 
to mention it during a public meeting. In council-manager or council-administrator forms of 
government, the agendas for these meetings are set by the council members and the local 
manager or administrator. The issues considered are often determined by current events but are 
also influenced by what local bureaucrats bring to the attention of a council member or the local 
manager. 
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There is evidence from the cases in this study that bureaucrats introduce issues directly 
onto the agenda. In three cases, bureaucrats independently brought up climate adaptation during 
public meetings:36 New Bern, NC, Pasquotank County, NC and Elizabeth City, NC. 
In New Bern, NC, climate adaptation never reached the agenda beyond one mention. 
However, the first-time climate adaptation was addressed – and the only time it was mentioned 
in a public meeting or other official documentation – was on December 13, 2011 when Planning 
and Inspections Director Mike Avery discussed a program run by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to address community 
resilience planning. The meeting minutes state: 
“…the city has been selected to participate in the EPA/FEMA Community 
Resilience Planning in a Coastal North Carolina technical assistance program. 
This will help the city use the best data to determine how climate change might 
impact local land use and infrastructure investments and to develop strategies that 
reduce vulnerability to known hazards, build long-term community resilience, and 
provide economic, environmental, and social benefits.” (Board of Aldermen 
Meeting, December 13, 2011) 
There appears to be no follow up on this by the elected officials and no comments from 
community groups or members. The only other times climate adaptation enters the local agenda 
are in the local newspaper37 and when a University of North Carolina graduate course capstone 
project was presented.38  
In Pasquotank County, NC, local Floodplain Manager Shelley Cox brought up climate 
change in a discussion of floodplain maps with elected officials (County Commissioners Joe 
                                                 
36 Local bureaucrats are present at local public meetings to provide information either on specific agenda issues or to 
be available in case a topic arises they can speak to. If a local bureaucrat is only responding to someone else 
discussing climate adaptation, they were not considered to be introducing the issue. 
37 “Commentary: Reform national disaster policy before the next storm strikes” in the Sun Journal August 25, 2014; 
“Letter: Climate change and the Clean Power Plan” in the Sun Journal June 2, 2015  
38 “New Bern Stormwater Management: An Integrated Low-Impact Design Approach” capstone for ENST 698 at 
UNC Institute for the Environment, Spring 2013.  
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Winslow and Bettie Parker) on December 7, 2015. The discussion was mostly about how new 
floodplain maps issued by FEMA would impact flood insurance premiums in the community. 
The meeting minutes state: 
“[Shelley Cox] said the state believes that these maps are more accurate than we 
had before.  She said she and other planners throughout the region have some 
concerns that these maps may take the reductions too far.  She added that these 
maps do not take climate change or sea level rise into consideration.  They are just 
storm modeling from hurricanes. … Ms. Cox said her concern is residents 
dropping flood insurance and then being flooded.  She said hopefully people will 
see this as an opportunity to reduce their flood insurance policies and not 
completely eliminate them. … She is a little disappointed because she feels the 
maps do not accurately reflect some of the areas that she feels there could be 
flooding.” (Board of Commissioners meeting, December 7, 2015) 
In addition to introducing the issue themselves, local bureaucrats can organize to have 
others present information to the elected officials at a public meeting. While the local bureaucrat 
is not speaking herself, she is using her position to make space for a message to be delivered. 
This happened in Elizabeth City, NC at the City Council’s January 25, 2016 work session when 
City Manager Richard Olson brought a group of University of North Carolina Chapel Hill 
students to present their capstone project on the likely impacts of climate change on sea level rise 
and flooding in the area.39 The meeting minutes state: 
“Mayor Peel recognized Mr. Olson for an overview of this matter.   Mr. Olson 
reported that present for the meeting were some of the members of a team from 
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  He advised that the team had 
performed an assessment of the vulnerability to sea level rise in Pasquotank 
County and had recommended a number of mitigation strategies to combat the 
issue. …  He noted that the presentation had been given to the Board of County 
Commissioners in November 2015; and based on that report, City staff felt it 
                                                 
39 A similar presentation occurred at the Pasquotank County Board of Commissioners meeting on November 15, 
2016. However, the county’s meeting minutes are not clear how the issue entered the agenda (e.g., at the request of a 
commissioner or a local bureaucrat). 
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would be appropriate to provide the information to the City Council.” (City 
Council Work Session, January 25, 2016) 
Later in the same meeting, one of the elected officials – Councilwoman Jean Baker – 
asked about the information from this presentation and asked if the city was going to follow-up 
on the students’ recommendations. From the city manager’s response, it seems unlikely that he 
will be heading any efforts to proactively address the issue because he emphasized existing 
policies that address current flooding concerns. City Manager Olson did follow-up on the 
presentation in a few weeks in his weekly memo to the elected officials on January 29, 2016. 
However, he again did not present any long-term planning efforts to address climate adaptation, 
only a focused effort on one development project.  
“Additionally, and at Council’s suggestion, I have shared with GEI’s project 
engineer details from the UNC Sea-Level Rise Study recently presented to the 
City of Elizabeth City. The MGP site is one of several properties in the Knobbs 
Creek area to be affected by potential sea level rise. In order to mitigate saturation 
of the subject property and others nearby, I have suggested formation of a berm 
along the northern border of the MGP site. GEI nor Pivotal have committed to 
this suggested storm water management improvement.” (City Manager’s Weekly 
FYI, January 29, 2016) 
It is possible, then, that local bureaucrats will present information in public forums without 
supporting further action on that issue – as Richard Olson’s actions indicate. 
In only one case – New Bern, NC – a local bureaucrat introduced climate change 
adaptation onto the formal agenda. The issue was discussed by local bureaucrats in two other 
cases but was not introduced by the bureaucrats themselves: (1) in Pasquotank County, NC a 
local bureaucrat discussed climate change but only in response to questions about a related topic 
(floodplain maps), and (2) in Elizabeth City, NC the issue was on the public agenda without 
support from the City Manager who facilitated the presentation.  
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Bringing information about climate adaptation to local public meetings is done more 
often by elected officials and citizens. In Craven County, NC, Elizabeth City, NC, Pasquotank 
County, NC, St. Lucie County, FL, Martin County, FL, and Carson City, NV elected officials or 
citizens discussed climate adaptation on 17 separate occasions. Considering that for each of the 
18 cases in this study there are regular public meetings (weekly, bimonthly and monthly), there 
are relatively few mentions of climate adaptation. Public meetings do seem to be more the realm 
of elected officials and citizens for bringing up issues or topics of concern, and not where 
bureaucrats discuss issues or shape the agenda. This might be one reason why local bureaucrats 
are overlooked as important policymakers – their efforts are not as clearly documented or visible. 
Meeting minutes show bureaucrats’ role as more supportive than leading the policy discussion. 
However, as the next sections will show, bureaucrats are shaping local discussions about climate 
change more ‘behind the scenes’ than at public meetings.  
3. Bureaucrats Write Policy Language and Policy Documents 
Local bureaucrats are often responsible for both drafting policy language or writing 
planning documents, as well as researching what is required and recommended to be included in 
these documents. In this way, they act like congressional aides by providing information for 
council members to propose policies. This is especially true for complex policy documents like 
hazard mitigation plans or floodplain documents which are required by FEMA for disaster 
recovery and mitigation funds. 
From my interviews and readings of local government documents, the adoption of hazard 
mitigation plans or floodplain ordinances is often a response by the local elected officials to 
incentives attached to these policies. For instance, when a local community adopts a hazard 
mitigation plan, FEMA promises matching funds for the community in the aftermath of a 
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disaster, plus extra funds for disaster mitigation projects designed to reduce damage from future 
natural disasters (FEMA, 2017). Similarly, membership in the Community Rating System (CRS) 
allows localities to offer discounted flood insurance to residents (FEMA, 2017). However, local 
elected officials who want to participate in these programs do not craft documents. Interpreting 
requirements from superior governments, researching, collecting data, and crafting language are 
left to bureaucrats (and increasingly contractors hired by local governments to help write these 
documents. See Peters, 1994; Peters & Pierre, 1998 for a discussion of the “hollowing out” of 
government services). Local officials are consulted during the process and they approve or reject 
the final project but are not directly involved in the creation of these documents. Thus, it is often 
in local bureaucrats’ power to make decisions about if or how to address non-required elements 
like the influence of climate change on the community and the need to adapt.   
In seven cases – Havelock, NC, Martin County, FL, St. Lucie County, FL, Greenville 
County, SC, Grant County, WA, Kittitas County, WA, and the City of Yakima, WA – the first-
time climate adaptation was on the formal agenda it was written into planning or policy 
documents written by local bureaucrats. In an additional three cases – Carson City, NV, 
Pasquotank County, NC, and Craven County, NC – climate adaptation was included in these 
documents although it was not the first mention. As shown in Table 6: Planning Documents, 
climate adaptation appears in a variety of documents written by bureaucrats including hazard 
mitigation plans,40 land use plans, and a water system report. 
 
                                                 
40 Also called Local Mitigation Strategies (in Florida) and Emergency Management Plans (as in the case of Martin 
County). 
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Table 6: Planning Documents Written By Bureaucrats which Mention Climate 
Adaptation 
Case Date Type of Document 
First Mention of 
Adaptation 
Havelock, NC June 2009 Comprehensive Land Use Plan Yes 
Craven, NC October 2009 
Coastal Area Management Act Land Use 
Plan 
No 
St. Lucie County, 
FL 
March 2010 Local Mitigation Strategy Yes 
October 2010 
Comprehensive Plan: Coastal 
Management Element 
No 
Carson City, NV 
November 2010 Hazard Mitigation Plan No 
September 2015 Hazard Mitigation Plan Update No 
City of Yakima, 
WA 
June 2011 Water System Report Yes 
Kittitas County, 
WA 
October 2012 Hazard Mitigation Plan Yes 
Martin County, FL 
November 2013 
Comprehensive Emergency Management 
Plan 
Yes 
October 2015 Local Mitigation Strategy No 
Grant County, WA December 2013 Hazard Mitigation Plan Yes 
Greenville County, 
SC 
January 2015 
Multi-jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation 
Plan 
Yes 
Pasquotank, NC March 2015 
Albemarle Regional Hazard Mitigation 
Plan 
No 
 
3.1 Land Use Plans 
Including sea level rise in a planning document can guide future land use decisions, 
potentially prompting zoning or development decisions which discourage development in areas 
at risk of flooding related to sea level rise or encouraging water smart development sensitive to 
drought risk. The main strength of incorporating climate adaptation through land use planning is 
that the document is written by bureaucrats and for bureaucrats to interpret during 
implementation. This insulates climate adaptation from political debates which might otherwise 
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prevent progress. There are three cases where climate adaptation was incorporated into land use 
or comprehensive planning documents. 
The first case where climate adaptation was incorporated is Havelock, NC. The city’s 
Comprehensive Land Use Plan was finalized in June 200941 and is a 304-page document 
outlining “long-term, sustainable growth in the community,” (p. 1-2). It was written by two 
contracted consultants for land planning – Matt Noonkester and Erin Musiol – and local planning 
director Scott Chase. The document was crafted with input from citizens and local elected 
officials. It mentions sea level rise twice: 
“The City of Havelock will continuously monitor the effects of sea level rise and 
update land use plan policies as necessary to protect the city's public and private 
properties from rising water levels. Annual report documenting the effects of sea 
level rise; revisions to the land use plan based on the conclusions and 
recommendations from this report.” (p. 278) 
“The City of Havelock will support bulkheading on the mainland to protect its 
shoreline areas from intruding water resulting from rising sea level. Number of 
bulkheads constructed on the mainland to protect the shoreline since 1996.” (p. 
279). 
Nearby Craven County, NC also included climate adaptation in their land use plan. Their 
Coastal Area Management Act Core Land Use Plan was finalized in October 2009, and like the 
Havelock Plan was written by local bureaucrats working with contracted consultants. Holland 
Consulting Planners worked with local bureaucrats in the Planning and Inspections Department 
to craft the 258-page document. It includes four mentions of monitoring and preparing for sea 
level rise, but does not plan for any specific actions: 
                                                 
41 Dates when the document was finalized are reported instead of dates when the documents were written because 
crafting these documents takes many years. 
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 “Craven County will continuously monitor the effects of sea level rise and update 
the land use plan policies as necessary to protect the county’s public and private 
properties from rising water levels.” (p. 145) 
“Craven County recognizes the uncertainties associated with sea level rise.  The 
rate of rise is difficult to predict.  Thus, it is difficult to establish policies to deal 
with the effects of sea level rise.  Craven County supports cooperation with local, 
state, and federal efforts to inform the public of the anticipated effects of sea level 
rise.” (p. 154) 
“Craven County will rely on the North Carolina Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources, Division of Coastal Management to monitor and regulate 
development in areas susceptible to sea level rise and wetlands loss.” (p. 154) 
“Craven County will support bulkheading to protect its shoreline areas from 
intruding water resulting from rising sea level.” (p. 155). 
No subsequent documents in Havelock or Craven County discuss climate change or sea level 
rise. This could be due to the changing attitudes of the North Carolina legislature which became 
more opposed to climate change action starting in 2012 (for a more detailed description of this 
and state-local dynamics in North Carolina see Chapter 5, Section 3.1). 
St. Lucie County’s (FL) Comprehensive Plan was written by the planning division led by 
Planning and Development Services Director Leslie Olson and Planning Manager Bonnie 
Landry and completed in October 2010; it also mentions the threat sea level rise poses to the 
county in the Coastal Management Element section. It focuses on documenting and monitoring 
sea level rise data as a basis for future actions:  
“The County shall continue to monitor all credible climate change and sea level 
rise data and what direct and potential effects this has on the coastal system 
natural resources. Based on this data the County shall evaluate and update the 
resource protection standards of the Land Development Code and this plan as 
necessary.” (p. 5-17) 
“Policy 5.2.1.6 - The County shall consider the most current and credible sea level 
rise data when planning long term infrastructure and capital improvement 
expenditures and land use amendments in areas less than 10 feet in elevation.” (p. 
5-25) 
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In St. Lucie County, climate change and sea level rise come up again and again including in the 
county’s Local Mitigation Strategy (2010 and 2016 updates, discussed more with other hazard 
mitigation plans below). It is clear that the Comprehensive Plan’s treatment of climate change 
and sea level rise reflect local commitments, at least among the local bureaucrats. 
3.2 Disaster Preparation and Mitigation Documents 
Disaster preparation and mitigation documents are prepared by bureaucrats and 
predominately used by bureaucrats, much like land use plans. While the literature faults these 
documents as exercises in completing checklists rather than thoughtful hazard planning efforts 
(Godschalk, 1999; Birkland T. A., 2009), I argue that because these documents are mostly used 
by bureaucrats, the exercise is useful in raising awareness among bureaucrats about the threats 
from climate change including flooding, drought, wildfires, and severe storms. By including 
information about how climate change will impact disaster frequency and severity and how the 
community can respond to these threats, hazard mitigation plans can encourage climate 
adaptation driven by emergency managers. For instance, connecting climate change to 
increasingly severe and more frequent floods can lead emergency managers to recommend flood 
management strategies like preserving green space or turning lots into green space instead of 
rebuilding structures after a flood (called Severe Repetitive Losses by FEMA (FEMA, 2015)).42   
In the seven cases where climate adaptation is incorporated into hazard mitigation plans, 
there is a range from plans that quickly mention climate change as a general threat to plans that 
incorporate climate threats in every section and for every hazard the document addresses. The 
                                                 
42 FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grants often provide the funds necessary to purchase lots that have been repeatedly 
damaged by floods. The goal is to turn these lots into non-inhabited spaces to reduce the human and property losses 
associated with flooding. 
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extent to which climate adaptation is addressed in the plan reflects how committed the 
bureaucrats are or how much pressure they faced to include climate adaptation in the plan. 
Greenville County’s (SC) Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan, January 2015 
Update contains a single paragraph referencing climate change’s impacts on the county:  
“Greenville County acknowledges that climate change can have an impact on 
hazards affecting the County. Over time, the County may experience more intense 
rainfall events and droughts of longer duration. However, it is not anticipated that 
climate change will have a significant impact during this planning cycle. Issues 
regarding climate change will be considered again in the next planning cycle.” (p. 
6-2) 
Interviews with members of the county’s emergency management team indicate that they believe 
climate change will be a larger part of their hazard mitigation efforts, but they had not done 
enough research to include details in their most recent update to the hazard mitigation plan.43 
“That is the next big thing that we've been told by a number of folks in some of 
the other regulatory agencies, and by doing a lot of research, that climate change 
will be the next thing that we have to deal with.” (Interview with Paula Gucker, 
October 29, 2015) 
“So it is better to plan for something [like climate change] and it not happen than 
obviously not plan and it does. We need to address that. And again this whole 
document is to try to help Greenville County citizens to be safer and more 
prepared.” (Interview with Brian Bishop, November 9, 2015) 
While Greenville County, SC barely mentioned climate change, the hazard mitigation 
plan covering Pasquotank County, NC goes into more depth to address climate adaptation. 
Pasquotank County is a member of the Albemarle Region in North Carolina’s northeast corner. 
They joined with 24 other local governments to craft the Albemarle Regional Hazard Mitigation 
Plan, published in March 2015. While the local bureaucrats in Pasquotank County were not the 
                                                 
43 Under FEMA rules, hazard mitigation plans need to be updated every 5 years for the locality to remain eligible for 
disaster mitigation funds (FEMA, 2013). 
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principals in writing the documents – that task was completed mostly by the Wooten Company, a 
planning consultant firm – Pasquotank’s previous hazard mitigation documents were used to 
craft the Albemarle Plan and two representatives from Pasquotank County participated in 
developing the plan: Emergency Management Coordinator Christy Saunders and Floodplain 
Manager Shelley Cox. The document does not extensively address climate adaptation, but it does 
discuss how climate change is likely to impact flooding from sea level rise: 
“Sea level rise may impact the frequency and severity of these hazards in the 
future. Sea level rise occurs when the oceans warm or ice melts, bringing more 
water into the oceans. ... There is strong evidence that global sea level is now 
rising at an increased rate and will continue to rise during this century.” (p. 7) 
“Additional factors involved in coastal erosion include human activity, sea-level 
rise, seasonal fluctuations and climate change.” (p. 29)  
The Albemarle Plan does not develop a strategy for addressing sea level rise. It is merely 
bringing attention to the threat. 
St. Lucie County and Martin County in Florida go beyond the brief treatment that 
Greenville, SC and the Albemarle Regional Hazard Mitigation Plans gave climate adaptation. 
Both St. Lucie and Martin counties include information about how climate change, and more 
specifically sea level rise, is likely to hurt their communities. 
The St. Lucie County’s 2010 Hazard Mitigation Plan44 discusses the impacts of climate 
change on severe storms and hurricanes, pointing to the potential for warmer temperatures to 
lead to stronger storms (March 2010, p. 84-85) and the impacts of sea level rise on coastal area 
development (August 2010 update). In the county’s 2016 update to their Local Mitigation 
                                                 
44 Written by William Hoeffner the Local Mitigation Strategy Coordinator and the Grants/Disaster Recovery 
Division.  
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Strategy,45 climate adaptation – specifically dealing with the threat that sea level rise poses – is 
given more extensive attention. In addition to an entire section describing the threat sea level 
poses to the county (p. 145-149) and it links sea level rise to flooding: 
“The probability for future flooding in St. Lucie County is high, and based on 
recent rain events and potential climate change will continue to grow.” (p. 92) 
It also discusses climate change in relation to severe storms, storm surges, and hurricanes: 
“Global warming may cause changes in storm frequency and the precipitation 
rates associated with storms. A modest 0.9°F (0.5°C) increase in the mean global 
temperature will add 20 days to the annual hurricane season and increase the 
chances of a storm making landfall on the U.S. mainland by 33%. The warmer 
ocean surface also will allow storms to increase in intensity, survive in higher 
latitudes, and develop storm tracts that could shift farther north, producing more 
U.S. landfalls.” (p. 103) 
St. Lucie, FL’s plan discusses the threat in more detail but does not separate responses to 
flooding from responses to sea level rise-based flooding. The Martin County Comprehensive 
Emergency Management Plan,46 published in November 2013, discusses sea level rise: 
“Sea level changes can have a compounded impact when a flooding or storm 
surge event impacts coastal and inland areas. Adaptation of current structures, 
mitigation and/or managed withdrawal of structures in redevelopment activities 
can lessen economic and social impacts to County businesses, government and 
residents.” (p. 12-13) 
The plan does suggest strategies the county can adopt which specifically address responding to 
climate change. The county’s 2015 Unified Local Mitigation Strategy echoed these sentiments 
discussing sea level rise at length (p. 157-162) and how climate change will impact the number 
of hurricanes expected (p. 99).  
                                                 
45 Written by Tom Daly, the Local Mitigation Strategy Coordinator with the Department of Public Safety Division 
of Emergency Management and the Treasure Coast Regional Planning County.  
46 Written by the Emergency Management Department, led by Mike Ewing. 
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More extensive coverage of climate adaptation and suggestions for responses are present 
in the disaster preparation documents from Carson City, NV, Kittitas County, WA, and Grant 
County, WA. Carson City, NV’s Hazard Mitigation Plan was completed in November 201047 
and includes several sections discussing how climate change will change snowpack levels which 
are crucial for water storage in the area (p. 5-21). The document’s 2015 update (completed in 
September of that year) went into more detail about how the area needs to prepare for changing 
precipitation patterns (p. 5-21 to 5-22). Additionally, every hazard was evaluated for impacts of 
climate change, including predictions for more rain instead of snow in winter (p. 5-14), increased 
length and severity of drought (p. 5-14), higher temperatures linked to the spread of disease (p. 
5-33), a longer fire season (p. 5-56), and more severe winter storms (p. 5-45). The document 
goes onto make suggestions for how the community can respond to these threats, although it 
does not differentiate adaptation from other disaster preparation efforts. 
Kittitas County’s (WA) Hazard Mitigation Plan was completed in October 201248 and 
looks at climate adaptation for every identified hazard and includes a separate section on climate 
change where the threat is discussed holistically – considering how different climate threats 
interact. The document discusses drought and higher temperatures in depth. As drought will 
strain the already dry climate in Kittitas and increase forest fire concerns, the mitigation plan 
points to ways local planners can build on current projects to deal with these challenges: 
“The best advice to water resource managers regarding climate change is to start 
addressing current stresses on water supplies and build flexibility and robustness 
into any system. Flexibility helps to ensure a quick response to changing 
conditions, and robustness helps people prepare for and survive the worst 
                                                 
47 Written by Staci Giomi the Carson City Emergency Management Director, Gary Dunn from the Carson City Fire 
Department, and Karen Johnson from the State Department of Emergency Management. 
48 Written by Christina Wollman, a planner in the Kittitas County Department of Public Works and members of the 
Tetra Tech, Inc. consultant firm. 
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conditions. With this approach to planning, water system managers will be better 
able to adapt to the impacts of climate change.” (p. 8-6) 
Grant County’s (WA) Hazard Mitigation Plan update was completed in December 
2013,49 and like Carson City, NV and Kittitas County, WA, it addresses climate adaptation 
concerns for every hazard included in the plan. They also suggest that the best adaptation 
strategies local water managers can adopt for dealing with water shortages (one of the county’s 
biggest predicted problems) is to improve and maintain existing water storage systems (p. 11-8).  
Moving forward, it is possible that more plans will include climate adaptation. However, 
this is contingent on the Trump Administration’s actions. As Chapter 5 will discuss in more 
detail, FEMA’s move to integrate climate adaptation in their grant programs inspired many 
localities to start considering the impacts of climate change – and in some areas like Greenville 
County, SC this was the first time the locality started planning for the impacts of climate change. 
As FEMA’s approach to climate adaptation changes with the Trump Administration, fewer 
communities may be inspired to act. 
Hazard mitigation plans provided a space for bureaucrats – the main authors and users of 
the documents – to (1) think about what threats they will face from climate change and (2) 
explore strategies to adapt. Although they do not always lead to new projects, they represent 
local government policy on climate adaptation. 
3.3 Other Documents 
The final type of document written by bureaucrats that incorporates climate adaptation is 
a Water System Report from the City of Yakima, WA, completed in June 2011, it was written by 
Thomas Coleman, P.E. Consulting Services with the City of Yakima’s Water and Irrigation 
                                                 
49 Written by Grant County Emergency Management Staff Members: Sam Lorenz (Former Director), Sandi Duffey 
(Project Manager), and Joy Reese (Special Project Coordinator) with help from the Tetra Tech, Inc. consultant firm. 
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Division Manager Dave Brown. Climate change is briefly included as a stressor on the city’s 
water system because it will change water quantities (occasional floods and more frequent 
drought spells) and increase water temperatures making the city’s water supply hospitable for the 
growth of water-borne diseases (p. 4-44). The document warms that these threats will need to be 
dealt with but does not commit to specific strategies to do so. 
In conclusion, local bureaucrats bring climate adaptation onto the local agenda by 
including it in documents they write. Many of these documents are only read by bureaucrats,50 
limiting their agenda-setting power. However, this limit is inconsequential when bureaucrats are 
the ones changing policies – either by writing new policies and getting politician approval or 
changing policies through implementation decisions. 
Additionally, some of these documents are required to contain information about climate 
change by the state government (e.g. Washington State requires that hazard mitigation plans 
address climate change).51 Although bureaucrats did not independently choose to introduce 
climate adaptation on the local agenda, their actions do introduce the idea and can spur action. It 
should not be concluded that these bureaucrats will necessarily become advocates for climate 
action beyond the bounds of hazard mitigation plans or other documents. Conversely, in areas 
where state action prevents local governments from integrating climate adaptation into 
documents like hazard mitigation plans or comprehensive plans (e.g. North Carolina), it does not 
necessarily mean that local bureaucrats do not use other avenues to get climate adaptation on the 
local agenda or shape it once it is introduced – in ways I will address next. 
                                                 
50 This includes mostly local bureaucrats but sometimes state or federal bureaucrats who approve or comment on 
these documents so the locality can be eligible for state or federal grant monies.  
51 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of intergovernmental relations surrounding local bureaucratic behavior and climate 
adaptation policy development. 
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4. Bureaucrats Following-Up on Elected Official’s Ideas 
If bureaucrats do not introduce climate change adaptation onto the agenda first, it does 
not mean that they cannot or do not shape how that issue is presented and addressed on the 
agenda. As discussed earlier (see Section 3) local elected officials do not have the equivalent 
staff to a governor, or a state/federal legislator. Due to this, they often do not draft their own 
complete policies – they ask local bureaucrats to draft these policies. Filling in the details leaves 
significant space for bureaucrats to influence policies. 
Of the 18 cases, there was one case where local bureaucrats took a suggestion made by an 
elected politician as an opportunity to craft comprehensive climate adaptation strategies. While 
the local bureaucrats were not the first to introduce the issue of climate adaptation onto the 
agenda, their efforts shaped Martin County, FL’s climate efforts since. 
According to Anne Murray, the county hydrogeologist, Martin County’s efforts to 
address climate adaptation began with the formation of the Southeast Florida Regional Climate 
Compact in January 2010. Martin County is just north of Palm Beach – a member of the 
compact. The creation of the compact began a broader discussion of the impacts of climate 
change and sea level rise in southeastern Florida – a conversation which culminated in the 
creation of the Seven50 project which studied the economic future of seven south Florida 
Counties (Indian River, St. Lucie, Martin, Palm Beach, Broward, Miami-Dade, and Monroe52) 
over the next 50 years. This effort was a burst of activity to account for sea level rise: 
“And so as part of that effort, we did a vulnerability study - and basically – it’s an 
analysis: if sea level rises this much, between 1 and 3 feet - what infrastructure is 
going to be affected, where are we hanging out. So it gave us an overview of what 
                                                 
52 Palm Beach, Broward, Miami-Dade, and Monroe are members of the South Florida Regional Climate Compact 
and have been outspoken advocates for climate action (Bump, 2016; Burleigh, 2016).  
82 
 
that looks like and then what storm surge would look like on top of that sea level 
rise.” (Interview with Anne Murray, June 6, 2016) 
However, after this initial burst of activity, “it kind of stopped” according to Ms. Murray. 
The county was equipped with studies outlining the impacts of sea level rise but no actionable 
plans to counter the threat. Ms. Murray worked with a few colleagues – Deborah Drum, an 
ecosystem restoration manager, and Kathy Fitzpatrick, a coastal engineer – during this time to 
monitor sea level rise threats as well as any actions from other organizations.  
Eventually, the elected county commissioners, specifically John Haddox, became 
interested in the threat of sea level rise and asked this group of bureaucrats to start developing a 
more comprehensive picture of the sea level rise threat and how the county can respond to it. 
According to Ms. Murray: 
“… one of our commissioners ended up coming to one of these climate change 
summits. And he brought us all together and said, "I think we need to do 
something about all of this. We've got cities and counties that are more advanced 
in our planning at this than we are, and I think we need to start moving on this. 
We need to get our communities involved, we need to have more awareness, we 
need to have more of a plan." (Interview with Anne Murray, June 6, 2016) 
Ms. Fitzpatrick echoed this: 
“Yeah, I mean Commissioner John Haddox asked for information to be brought 
forward on sea level rise. And I think he's possibly the only commissioner to 
publicly express that, although certainly in one way or another it's been mentioned 
by other commissioners.” (Interview with Kathy Fitzpatrick, June 14, 2016) 
The commissioner’s interest and support led to a more robust effort to address climate 
adaptation in the county. According to Ms. Murray and Ms. Fitzpatrick, the county is putting 
together a comprehensive adaptation plan involving many county departments (planning, public 
works, engineering, growth management, etc.) which addresses direct threats like land loss from 
sea level rise to indirect threats like migration of people from southern counties which are 
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currently experiencing problems with sea level rise. (Interview with Anne Murray, June 6, 2016; 
Interview with Kathy Fitzpatrick, June 14, 2016).  
The involvement of the county commissioner expanded the effort from the three 
bureaucrats monitoring climate adaptation needs to the development of a comprehensive 
adaptation plan. While the commissioner’s requests on sea level rise and climate adaptation 
energized the effort, the work of the local bureaucrats shaped the policy itself.  
5. Conversations with Co-Workers 
Bureaucrats did not use public meetings to introduce climate adaptation. A potential 
reason for this is that bureaucrats are more likely to introduce new policy initiatives or advocate 
for new ideas in conversations with other government employees away from the public eye. 
Once these initiatives generate momentum, they are presented to the public. In this way, the 
conversations between government employees are an important facet of the local government 
agenda. 
While the transition from informal agenda53 to policy is more difficult when an issue is 
discussed informally by government employees the likelihood of policy action increases. 
Bureaucrats can bring up the issue of climate adaptation with their colleagues and raise the issue 
on the personal agenda of other bureaucrats or elected officials. This type of lobbying can help 
local bureaucrats build support for the idea of addressing climate adaptation. However, because 
this is a more informal path, discussions about climate adaptation are not sufficient for policy 
change. Co-workers often discuss a myriad of topics without acting on them. These discussions, 
                                                 
53 This is also referred to as a systemic agenda or the universe of issues being discussed at any time (see Cobb and 
Elder, 1983; Anderson, 2011) 
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on the other hand, are necessary for policies that need cooperation between bureaucrats or 
between bureaucrats and politicians. 
In nine of the 18 cases in this study, local bureaucrats indicated that they are discussing 
climate change and the need for climate adaptation with their coworkers – either fellow 
bureaucrats or bureaucrats and elected officials.  
Often, local bureaucrats frame the need for climate adaptation in an acausal way, arguing 
that it does not matter why climate change is happening. The locality needs to respond anyway. 
For instance, Director of the Roza Irrigation District Scott Revell in Yakima County, WA said: 
“We talk about it every day. I mean basin-wide, our water plan ... is predicated on 
the fact that the climate is changing. And we could debate why it is changing and 
what you can do about it ... But, if it is changing, it is changing. It doesn't matter 
why, it just is.” (Interview with Scott Revell, September 16, 2016) 
Don Donaldson, the Director of Engineering in Martin County, FL made a similar remark about 
the impact of climate change and sea level rise: 
“Staff-wise, we look at [sea level rise]. I mean I think if you... basically if you 
look at the data, the State of Florida and the water level gauges has experienced - 
if I remember the data correctly - about 10 inches of sea level rise in the last 100 
years; and the land sank roughly 2 inches. So we had a one foot rise basically in 
100 years. And no matter whether we want to believe anything has to do natural 
climate effects or not, we're going to see at least that much or more. So the fact is 
that, yes, the water levels are incrementally changing.” (Interview with Don 
Donaldson, May 26, 2016) 
In Greenville County, SC, the local bureaucrats have been discussing climate adaptation 
in the context of updating their hazard mitigation plan. The county’s floodplain manager Brian 
Bishop had a discussion with members of the South Carolina Emergency Management Division 
about the need to eventually include climate change in their hazard mitigation plan. Although 
climate adaptation was only briefly mentioned in the document, Mr. Bishop’s recommendation 
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to Paula Gucker, the Assistant County Administrator for Community Planning (in charge of 
emergency management), and other Greenville County emergency planners led to a discussion 
about the impacts of climate change in the region and the need to integrate it into the next hazard 
mitigation plan update due to be finished in 2020. As Gucker describes: 
“It was discussions our floodplain manager was having with folks down at South 
Carolina Emergency Management Division. And then, he had done some research 
and he was doing a lot of reading – he's new – so he's been doing a lot of research 
to find out, what the heck is this stuff, and what are we doing here, and how are 
we doing that, and why? And through his research on EPA's site and other sites 
that he went on, and talking to folks, he found out that, "Uh-oh, this is the next 
thing that is coming." So we figured we would put it in there.” (Interview with 
Paula Gucker, October 29, 2015) 
In several cases, discussions about climate adaptation began when a neighboring area 
experienced extreme events linked to climate change like sea level rise and flooding in Miami, 
Florida and the “mega-drought” in California. For instance, the situation in Miami influenced 
conversations in Martin County, FL: 
“The other thing is that we've started to have some inquiries from newspaper 
reporters, T.V. reporters - "What is your sea level rise program?" And they are 
probably feeling a need to have an answer for that. I don't know if they told you, 
but the four counties to our south have been extremely proactive on climate 
change and sea level rise. And so I think that people are starting to look at the 
next county to the north to see what is being done.” (Interview with Kathy 
Fitzpatrick, June 14, 2016) 
It also came up during discussions with local bureaucrats in the City of Fort Pierce, FL (in St. 
Lucie County): 
“All we have heard for the three or four years out of South Florida, and we are on 
the fringes of south and central Florida, that the sea level rise and the all-time 
record tides that we are seeing within 50 miles of us to the South, and the horror 
stories that within 20 years a majority of South Florida will be under water. And 
that's a real concern. They are receiving, and I thought we had a high tide here 
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within the last 18 months that was extremely high.” (Interview with Marc Meyers, 
January 29, 2016) 
California’s mega-drought raised concerns over drought management in Carson City, NV: 
“And the term of 'mega-drought' and what are we going to do 20 years from now 
if we have a 20-year drought?” (Interview with David Bruketta, June 9, 2016) 
And in nearby Fernley, NV: 
“And you know, with California being right next door to us and we see all of the 
impacts, those are some indicators that are certainly considered. Because if it is 
there, it is not far away from us. And we share a river system, so that is important 
for us to consider.” (Interview with NV-Local Bureaucrat-282, June 15, 2016) 
In several cases, non-governmental organizations’ work on climate change inspired 
conversations about adaptation in the local government. For instance, Fernley, NV is 
participating in a program run by researchers at the University of Nevada Reno called “Water for 
the Seasons,” which addresses the water shortages expected in the Truckee-Carson drainage area.  
“[Climate change] is this big broad concept that they are addressing at the state 
level and again through the University of Nevada - that is kind of what that Water 
for the Seasons is addressing too - is the climate change and what that means. ... 
And part of that process was really looking at what happens if it is a super dry 
year and this is what the hydrology looks like and this is what the climate looks 
like, and what does that mean? So it has been kind of a team approach and all of 
the stakeholders involved are kind of running through those models and figuring 
out what that means for the system.” (Interview with NV-Local Bureaucrat-282, 
June 15, 2016) 
Similarly, the creation of the Yakima Basin Integrated Water Resource Management Plan (or 
Yakima Integrated Plan) spurred conversations about climate change in participating localities – 
several of which are in this study: Yakima County, WA, the City of Yakima, WA, and Kittitas 
County, WA. Responding to a question asking if climate change was part of the discussion 
around drought management, David Brown from the City of Yakima, WA said: 
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“There is a large program here called the Yakima Integrated Plan. And that is all 
of the farmers and the Yakima Nation - that's the Indian Tribe, cities, the Forest 
Service, the Fish and Wildlife Agencies. We've all gotten together and put this 
plan together about adding more storage, making more conservation available, 
doing all of this work. So there is a lot of talk about climate change. That has 
become one of the big parts of that plan. We know climate change is going to 
happen. We've decided that we don't argue why, we just know it is here. And it 
doesn't really, in the end, it doesn't really matter why it is here, it's here. And 
we're going... we know we are going to have less snowpack, we're going to have 
probably the same amount of water but it will come as rain instead of snow.” 
(Interview with David Brown, June 22, 2016) 
In these cases, elected officials often participate in these non-governmental organizations 
and are part of the discussion about climate adaptation with local bureaucrats. In a way, by 
participating in these non-governmental efforts, local governments contract out their adaptation 
planning to these organizations. 
Occasionally, worries about the politics (i.e. negative citizen feedback) of funding 
adaptation projects or imposing additional regulations stop these conversations before any 
further adaptation steps are taken. As David Bruketta from Carson City, NV said: 
“And we have looked at some of those concepts [like mega-droughts], and it's 
really scary because it involves a significant amount of money. So when that 
happens, a lot of people don't want to hear that. So we have looked at it, but no 
formal plans have been implemented.” (Interview with David Bruketta, June 9, 
2016) 
This sentiment was also reflected by Craven County, NC Department Head NC-Local 
Bureaucrat-823: 
“[Sea level rise] is a big level of concern. They are already doing a lot of studies 
on it. And there is a group out of Greenville, North Carolina … they've been 
doing something about sea level and sea level change and how it is going to affect 
local counties and planning and zoning for future development. And they are like, 
you maybe better start looking at it now, and might start changing where you 
allow and don't allow people to build now instead of having to deal with it in the 
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future. But I think when the money washes out, it will go away.” (Interview with 
NC-Local Bureaucrat-823, September 23, 2015) 
In localities in North Carolina, the attitudes of state politicians regarding climate change stop 
conversations about adaptation almost altogether.54 This sentiment came up a few times, 
including remarks from Shelley Cox in Pasquotank County, NC: 
“I don't know if you follow North Carolina politics, but our legislature the last 
few years has become extremely conservative.  They have changed a lot of 
development regulations, there is a lot less support for water management or any 
type of limits on development, so when you are talking sea level rise and sea level 
rise policy, it is regulations, and that is also a dirty word right now for our 
legislature.” (Interview with Shelley Cox, April 17, 2015) 
Landin Holland, a planning consultant who works with several Inner Banks55 communities to 
develop hazard mitigation plans and land use plans, said something similar: 
“Well, one thing that is quite interesting and intriguing is that, in our mitigation 
plans, under this cycle, under our current regime in terms of governor and our 
legislature, we are not allowed to acknowledge or discuss in any way shape or 
form sea level rise in these mitigation plans. I mean it is basically, I won't use the 
word illegal. But we are not allowed to discuss it. And if it is in there, the State of 
North Carolina State Office of Emergency Management makes you remove it 
prior to submitting it to FEMA.” (Interview with Landin Holland, September 11, 
2015) 
These conversations with coworkers about climate change adaptation shape the informal 
agenda by raising the issue on the personal agendas of other government actors. However, it can 
lead to real changes like in the Greenville County, SC case where discussion about climate 
adaptation among the emergency management staff led to studying the impacts of climate 
change for inclusion in future hazard mitigation plan updates. When these conversations about 
climate adaptation include elected officials, bureaucrats can build support for more extensive 
                                                 
54 For a discussion about why the state’s influence is this strong, see Chapter 5. 
55 North Carolina cases for this study all fall in the Inner Banks area: Craven County, Pasquotank County, New 
Bern, Havelock, and Elizabeth City. 
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efforts, like the Yakima Integrated Plan or the effort in Martin County, FL where a team of 
bureaucrats is building a comprehensive approach to adaptation.  
6. Special-Focus or General-Focus Bureaucrats 
Overwhelmingly, bureaucrats identified in this study as influencing the local agenda on 
climate change adaptation are bureaucrats with a special focus. They include planners, 
emergency managers, floodplain managers, water (and irrigation) managers, engineers, and 
public works and utilities specialists. As Table 7 shows, there are 40 bureaucrats mentioned in 
this chapter as influencing their respective local agendas on climate change. Of those, only five 
are categorized as general-focus bureaucrats.  
The large number of special-focus bureaucrats working on climate change indicates that 
local climate adaptation efforts are drawing on specific knowledge and research to craft these 
policies. These bureaucrats are often seen as experts in their subject areas (see Chapter 4 for 
more discussion of bureaucratic expertise) and this expertise is being drawn upon largely to craft 
policy rather than implement it for the emerging issue of climate adaptation. Additionally, 
special-focus bureaucrats can often avoid the polarized debate around climate change by 
focusing on the details of securing an adequate water supply, preventing damage and fatalities 
from flooding, and preparing the community for other threats from climate change.  
Table 7: Special- or General-Focus Bureaucrats 
State Case Name of Bureaucrat Position 
Special or 
General Focus 
N
o
rt
h
 
C
a
ro
li
n
a
 
Craven County 
Landin Holland Consulting Planner Special 
NC-Local Bureaucrat-823 County Department Head Special 
City of 
Elizabeth City 
Richard Olson City Manager General 
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Table 7: Special- or General-Focus Bureaucrats 
State Case Name of Bureaucrat Position 
Special or 
General Focus 
City of 
Havelock 
Scott Chase Planning Director Special 
City of New 
Bern  
Mike Avery 
Planning and Inspections 
Director 
Special 
Pasquotank 
County 
Shelley Cox Floodplain Manager Special 
Christy Saunders 
Emergency Management 
Coordinator 
Special 
F
lo
ri
d
a
 
City of Fort 
Pierce 
Marc Meyers 
Director of the Building 
Department 
Special 
FL-Local Bureaucrat-762 Lower Level Bureaucrat Special 
F
lo
ri
d
a
 
Martin County 
Anne Murray County Hydrogeologist Special 
Deborah Drum Ecosystem Restoration Manager Special 
Kathy Fitzpatrick Coastal Engineer Special 
Don Donaldson Director of Engineering Special 
Mike Ewing 
Emergency Management 
Department Manager 
Special 
St. Lucie 
County 
Leslie Olson 
Planning and Development 
Services Director 
Special 
Bonnie Landry Planning Manager Special 
William Hoeffner 
Local Mitigation Strategy 
Coordinator (2010 Version) 
Special 
Tom Daly 
Local Mitigation Strategy 
Coordinator (2016 Update) 
Special 
N
ev
a
d
a
 
Carson City 
David Bruketta Utilities Director Special 
Staci Giomi 
Emergency Management 
Director 
Special 
91 
 
Table 7: Special- or General-Focus Bureaucrats 
State Case Name of Bureaucrat Position 
Special or 
General Focus 
Gary Dunn Fire Department Special 
City of Fernley NV-Local Bureaucrat-282 City Department Head Special 
S
o
u
th
 C
a
ro
li
n
a
 
Greenville 
County 
Paula Gucker 
Assistant County Administrator 
for Community Planning 
Special 
Brian Bishop Floodplain Manager Special 
Robert Hall Floodplain Administrator Special 
Teresa Barber Codes Enforcer Special 
W
a
sh
in
g
to
n
 
Grant County 
Sam Lorenz 
Director of Emergency 
Management Department 
(former) 
Special 
Sandi Duffey 
Project Manager, Emergency 
Management Department 
Special 
Joy Reese 
Special Project Coordinator, 
Emergency Management 
Department 
Special 
Tim Culbertson 
General Manager for the Grant 
County Public Utilities District 
General 
Dick Erickson 
East Columbia Basin Irrigation 
District Manager 
General 
Kittitas County 
Christina Wollman 
Planner, Department of Public 
Works 
Special 
Kirk Holmes Public Works Director Special 
Jason Eklund Information Services Special 
Fred Slyfield 
Emergency Management 
Specialist 
Special 
Joe Gilbert Public Health Special 
Urban Eberhart 
Kittitas Reclamation Board 
Director 
General 
City of Yakima David Brown Water and Irrigation Manager Special 
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Table 7: Special- or General-Focus Bureaucrats 
State Case Name of Bureaucrat Position 
Special or 
General Focus 
Thomas Coleman Consultant Special 
Yakima County Scott Revell 
Director of the Roza Irrigation 
District 
General 
Note: No bureaucrats were mentioned from the City of Greer, SC, the City of Mauldin, SC, or Oconee County, SC because 
climate adaptation was not on the agenda in these three cases. 
7. Conclusion  
Local bureaucrats occupy a position in local government which allows them to influence 
climate adaptation as an issue on local policy agendas. As this chapter demonstrated, bureaucrats 
have more influence when they (a) have knowledge elected officials lack or (b) are working on 
low salience issue areas like emergency management56 and water management. 
While many different actors can be the first to introduce climate adaptation onto the local 
agenda, bureaucrats are often the first actors to discuss climate change. In nine cases bureaucrats 
were the first to mention climate change. Furthermore, bureaucrats play a large part in raising the 
salience of climate adaptation on the local agenda. However, bureaucrats are not the only actors 
involved in increasing the salience of the issue, indicating that bureaucrats do not often take on 
the role of policy advocate without support from other actors in local policymaking circles.  
These findings support hypothesis 1: Front-line local bureaucrats are more likely than 
elected officials to introduce climate adaptation into the local agenda. It is important to 
understand the ways that bureaucrats bring up the issue of climate adaptation. While bureaucrats 
are unlikely to use public meetings with elected officials as a venue to discuss climate 
                                                 
56 Unless there is a recent disaster, emergency management is often a low salience issue. It is only in the wake of 
disasters that attention is drawn to disaster mitigation efforts (Birkland T. A., 2006). 
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adaptation, they are likely to include climate adaptation in documents they write, in research they 
do at the request of elected officials, and in conversations they have with coworkers. Essentially, 
bureaucrats work on climate change in venues where they have more control and are not 
immediately scrutinized by either elected officials or the public. This happens for several (not 
mutually exclusive) reasons: 
1. Climate adaptation policy is complex and involves many local departments from 
emergency management to public works to engineering to planning (as demonstrated by 
Martin County’s attempt at a comprehensive climate adaptation policy). Bringing these 
actors together takes time behind the scenes. This work is not accomplished in public 
meetings where government presents ideas more than brainstorms them. 
2. Polarization around climate change can “chill” conversations about climate adaptation, 
but this does not happen everywhere (only in the North Carolina cases in this project). 
Often, bureaucrats side-step polarization by arguing that the cause of the problem does 
not matter, only the solutions to prevent harm in the community (i.e. Yakima County, 
WA and Martin County, FL).  
3. Climate adaptation is often seen as an expensive undertaking, which can lead to a lack of 
support for adaptation policies among politicians and citizens (i.e. Carson City, NV and 
Craven County, NC). 
4. Bureaucrats are often responding to the attitudes of superior governments on climate 
change (state or federal governments) while writing documents like hazard mitigation 
plans. Therefore, their efforts to set the local agenda happen as a response to other 
governments rather than bureaucrats deciding independently that climate change is a 
concern. (Addressed in Chapter 5 in more depth.) 
There is evidence that bureaucrats are shaping the agenda on climate change, and, more 
precisely, bureaucrats with specialized knowledge and with special-focus positions in local 
government are acting to shape climate adaptation policy. In other words, the data presented here 
support hypothesis 2: Bureaucrats with a special area of focus – e.g. water managers, floodplain 
managers, etc. – are more likely than general-focus bureaucrats – e.g. city managers – to 
suggest integrating climate adaptation into existing policy areas.. This is because most localities 
94 
 
are still researching what climate impacts they will face and how to address them. Bureaucrats 
with specialized knowledge represent important resources for gathering technical information 
requested by elected officials or information that local bureaucrats see as important in crafting a 
climate adaptation response. Furthermore, the focus on solutions to climate threats rather than 
the causes of climate change shifts conversation towards the technical rather than political, which 
helps avoid the partisan baggage associated with climate change. There is not just one type of 
specialized bureaucrat who works on climate adaptation. Local planners, emergency managers, 
floodplain managers, water (and irrigation) managers, engineers, and public works and utilities 
specialists all work on climate adaptation in the communities studied in this project. This 
indicates that local bureaucrats commonly recognize climate change as a threat and this is not an 
issue being pushed by one particular professional association or in the training for a specific type 
of position. Additionally, this speaks to the complexity of crafting local climate adaptation 
policies. 
 Building on the findings in this chapter which establish that bureaucrats have raised the 
issue on the local government agenda, Chapter 4 describes the tactics, strategies, and approaches 
bureaucrats use to develop climate adaptation policy. It looks at five general categories of action: 
(1) defiant behavior, (2) cooperative action, (3) politician-led action, (4) non-confrontational 
behavior, and (5) no action. 
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CHAPTER 4: HOW BUREAUCRATS ACT TO ADAPT TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN THEIR 
COMMUNITIES 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 3 established that local bureaucrats play an important agenda-setting function in 
local governments for the issue of climate adaptation. Their efforts to advise local leaders, craft 
policy documents, and bring attention to low-salience issues like emergency preparedness shape 
the local agenda and introduce the idea of climate adaptation at the local level. However, agenda 
setting is only the first step in crafting new policy. This chapter examines if and how bureaucrats 
take the second step: creating new policy or changing existing policy to address climate 
adaptation.57 
First, this chapter describes actions bureaucrats took to craft climate adaptation policy in 
their local governments. These are organized by the four forms of action bureaucrats can take: 
defiant behavior, cooperative action, politician-led action, and non-confrontational behavior. The 
behavior of bureaucrats in the sample who did not act to address climate change is also 
discussed. Definitions and examples of these are presented in Table 8. 
Second, I look at how bureaucrats act to adapt climate to climate change – either by using 
their expertise or crafting arguments about how to create adaptation policy. Hypothesis 3 states: 
local bureaucrats drive climate adaptation policy by providing issue-specific expertise about 
potential harms. It suggests bureaucrats recognize the power of their expertise and use it to shape 
policy. They provide information about risks from climate change in order to encourage adaptive 
                                                 
57 This chapter does not evaluate the benefits or drawbacks of the different approaches bureaucrats take to craft 
policy. I acknowledge that some policy approaches may be more successful than others. However, that evaluation is 
beyond the scope of this project and will be difficult to accurately assess until climate change has progressed to the 
point that adaptation is essential in many communities where different approaches can be compared.  
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responses to those risks. This hypothesis was overwhelmingly supported by the data with 15 of 
the 16 bureaucrats who addressed climate adaptation acting in this way. Hypothesis 4 states: 
local bureaucrats drive climate adaptation by arguing that climate change predictions can be 
integrated into existing policies rather than suggesting adaptation should be pursued through 
new policy areas. Hypothesis 4 suggests that bureaucrats will argue to integrate climate 
adaptation into existing policies rather than arguing for entirely new initiatives or programs. This 
study finds support for this hypothesis as well, but there were a few bureaucrats working on a 
comprehensive plan instead of integrating climate adaptation only into existing policies, 
demonstrating that not all bureaucrats are interested in addressing climate change only through 
existing policies. 
The data also suggest that bureaucrats use more than these two methods (using their 
expertise to highlight harms from climate change and arguing for integrating climate adaptation 
into existing policy). Bureaucrats also depoliticized climate adaptation by divorcing the causes of 
climate change (fossil fuel emissions, deforestation, poor land use practices, etc.) from the need 
to prepare for potentially devastating consequences from climate change. This shifts focus 
towards risk management conversations anchored in the precautionary principle (Applegate, 
2010; UNFCCC, 1992), and argues that the costs of doing something now to respond to climate 
change are lower than reacting to disasters like mega-droughts or devastating floods. 
Additionally, bureaucrats encouraged local participation in multi-stakeholder groups 
whose goals include climate adaptation. The rationale for joining these groups rests on other 
goals (like water management, cost-sharing, etc.) instead of climate adaptation. However, 
participation in the group encourages the local government to adopt climate adaptation practices 
as they cooperate with other stakeholders. 
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Third, this chapter evaluates the ability of the model presented in Chapter 1 (Figure 1) to 
correctly describe how bureaucrats acted based on their level of autonomy and the amount of 
problem definition agreement there is in the policymaking community concerning the need for 
climate change adaptation policy. The model presented in Chapter 1 (and replicated below in 
Figure 6) proposes that once bureaucrats decide to act to address climate adaptation in their 
communities, the form their action takes is shaped by the interaction of (a) their personal 
autonomy as a local government bureaucrat and (b) the amount of agreement members of the 
policymaking community have concerning the need to adapt to climate change. While the model 
correctly predicts the actions of 13 of the 16 bureaucrats, the three incorrect cases reveal flaws in 
the model including too much emphasis on bureaucratic autonomy and missing the important 
role of multi-stakeholder cooperative organizations. Corrections to the model are suggested for 
future research. 
Figure 6: Forms of Bureaucratic Behavior to Integrate Climate Change Adaptation into 
Existing Policies 
 
  Problem Definition Agreement  
  Low High 
Bureaucratic 
Autonomy 
Low  
Non-Confrontational 
Behavior 
 
example: guerilla bureaucrats, 
disgruntled bureaucrats 
Politician-Led Action 
 
example: traditional legislative 
or executive policymaking 
High 
Defiant Behavior 
 
examples: autonomous agencies, 
whistleblowers 
 
Cooperative Action 
 
example: collaborative 
governance 
 
 
98 
 
In sum, this chapter demonstrates that bureaucrats act to create and develop climate 
adaptation policy even in the conservative and small- to medium-sized communities this study 
focuses on. Bureaucrats use a variety of strategies to push climate adaptation policy development 
in their local communities with varying levels of success. How bureaucrats act is influenced by 
their level of autonomy, agreement with superiors about the need for climate adaptation policy, 
and their government’s participation in multi-stakeholder groups which address climate change 
adaptation among other goals. 
2. How Bureaucrats Act to Address Climate Change Adaptation in their Communities 
In this section I describe how the bureaucrats in my sample acted to integrate climate 
change adaptation into existing policies. First, I categorize bureaucrats’ behavior into the four 
types of action described in the theory chapter of this project: (1) defiant behavior, (2) 
cooperative action, (3) politician-led action, and (4) non-confrontational behavior. Those 
bureaucrats who did not act are also described.58 An overview of the forms of action are 
presented in Table 8. 
Second, I evaluate hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4 (described above). These hypotheses 
address the methods through which local bureaucrats drive climate change adaptation, mainly 
through providing issue-specific expertise about potential harms (hypothesis 3) and arguing that 
climate change predictions can be integrated into existing policies (hypothesis 4).  
2.1 Defiant Behavior 
Defiant behavior occurs when bureaucrats disagree with politicians on an issue but act to 
address it regardless. The key distinguishing factor here is that bureaucrats are aware of their  
                                                 
58 The theory chapter outlines the first four forms of action in more detail. The option of no action is included here to 
include those bureaucrats captured by the sample who did nothing to help their communities address climate change. 
More research and theorizing are necessary to explain why some bureaucrats act and others do not.  
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Table 8: Forms of Bureaucratic Action 
   
Form of Action Description 
Defiant Behavior 
Bureaucrats know that their superiors disagree with the local government 
adapting to climate change, but the they act anyway. 
Examples: write policy documents, change department policy, use discretion 
to change implementation of existing policies to make them fulfill adaptation 
goal while voicing need to adapt in front of elected officials 
Cooperative Action 
Bureaucrats work with politicians to address climate change adaptation 
through local government policy. Bureaucrats or politicians can initiate 
policy changes. Both bureaucrats and politicians stay involved in policy 
development past the initial idea to start addressing climate change. 
Examples: politicians work with bureaucrats at monthly meetings to create 
adaptation policy, politicians and bureaucrats become involved in a multi-
stakeholder organization to develop regional climate adaptation strategy 
Politician-Led Action 
Politicians initiate climate change adaptation policy development, but unlike 
cooperative action they do not stay involved. In other words, politicians 
“assign” climate change adaptation to local bureaucrats and wait for 
bureaucrats to finish the policy development on their own. 
Examples: politicians pass resolution to raise flood elevation levels to 
prepare for increased flooding – then leave to bureaucrats to enforce, 
politicians pass resolution ordering expansion of water storage capacity – 
leave to bureaucrats to find strategy to achieve this 
Non-Confrontational 
Behavior 
Bureaucrats take steps to adapt to climate change but try to avoid attention 
of politicians. Bureaucrats may avoid drawing the attention of politicians 
because they know politicians will disagree or they do not know the 
attitudes of politicians but do not want to involve them for other reasons. 
Examples: bureaucrats include climate adaptation in a document they write 
which politicians do not evaluate in-depth, bureaucrats use discretion to 
achieve climate adaptation goals through existing policies but do not 
announce to elected leaders 
No Action 
The bureaucrat does not take steps to address climate change adaptation 
through role as government employee. Bureaucrats can believe climate 
change is a problem. They can also think that their local government should 
do something to adapt. However, they are not doing anything themselves 
(either initiating or supporting someone else) to address the impacts of 
climate change. 
100 
 
superiors’ disagreement with the potential action, but they act anyway. This type of behavior 
includes actions ranging from writing documents which must be approved by superiors (e.g. 
planning documents, reports, etc.) which address issues politicians do not want addressed or 
disagree with, to bureaucrats changing how they implement existing policies to integrate an 
adaptation goal (e.g. enforcing a higher flood standard, seeking more water storage or water 
rights). For a bureaucrat to act defiantly, she needs to be aware of politicians’ attitudes on an 
issue. This means that her superiors need to have vocal positions – either in public forums or in 
conversations with the bureaucrat. Overall, I would not expect defiant behavior to happen often. 
Many people are conflict-averse and there is a norm in the US where bureaucrats do not make 
policies unless they have democratic support from public opinion or elected officials. The policy 
studies literature and the bureaucratic behavior literature demonstrate that this norm 
oversimplifies what policymaking is, but the norm discourages bureaucrats from acting in ways 
they might think are “political.”  
Planning Director Shelley Cox from Pasquotank County, NC was the only bureaucrat in 
the sample to demonstrate defiant behavior. Among Ms. Cox’s job responsibilities is floodplain 
management (i.e. making sure that homes and businesses are not in the path of frequently or 
regularly occurring floodwaters). Climate change is likely to increase flooding in Pasquotank 
County through a combination of increased precipitation events and sea level rise. Ms. Cox 
acknowledged that sea level rise and climate change are threats to the area: 
“We also have sea level rise now to kind of start thinking about because we're 
hearing more and more that with sea level rise, particularly for areas like ours 
where we are already pretty low, and we could definitely see some tremendous 
flooding impacts from that in the future as well. … There has been a little bit of 
reluctance politically to even admit that that is even happening.  But I think in the 
future, that is going to be something that we're going to have to really address.  
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It’s not a matter of if; it is a matter of when.” (Interview with Shelley Cox, April 
17, 2015) 
The local politicians – along with the state government – in 2013 to 201559 were actively trying 
to stop efforts to integrate sea level rise predictions into flood management and minimize any 
predictions of sea level damages. Ms. Cox was aware of this, she said: 
“North Carolina has been a little bit more hesitant to even discuss that issue, 
because politically it is kind of a dirty word when you start to talk about sea level 
rise and climate change. … It is definitely at the state level, to some degree it is at 
the county level too.” (Interview with Shelley Cox, April 17, 2015) 
Additionally, the Board of Commissioners unanimously supported a resolution on April 
2, 2012 which uses a lower predicted rate of sea level rise (that does not consider climate change 
predictions) instead of the original 39-inch prediction released by the North Carolina Coastal 
Area Management Commission (Rawlins, 2012; WUNC News, 2014). The resolution cites the 
“irreparable economic harm to the coastal plain of North Carolina by adversely changing 
land/property values, uses, insurances, and construction/maintenance costs of both private and 
public infrastructure,” that the higher sea level prediction would have produced.60 
Despite the strong signals sent from the Board of Commissioners, Ms. Cox worked with a 
group of UNC Chapel Hill students to complete a study of the impact of sea level rise in 
Pasquotank County. She helped the students present their findings to the Board of 
Commissioners on November 16, 2015 and advocated for the county to adopt several of their 
recommendations. Three weeks after the UNC student presentation, Ms. Cox presented 
                                                 
59 As described in the methods chapter (2), bureaucratic action is considered in a limited time frame around the time 
the interview took place. This time-frame is 2010 to 2016 for all bureaucrats, although the moment of the interview 
is considered as well to contextualize bureaucrats’ remarks. Ms. Cox was interviewed in April 2015. 
60 The Pasquotank County Board of Commissioners also had previously been members of the NC-20 advocacy 
organization which lobbied against sea level rise and climate change adaptation measures in the state legislature. 
They discontinued their membership by 2012 when this resolution was signed, but it does not appear this was done 
because the Board of Commissioners disagreed with the organization’s stance on climate change.  
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information to the Board of Commissioners about new floodplain maps from FEMA. During this 
December 7, 2015 meeting, Ms. Cox lamented that the new maps might lead some residents to 
drop flood insurance when they are still at risk due to sea level rise and climate change – two 
factors which the maps did not take into consideration. 
Ms. Cox’s behavior is defiant because she is aware that the local elected officials do not 
support working to address climate change, but she still advocated for local efforts to consider 
the impacts of climate change. Her choice to work with the UNC students shows she is willing to 
be creative in finding ways to elevate the issue in the county. 
The Board of Commissioners did not rebuke Ms. Cox as far as the data show,61 so it is 
likely that her position as an expert and a long-standing member of the Pasquotank County staff 
helped her act in this way. However, it does not appear that she convinced the board to take up 
the issue of sea level rise adaptation because they have not taken any steps to act since her 
actions in late 2015.62 
2.2 Cooperative Action 
Cooperative action occurs when bureaucrats and politicians work together to develop or 
change policy. This can include instances where bureaucrats initiate a policy change idea (a new 
policy tool, a new approach to a problem, or recognizing a new problem that needs policy 
solutions) or instances where politicians initiate the effort. Cooperative action occurs when the 
bureaucrats and politicians are involved in discussions, work-groups, etc. to create or change 
policy. It is distinguishable from politician-led action in that cooperative action is a collaborative 
                                                 
61 Ms. Cox was interviewed on April 15, 2015 before she helped the UNC students present information on climate 
change, so the researcher did not hear Ms. Cox’s personal account of these events.  
62 In an email exchange in April 2018, Ms. Cox said that the commissioners’ eyes were opened to the county’s sea 
level rise and flooding risk by the students’ presentation. However, the cost and difficulty of taking action meant the 
issue was dropped shortly after the students’ presentation. 
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effort whereas politician-led action looks more like a teacher giving an assignment to her 
students. While students can express creativity, and use their own knowledge in completing the 
assignment, they were not responsible for the genesis of the ideas surrounding the assignment. In 
cooperative action, a more collaborative approach is used. Bureaucrats and politicians work 
together to define the problem and pursue solutions. Since it is a collaborative effort, politicians 
are not hands-off here. They stay involved in developing solutions. 
There were six bureaucrats from four communities who acted to address climate 
adaptation in a cooperative way: NV-Local Bureaucrat-282 and NV-Local Bureaucrat-895 from 
Fernley, NV; Public Works Director Mark Cook from Kittitas County, WA; Water and Irrigation 
Manager David Brown from the City of Yakima, WA; and Direct of the Roza Irrigation District 
Scott Revell and Senior Natural Resource Specialist Joel Freudenthal from Yakima County, WA. 
In the four cases in this study where local bureaucrats engaged in cooperative action on 
climate adaptation with their superiors, multi-stakeholder partnerships helped facilitate this 
cooperation. Highly limited water supplies in Nevada and Washington led to litigation, and two 
multi-stakeholder partnerships – Water for the Seasons in Nevada and the Yakima Basin 
Integrated Plan in Washington – formed in its wake to help resolve existing litigation and 
prevent future lawsuits.  
Fernley, NV is a participating local government in the University of Nevada, Reno’s 
(UNVR) Water for the Seasons project. The project began in 2014 with funding from the 
National Science Foundation and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Its mission is to bring 
together scientists from UNVR, community water managers, and water rights holders in the 
Truckee-Carson River System to model and develop strategies for responding to drought and 
flooding problems that climate change will cause in the basin (Water for the Seasons, 2016). 
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Climate change is the principle goal of the group, but its efforts include drought and flood 
management strategies that are needed regardless of a changing climate. 
Elected officials and bureaucrats from the City of Fernley are active participants in the 
Water for the Seasons project in the roles of (a) community water managers and (b) holders of 
significant groundwater rights in the basin. Both NV-Local Bureaucrat-282 and NV-Local 
Bureaucrat-895 work with the Water for the Seasons group to develop strategies to deal with 
significant droughts predicted by climate change models. Additionally, NV-Local Bureaucrat-
282 and NV-Local Bureaucrat-895 participate in the city’s water team. The city’s water team is 
composed of the city manager, water rights manager, public works director, water attorney, and 
water engineer. This team meets weekly to address water supply concerns for the city, and every 
month they meet with at least two members of the city council to discuss water policy 
development. 
These two meeting structures keep politicians and bureaucrats in Fernley actively 
involved in policy development. The local politicians and the local bureaucrats both feel 
responsibility for being involved and crafting successful policy responses to climate change 
driven drought in the area. Furthermore, by involving partners in the larger basin area (including 
other municipalities and indigenous governments), Fernley benefits from a basin-wide strategy 
instead of facing a tragedy of the commons problem where their efforts are undermined by 
others’ actions in the basin (Hardin, 1968). 
A similar story played out in the Yakima River basin in South Central Washington. The 
Yakima Basin Integrated Water Resource Management Plan (referred to commonly at the 
Integrated Plan in the region) is a unique collaborative partnership to manage water use, 
environmental protection, agriculture, recreation, and historical water rights of the indigenous 
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people: the Yakima Nation. The project officially began in 2009 and emerged from the effort of 
Ron Van Gundy63 from the Roza Irrigation District64 and Phil Rigdon from the Yakima Nation 
who began working together to develop solutions to the area’s long-standing water shortages and 
conflicts.  
Van Gundy’s and Rigdon’s partnership led to a joint letter addressed to Derek Sandison – 
the Washington State Department of Ecology’s Regional Director for the Yakima Area – and 
David Kaumheimer – the Federal Bureau of Reclamation’s Director of the Upper Columbia 
Office. The March 31, 2008 letter implored the Department of Ecology and the Bureau of 
Reclamation to support a comprehensive effort to manage water in the Yakima Basin, bringing 
together actors who had been longstanding adversaries in water litigation battles. The letter ends 
with the follow recommendation: 
“We recommend that Ecology and Reclamation work with Roza, the Yakima 
Nation, and others with interest and expertise in water and fisheries management 
to construct a package of measures to solve problems of flow, passage, and 
habitat in the Yakima basin.” 
The letter was signed by Ralph Sampson, Jr. – the Chairman of the Yakima Tribal Council – and 
Ric Valicoff – the Chairman of the Roza Irrigation District Board of Directors – but was widely 
understood to be the work of Van Gundy and Rigdon. 
The next year, the Department of Ecology created the Integrated Plan by bringing 
together representatives from the Yakima Nation, irrigation districts, environmental 
                                                 
63 Ron Van Gundy served the Roza Irrigation District (one of the largest irrigation districts in South Washington 
state) for 40 years. Under his leadership, the area adopted scientific water management systems, low flow irrigation 
technology, and began the Integrated Plan. Van Gundy passed away in early 2017 and was widely heralded as a 
great water management innovator and local leader. He is credited for helping save the area’s agricultural systems 
from disaster during severe droughts during his 40-year tenure (Jenkins, 2017). 
64 Irrigation districts are special-purpose governments which help manage water resources, mainly in agriculturally 
dependent communities. They are governed by elected boards chosen by water users or water rights holders and 
administered by a small staff of local bureaucrats.  
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organizations, and federal, state, county, and city governments. The resulting group – the 
Yakima River Basin Water Enhancement Project Working Group (referred to as the Working 
Group) – has been working since 2009 on creating a balanced water management strategy. 
Recognizing the challenge that climate change poses to the basin – and the delicate balance they 
have achieved with the Integrated Plan – the Working Group has a committee focused 
specifically on climate change adaptation strategies. 
Yakima County, Kittitas County, and the City of Yakima are all participating local 
governments in the Integrated Plan and send representatives to the Working Group. During 
interviews with bureaucrats from these governments, they all referenced the Integrated Plan. Mr. 
Brown from the City of Yakima, said: 
“There is a large program here called the Yakima Integrated Plan, and that is all 
of the farmers and the Yakima Nation… cities, the Forest Service, the Fish and 
Wildlife agencies. We’ve all gotten together and put this plan together about 
adding more storage, making more conservation available, doing all of this work. 
So there is a lot of talk about climate change. That has become one of the big 
parts of the plan. We know climate change is going to happen. We’ve decided that 
we don’t argue why, we just know it is here. And it doesn’t really, in the end, it 
doesn’t really matter why it is here, it’s here.” (Interview with David Brown, June 
22, 2016) 
This attitude is common among water managers in the region. Mr. Revell from the Roza 
Irrigation District, echoed this sentiment: 
“We talk about [climate change] every day. I mean basin-wide, our water plan is 
predicated on the fact that the climate is changing. And we could debate why it is 
changing and what you can do about it, but it is not a phrase that gets a lot of 
credibility amongst a lot of our growers. But if it is changing, it is changing. It 
doesn’t matter why, it just is.” (Interview with Scott Revell, September 16, 2016) 
By divorcing the causes of climate change from the impacts of climate change, it seems 
these conservative areas can begin tackling the issue. However, the role of the Integrated Plan 
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cannot be understated. Local elected officials from these governments – Yakima County, the 
City of Yakima, and Kittitas County65 – are active participants in the development of the 
Integrated Plan as well.  
The Yakima County Commissioners wrote a joint letter supporting the Integrated Plan, 
published on September 28, 2014 in the Yakima Herald-Republic. They argued that the project 
helps safeguard the economy of the area from agricultural losses during drought,66 and that 
droughts are more of a risk in a world with climate change. They write: 
“The governor made it clear that he is concerned about the worsening impacts of 
climate change on water supplies. These impacts have become a common refrain 
here. City water managers, farmers, and tribal leaders have all told us they have 
witnessed summertime water levels decrease as warmer temperatures cause the 
snowpack to melt earlier in the spring. Without our proactive water plan and joint 
participation, these variations in rainfall and snowpack will leave junior water 
rights, instream needs, and even senior water rights at risk.” (Leita, Bouchey, and 
Elliot, 2014) 
Similarly, in Kittitas County, Commissioner Paul Jewell has become a regular participant 
in the Integrated Plan’s Working Group and an advocate for the plan in his county. He regularly 
attends meetings of the Working Group. He also wrote a guest column in the local paper: the 
Ellensberg Daily Record on March 4, 2016 supporting the plan and arguing that the Integrated 
Plan’s efforts led to an easier experience with the 2015 drought season than would have 
otherwise occurred. 
                                                 
65 Mr. Brown from the City of Yakima, Commissioner Mike Leita from Yakima County, and Commissioner Paul 
Jewell from Kittitas County are the regular representatives from their local governments at the Integrated Plan 
Working Group meetings. However, they often bring others from their governments to these meetings as well. 
66 The Yakima basin is an incredibly productive and rich agricultural economy. The area produces high value crops 
including apples, cherries, grapes (wine), and hops (beer). Many of these crops take years (up to a decade) for the 
plants to produce. For instance, a hop vine takes five to eight years to become productive. Grape wines can take 
three years to produce. Crop losses from drought in this area have long-lasting negative impacts, especially for 
orchards, grape vines, and hop vines. 
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Commissioner Jewell’s involvement and knowledge was cited by Mr. Cook as a reason 
why their drought management and water management policies are developing well: 
“I think, we are benefitting from an elected body that has gone through this 
groundwater issue together, for the most part. So they have a good knowledge 
base. And so the conversation isn't just being driven on the staff-side. I think we 
have a unique situation where we have a fairly educated group of elected officials, 
and they are certainly very cognizant - they are very conversant - in the challenge 
of drought management in Kittitas County.” (Interview with Mark Cook, 
September 21, 2016) 
For both the Water for the Seasons project in Nevada and the Yakima Integrated Plan in 
South Washington state, local bureaucrats and their elected official superiors worked to address 
water management in light of climate change stressors. Through these multi-stakeholder 
collaborative organizations, local bureaucrats collaborated with their peers in other governments 
as well as with their local elected politicians. The long-term and large-scale nature of these 
projects likely inspires continued interest and involvement from elected officials who might 
move on from emergency management issues when there is not a current emergency to respond 
to. Furthermore, these organizations provide a venue wherein bureaucrats and politicians present 
a united front representing their local governments. In other words, it is an outside force that 
inspires cooperation within the government. 
2.3 Politician-Led Action 
Politician-led action describes policy development that is initiated by elected officials. 
Bureaucrats are significantly involved in the process, but they are not the actors who initiate the 
effort. This includes policies that are developed because a politician asks bureaucrats to 
investigate or research a new policy option the elected official has heard about67 or a new policy 
                                                 
67 In other words, the elected official is participating in policy diffusion. 
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idea. It also includes politicians asking bureaucrats to develop options (policies) to address a 
problem. In the case of climate change adaptation, a local politician may ask bureaucrats to 
develop solutions to a problem like sea level rise or mega-droughts. While the solution itself is 
not specified, the politician initiated the effort to develop policy. The most important element 
here is that the politicians initiate the effort to develop policy but are not active in subsequent 
efforts to develop policy.  
This form of action fits the expected pattern of politicians delegating work to bureaucrats. 
However, the local government context changes this dynamic from how it typically works at the 
federal level in the U.S. At the federal level, elected politicians write policies then pass them to 
bureaucrats to implement and fill in necessary details. Admittedly this is an oversimplified 
version of policymaking, but it differs from the local context because in local governments, 
bureaucrats are more active in writing policy before it is approved by elected officials. They also 
fill in the gaps after the policy is approved by elected officials. 
The three bureaucrats demonstrating politician-led action in this study were from one 
case (Martin County, FL): County Engineer Kathy Fitzpatrick, Director of Engineering Don 
Donaldson, and County Hydrogeologist Anne Murray. In this case, local bureaucrats started 
working on climate change adaptation after prompting from one local politician. Commissioner 
John Haddox asked three local bureaucrats to begin working on sea level rise adaptation after he 
attended a conference on the subject with representatives of other South Florida counties.68 As 
Ms. Murray described: 
                                                 
68 County Hydrogeologist Anne Murray stated that she and several other local bureaucrats had been aware of the 
need to adapt to sea level rise since the publication of the Seven50 report by the southeast Florida Regional 
Partnership in early 2013. The partnership comprises seven counties (Indian River, St. Lucie, Martin, Palm Beach, 
Broward, Miami-Dade, and Monroe) and is intended to plan for the next 50 years of economic development in the 
region. Ms. Murray and several others began monitoring and discussing the threat of sea level rise but did not begin 
any concrete planning at that time. 
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“There were some staff members including myself that have been following [sea 
level rise] because we know it is coming down. … We’ve been kind of checking 
in with each other on what has been going on and involving ourselves in other 
organizations. So, all of this is to say, one of our commissioners [John Haddox] 
ended up coming to one of these climate change summits. And he brought us 
together and said, ‘I think we need to do something about all of this. We’ve got 
cities and counties that are more advanced in our planning at this that we are, and 
I think we need to start moving on this.’” (Interview with Anne Murray, June 6, 
2016) 
After the encouragement from Commissioner Haddox, Ms. Murray began an inventory of what 
the county’s various departments were already doing to address climate adaptation, to serve as a 
starting point for crafting a comprehensive plan. She is working predominantly with Ms. 
Fitzpatrick and Deborah Drum – the county Ecosystem Restoration Manager. Both Ms. Murray 
and Ms. Fitzpatrick stressed that the project is going to require comprehensive planning and a 
combination of planning tools to achieve successful adaptation. They mentioned considering a 
wide range of issues from addressing loss of coastal land, to property damage for people living in 
flood-prone areas, to dealing with migrants from areas further south (e.g. Miami, Puerto Rico, 
the Florida Keys). While they do not have any concrete plans, they are beginning to work on 
formulating the policy. 
While Commissioner Haddox was working with members of the engineering department 
to craft a plan, other bureaucrats felt that existing policies were enough, at least for now, to 
address climate adaptation. Mr. Donaldson pointed to existing local flood management policies 
which can essentially self-update as sea levels rise. For example, local flood ordinances require 
homes to sit one to four feet above sea level (depending on their level of flood risk). As sea level 
rises, homes in the county will need to be at higher elevations to pass local requirements. This 
self-updating mechanism is dependent upon accurate sea level measurements and flood maps. 
Unfortunately, flood maps are not updated frequently enough to keep pace with climate-driven 
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sea level rise. FEMA acknowledges that their flood map updating process is slowed down 
(FEMA, 2014). Additionally, the maps can be challenged by local governments, do not take into 
account climate change models, and are built on historical data only which discounts the impact 
of climate change (i.e. the floodplains are expanding at a heightened rate) (Skibba, 2017). Mr. 
Donaldson described how sea level rise is happening in the county and a few commissioners “are 
asking about it,” but that on the whole the issue is still not discussed. Responding to the question, 
“Is sea level rise a big concern in Martin County?” Mr. Donaldson said: 
“Politically, no, it is not talked about. Staff-wise, we look at it. … We had a one 
foot rise basically in the last 100 years. And no matter whether you want to 
believe anything has to do with natural climate effects or not, we’re going to see 
at least that much or more.” (Interview with Don Donaldson, May 26, 2016) 
While the bureaucrats in Martin County were aware of the need to address climate change, they 
did not begin to put together a framework to actively address it until support emerged from an 
elected official. Ms. Murray said:  
“It has more weight when a commissioner gets interested in a program or you get 
public input that says "What are we doing on this?" It helps to put legs on it.” 
(Interview with Anne Murray, June 6, 2016) 
There is a chance that a cooperative relationship will evolve between the local 
bureaucrats and the local elected officials – especially if the Seven50 Plan or a different multi-
stakeholder cooperative group becomes more successful in organizing.69 However, without the 
                                                 
69 The Seven50 plan faced steep opposition from many community members. In the Martin County and St. Lucie 
County meeting minutes analyzed for this project, community members regularly came to speak about the economic 
growth that could be deterred by adopting the program, especially the elements that required adapting to sea level 
rise. 
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encouragement of Commissioner Haddox, it is unlikely the comprehensive approach to climate 
adaptation initiated by Ms. Murray, Ms. Fitzpatrick, and Ms. Drum would have begun.70  
2.4 Non-Confrontational Behavior 
Non-confrontational behavior describes a situation where bureaucrats act but do so in a 
way to avoid conflict with politicians. Bureaucrats know or assume they will face disagreement 
from elected politicians, so they pursue pathways for policy change using discretion, crafting 
departmental policies (which do not require supervisor oversight), and having discussions about 
future policy options but tentatively pursuing them.  
Non-confrontational behavior can include more overt actions to address climate change 
adaptation, but only when they are not presented defiantly to counter politicians’ wishes. For 
instance, if the elected officials and city manager in a city government do not voice opinions on 
climate change (either publicly or in a way the bureaucrat would be aware of their attitude), 
bureaucrats might integrate climate change adaptation into planning documents. Although these 
planning documents must be approved by elected officials, the choice from bureaucrats to 
integrate them “quietly” is a non-confrontational behavior. 
There were six bureaucrats from three cases who demonstrated non-confrontational 
behavior: Floodplain Manager Brian Bishop and Assistant County Administrator for Community 
Planning Paula Gucker from Greenville County, SC; Director of Building Development Marc 
Meyers and FL-Local Bureaucrat-762 from Fort Pierce, FL; and Deputy County Administrator 
Mark Satterlee and Stormwater Program Coordinator Jason Bessey from St. Lucie County, FL. 
                                                 
70 After the conclusion of data collection for this study, Commissioner Haddox lost his 2016 re-election bid. 
However, the bureaucrats’ efforts do not appear to have stopped. The county submitted an amendment to their 
comprehensive plan in September 2017, the entirety of which addressed sea level rise. 
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The bureaucrats who engaged in non-confrontational behavior in this study took small 
steps towards adapting to climate change but did not start any big new projects or initiatives. 
Largely, they acknowledged the threat posed by climate change in their communities but did not 
go out on a limb. Additionally, these actions were not significant policy efforts which will likely 
make an important difference adapting to climate change. 
In Greenville County, SC, Ms. Gucker acted on advice presented by Mr. Bishop to begin 
studying the impact of climate change as a hazard multiplier in their area. Mr. Bishop worked 
with representatives from federal government agencies including the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 
and the National Weather Service (NWS) in the creation of the county’s hazard mitigation plan 
2015 update. During his discussions, Mr. Bishop learned that climate change adaptation was 
likely to be required in future updates to the hazard mitigation plan. Furthermore, he believes 
there is a benefit in being prepared for worst-case scenarios that may arise from climate change. 
“Well, it’s just a hazard that whether or not you believe it or not we have to be 
prepared for. So if these El Niños and all this other stuff that is happening, and the 
water are increasing in temperature and things like that – if all of that comes 
about, if it actually comes about, we’ve got to know what the effect would be. … 
So its better to plan for something and it not happen than obviously not plan and it 
does.” (Interview with Brian Bishop, November 9, 2015) 
Mr. Bishop and Ms. Gucker both pointed to the October 2015 storm – Hurricane Joaquin 
– that flooded coastal South Carolina area as a case-in-point for being proactive. However, 
neither Mr. Bishop or Ms. Gucker made special efforts to bring climate change adaptation to the 
attention of elected officials.71 Climate change is not on the agenda of the county commissioners: 
                                                 
71 Hazard mitigation plan updates are shown to elected officials for approval. However, these hundred-page 
documents are often “rubber stamped” by elected officials.  
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there have been no mentions in public meetings, neither Mr. Bishop or Ms. Gucker had 
conversations with the commissioners about climate adaptation, and there were no mentions of 
the issue in conjunction with local government officials in the local newspaper. Furthermore, Mr. 
Bishop and Ms. Gucker gave no indication they knew what the commissioners thought about 
climate change. Essentially, Mr. Bishop and Ms. Gucker are taking some small steps, but not 
advertising them, fitting the definition of non-confrontational behavior. 
Similarly, Mr. Meyers and FL-Local Bureaucrat-762 in the City of Fort Pierce, FL are 
taking small steps to address the threat of sea level rise and climate change driven flooding in 
their community. Mr. Meyers and FL-Local Bureaucrat-762 began to worry more about sea level 
after hearing predictions coming out of the southernmost communities on the Florida peninsula – 
like Miami-Dade and Broward Counties. Mr. Meyers said: 
“All we have heard for three or four years out of South Florida, and we are on the 
fringes of south and central Florida, that the sea level rise and the all-time record 
tides that we are seeing within 50 miles to use to the South, and the horror stories 
that within 20 years a majority of South Florida will be under water. And that’s a 
real concern.” (Interview with Marc Meyers, January 29, 2016).  
Mr. Meyers and FL-Local Bureaucrat-762 are working with existing policies to start planning. 
For example, they are working to use the most up to date sea level data for evaluating home 
elevation requirements72 and other flood prevention measures. They discuss how sea level 
changes risk with builders and homeowners. FL-Local Bureaucrat-762 said: 
“We have discussed the risk of building at the current base flood elevation versus 
thinking about the future, and what that means for insurance and what it means in 
times of disaster. We have, when customers come in, we try to help them when 
they are smart enough to look about the flood zone. [We] try to recommend that 
                                                 
72 To qualify for the National Flood Insurance Program, local governments need to have specific requirements for 
structures in the floodplain. One requirement is elevating the first level of a structure a certain number of feet (often 
2 feet) above sea level to prevent regular flooding problems. This is referred to as “base flood elevation.” As sea 
levels change, the height of this elevation increases. 
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they try to find a location that is outside the flood zone.” (Interview with FL-
Local Bureaucrat-762, January 29, 2016) 
They are exercising discretion in a limited way to educate and encourage smarter, climate aware 
development in their community. They are not reaching out to property owners, only discussing 
climate risk with those who ask about their flood risk. However, neither Mr. Meyers or FL-Local 
Bureaucrat-762 are acting to engage elected officials. When asked if they had any conversations 
about sea level rise were with elected officials, Mr. Meyers replied with a flat “No.” The 
bureaucrats had no evidence that their actions run counter to the wishes of their superiors as there 
are no public mentions of sea level rise or climate change by elected officials in Fort Pierce. 
St. Lucie County’s bureaucrats are also engaged in non-confrontational behavior in 
addressing sea level rise and climate adaptation. Mr. Satterlee described how the county was a 
participant in several regional studies and has incorporated sea level rise into several existing 
policies: 
“We were part of a - several years ago there was a study that covered the seven 
counties of south east Florida called Seven50, and as part of that, we did some 
new mapping of projected sea level rise of one, two and three feet. A person on 
my staff worked with what is called the South Florida Compact,73 and they were 
all sort of doing this as sort of a subset of the Seven50 planning. So we did that 
work. And the Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council back in 2010 did a 
10,000 foot study of what sea level rise might entail.  
“And so while we've adopted some policies into our comprehensive plan specific 
to sea level rise, but between our flood elevation rules, our drainage rules, FEMA, 
NFIP - National Flood Insurance Program, South Florida Water Management 
District - all of this sort of web of things that we do. Whether it is a local 
mitigation strategy planning. We did a post-disaster redevelopment plan a couple 
of years ago. So we are kind of all around it in terms of trying to mitigate the 
impact of sea level rise. But certainly the biggest single thing that we do is we 
                                                 
73 Its formal name is the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact.  
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keep new development out of the floodplain. It is for the best. To the best extent 
we can.” (Interview with Mark Satterlee, February 24, 2016) 
However, the local bureaucrats are not taking many steps beyond what the regional studies 
recommended. Additionally, the county’s stormwater program coordinator – Mr. Bessey – said 
any significant action to address climate change would likely follow the state government’s lead.  
“So [sea level rise is] on our radar, at least it's on my radar, and it’s something we 
have to think about. … And again, we follow the state - whether it is stormwater 
or building codes or roads. So it would be a public decision and then the state 
would adopt it or argue about it, and over the years it would eventually come 
down to us.” (Interview with Jason Bessey, March 10, 2016) 
Like in Greenville County, SC and Fort Pierce, FL, the local elected leaders in St. Lucie County 
are not discussing climate change. Therefore, the limited steps Mr. Satterlee and Mr. Bessey are 
taking to address climate change are not intentionally defying the wishes of the local elected 
officials. 
Non-confrontational behavior occurred in these three cases where local bureaucrats did 
not know that their elected superiors would be upset with acting on climate change. The 
generally conservative political leaning of these areas might suggest that climate change is an 
unpopular topic, but as many bureaucrats have said in this study, climate adaptation is occurring 
despite opposition from some community members to the politics of climate change. Many 
localities are preparing for climate change because the consequences of not preparing are worse 
than taking some steps now to develop emergency management responses and smart 
development patterns.  
However, not all bureaucrats are taking this precautionary approach to climate 
adaptation. As the next section describes, many local bureaucrats have taken no action to address 
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climate change, even though some recognize the threat climate change poses to their 
communities. 
2.5 No Action 
Fourteen bureaucrats representing nine of the 18 cases did not act to address climate 
adaptation in their communities. They were (1) NC-Local Bureaucrat-823 and (2) Landin 
Holland, a consultant planner from Craven County, NC; (3) City Manager Richard Olson from 
Elizabeth City, NC; (4) Planning and Inspections Director Katrina Marshall from the City of 
Havelock, NC;  (5) Stormwater Engineer Amanda Boone and (6) Director of Public Works Matt 
Montayne from the City of New Bern, NC; (7) City Administrator Edward Driggers, (8) SC-
Local Bureaucrat-523, and (9) Stormwater Engineer Lillian Hanley from the City of Greer, SC; 
(10) Business and Development Services Director74 Kimberly Hamel from the City of Mauldin, 
SC; (11) SC-Local Bureaucrat-413 from Oconee County, SC; (12) Utilities Director David 
Bruketta and (13) NV-Local Bureaucrat-734 from Carson City, NV and (14) Emergency 
Management Department Project Manager Sandi Duffey from Grant County, WA. 
The reasons for inaction varied across the 14 bureaucrats. For two bureaucrats – Mr. 
Montayne and SC-Local Bureaucrat-413 – they said that climate change was not on the local 
government’s agenda implying that it was not their place to introduce the issue. SC-Local 
Bureaucrat-413 acknowledged speaking with peers about the issue, but did not believe it was 
going to affect Oconee County: 
“I mean, global warming and those things making storms more volatile, being 
more prepared for tornadoes, flash flooding and stuff. Um, [pause] not publicly. 
Not pushing, not a huge public conversation, but more of a say, me and another 
person just talking about when we are doing our hazard mitigation plan. Where is 
                                                 
74 The Business and Development Services department in Mauldin is in charge of planning efforts in the community, 
which includes flood management. 
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it going? Not, [pause] this is the reason why.” (Interview with SC-Local 
Bureaucrat-413, March 28, 2016) 
Others expressed that climate change was not going to impact their area, or at least not 
anytime soon. These bureaucrats were Ms. Marshall, Mr. Driggers,75 Ms. Duffey, Mr. Bruketta, 
and NV-Local Bureaucrat-734. Ms. Marshall did not believe that Havelock, NC was or would be 
seeing the impacts of climate change anytime soon. Mr. Driggers said that Greer, SC will prepare 
for storms, but he is less interested in the reasons why they might be as severe as they are. Ms. 
Duffey was confident that Grant County, WA’s water reserves were large enough that climate 
change driven droughts would not impact them. Similarly, in Carson City, NV, previous efforts 
to secure more access to water (water rights76) in the area77 gave the local bureaucrats confidence 
that climate change was not going to be a problem anytime soon. Mr. Bruketta credits the city’s 
former elected officials and city managers for helping secure water rights. He said: 
“I think that we are very fortunate that we can always improve something, but I 
think that, for the most part, there is nothing outstanding – and especially because, 
and again I have to give credit to our previous managers and electeds where they 
were very proactive in actively going after water rights years ago.” (Interview 
with David Bruketta, June 9, 2016) 
However, he expressed concern about the cost of preparing Carson City for the type of mega-
drought that hit California from 2011 to 2017 – the type of drought that is likely to occur more 
often with climate change. He said: 
“[Climate change] enters the conversation, but a lot of times we – the term ‘mega-
drought’ has been used a lot here. … And there is not, I mean there has been 
                                                 
75 Mr. Driggers, Ms. Hanley and SC-Local Bureaucrat-523 participated in a joint interview and responded to follow-
up questions individually by email. Neither Ms. Hanley or SC-Local Bureaucrat-523 responded to questions about 
climate change. 
76 Water rights refer generally to the legal system that governs water use in western states. Senior water rights are 
fulfilled before junior water rights when there are water shortages. For more information on water rights, see 
Getches, Zellmer, & Amos, 2015.  
77 Carson City is a unified city-county government. For this project it will be referred to as a city when a generic 
term for local government is used. 
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discussions about it, but … there has been mixed feedback because a lot of it 
involves money and dollars to secure an infrastructure for future use. And there is 
discussion about it, but there is not clear direction.” (Interview with David 
Bruketta, June 9, 2016) 
Despite being aware of these concerns, both Mr. Bruketta and NV-Local Bureaucrat-734 
expressed they would be cautious in developing plans without direction from the Board of 
Supervisors. Mr. Bruketta described the culture of policy development in Carson City being 
elected leader driven. Should Carson City begin to adapt to climate change, it is likely the 
bureaucrats would fit a politician-led action pattern. 
There were bureaucrats who did think that climate change was going to be a problem in 
their localities but did not see the local government as the appropriate level to respond. Mr. 
Holland from Holland Consulting Planners works with local governments in the inner and outer 
banks region of North Carolina. He was interviewed specifically about his work helping Craven 
County, NC prepare their hazard mitigation plans. During this interview, Mr. Holland referenced 
the state government’s stance on climate change as a reason not to address climate change. He 
said:  
“Well, one thing that is quite interesting and intriguing is that, in our mitigation 
plans, under this cycle, under our current regime in terms of governor and our 
legislature, we are not allowed to acknowledge or discuss in any way shape or 
form sea-level rise in these mitigation plans. I mean it is basically, I won't use the 
word illegal. But we are not allowed to discuss it. And if it is in there, the State of 
North Carolina State Office of Emergency Management make you remove it prior 
to submitting it to FEMA.” (Interview with Landin Holland, September 11, 2015) 
He also acknowledged that many areas in the coastal area were not capable of preparing for sea 
level rise: 
“I think one of the reasons why sea level rise is very controversial in Eastern 
North Carolina is there are a lot of these counties, if you want to talk about sea 
level rise, there is nothing they can really do. What are they going to do? They 
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don't have the money locally to address it in a manner that will ensure the sound, 
the establishment of a sound and stable environment years down the road. From 
an engineering perspective, I don't know how they would do it, and secondly, I 
don't know how they would ever pay for it. So to go out there and talk about sea 
level rise in this plan or in their land use planning documents, is kind of cutting 
your own throat as it relates to economic development, because who would ever 
want to build something somewhere they are being told is going to be underwater 
in 15 to 20 years.” (Interview with Landin Holland, September 11, 2015) 
Ms. Hamel from the City of Mauldin, SC echoed this sentiment: state governments are 
better situated to take the lead on climate change action because they have more resources. She 
acknowledged that local governments could do something in terms of crafting a strategy in the 
hazard mitigation plan or planning department documents. However, she has not seen any action 
in Mauldin to address climate change.   
In the City of New Bern, NC, Ms. Boone does not think that the local government can 
adapt to climate change. She said:  
“I would say that we are not having a conversation related to climate change, and 
I don't know that there is, I don't know how much of that we would be having a 
discussion about because we can't control that, I think is probably... A town of 
approximately 30,000 is certainly not going to impact climate change. So I don't 
know that I've heard anybody having a conversation about climate change.” 
(Interview with Amanda Boone, September 24, 2015) 
Ms. Boone said the city government was aware of how climate change will impact the 
community, but she pointed to initiatives to prepare for the threat from hurricanes as their best 
chance to prepare for any sea level rise or climate change impacts.  
For the remaining two bureaucrats, lack of support from local politicians and belief that 
the policies would not be supported led to inaction. NC-Local Bureaucrat-823 in Craven County 
worked in the county government for over two decades, but constantly faces a battle between 
flood prevention and economic development: 
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“And one of the issues I've dealt with is the balancing act between the elected 
officials who want all of the taxable property they can have as far having taxable 
property, but we look at the strain that it puts on us as far as emergency response 
and also the threat of someone losing their life. So I've been very strong verbally 
over the years for when we have an event to participate in the mitigation programs 
[inaudible] like property acquisition. … That's how you keep people out of harm’s 
way.” (Interview with NC-Local Bureaucrat-823, September 23, 2015) 
NC-Local Bureaucrat-823’s struggle to implement emergency management practices generally 
makes addressing climate adaptation even more of an uphill battle. The bureaucrat expressed 
frustration throughout the interview that economic development won out over emergency 
preparedness most of the time. They emphasized the need to “pick my battles” in order to make 
meaningful advances in emergency management, much less adding climate adaptation to the 
mix. 
In Elizabeth City, NC, it was actually the city manager who acted to stop a climate 
adaptation process before it could develop. Mr. Olson from Elizabeth City, NC does not believe 
that sea level rise (he calls it “ocean rise”) would impact his community anytime soon, and if it 
did there would be consequences closer to the coast first giving them time to prepare. Mr. Olson 
pointed to disagreement in the scientific community, saying “the scientists debate and disagree 
on what is causing that issue,” as another reason not to address climate change. In early 2015, the 
same group of UNC Chapel Hill students who presented an evaluation of sea level rise in 
Pasquotank County, NC presented their findings to the Elizabeth City Council (Elizabeth City is 
the county seat of Pasquotank County). Following this presentation, several council members 
asked how sea level rise might impact areas of the city that were already struggling with 
flooding. Mr. Olson’s response to this was to investigate and present the finding that flood 
management and stormwater management policies already in place were satisfactory to address 
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flooding concerns. There were no follow-ups on the issue from the council members, and no 
further action on climate change from the local bureaucrats in Elizabeth City, NC. 
2.6 Observed Forms of Behavior from Bureaucrats Who Acted 
Figure 7: Observed Form of Behavior organizes the 16 bureaucrats (from nine cases) who 
took action on climate change into the categories theorized in Chapter 1. (The model does not 
predict inaction, so the 14 bureaucrats who chose not to act are not included.) These placements 
are based on observed data, and do not reflect the bureaucrats’ levels of autonomy or the amount 
of agreement they have with elected officials.  
In the next section, I discuss the two factors which are theorized to predict how these 
bureaucrats have acted: (1) the amount of agreement there is between bureaucrats and their 
elected official superiors on the need to adapt to climate change and (2) the level of autonomy 
local bureaucrats have to act on their own preferences. As discussed in Chapter 1, this builds on 
principal agent theory which argues that agents (local bureaucrats) can act in accordance with 
their own wishes when they have sufficient autonomy78 (Carpenter, 2001; Lin, 2000; Lipsky, 
2010; Teodoro, 2011). However, this project adds a new dimension, arguing that when principals 
and agents have shared beliefs, the elected official principals can contribute by either leading or 
partnering with their bureaucratic agents to craft more effective public policy (describing the 
politician-led and cooperative behavior categories).  
Additionally, this project takes the position that bureaucratic policymaking is not 
necessarily a subversion of democratic values, especially for issues that are avoided by 
                                                 
78 Much of the political science literature on bureaucracy focuses at the federal level and is concerned with political 
control over the bureaucracy. The principal problem appears to be that bureaucracies are not easily controlled by 
politicians (for some of this debate see Gailmard & Patty, 2012; Balla, 1998; Gailmard, 2002; Waterman & Rouse, 
1999; Whitford, 2002).  
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politicians due to partisan commitments, ideological commitments, or because the issue is low-
salience at the time. Emergency management policy receives little attention from elected 
officials and members of the community, leaving local bureaucrats to think about and address 
disaster risk. By including climate change as a risk, bureaucrats are doing their job of preparing 
the community for disaster risk. 
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Figure 7: Observed Form of Behavior Based on Observed Behaviors from Interviews and Documents 
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Bureaucrats who did not act on climate adaptation: NC-Local Bureaucrat-823 and Landin Holland from Craven County, NC; Richard Olson from Elizabeth 
City, NC; Katrina Marshall from the City of Havelock, NC; Amanda Boone and Matt Montayne from the City of New Bern, NC; David Bruketta and NV-
Local Bureaucrat-734 from Carson City, NV; Edward Driggers, SC-Local Bureaucrat-523, and Lillian Hanley from the City of Greer, SC; Kimberley Hamel 
from the City of Mauldin, SC; SC-Local Bureaucrat-413 from Oconee County, SC, and Sandi Duffey from Grant County, WA. 
Disagreement 
Shelley Cox
Marc Meyers
FL-Local Bureaucrat-
762
Anne Murray
Kathy Fitzpatrick
Don Donaldson
Jason Bessey
Mark Satterlee
NV-Local Bureaucrat-
282
NV-Local Bureaucrat-
895
Paula Gucker
Brian Bishop
Mark Cook
David Brown Scott Revell
Joel Freudenthal
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2.7 Bureaucratic Action 
Table 9 (below) outlines how local bureaucrats who took action to address climate 
adaptation in their communities acted, specifically if they provided expertise or if they argued to 
integrated climate adaptation into existing policies. This information is used in sections 2.7a to 
evaluate hypothesis 3 (local bureaucrats drive climate adaptation by providing issue-specific 
expertise about potential harms) and 2.7b to evaluate hypothesis 4 (local bureaucrats drive 
climate adaptation by arguing that climate change predictions can be integrated into existing 
policies.) 
Table 9: Bureaucrats Influencing Policy Change 
Locality Bureaucrat 
Short Description of 
Action or Inaction 
Provided 
Expertise 
(hypothesis 3) 
Argue to Integrate 
Climate Adaptation 
into Existing Policy 
(hypothesis 4) 
P
as
q
u
o
ta
n
k
 
C
o
u
n
ty
, 
N
C
 
Shelley Cox, 
Planning Director 
Worked with UNC Chapel 
Hill students on sea level rise 
vulnerability study, argued for 
paying attention to sea level 
rise risk in floodplain 
management 
Yes Yes 
C
it
y
 o
f 
F
o
rt
 P
ie
rc
e,
 F
L
 Marc Meyers, 
Director of the 
Building 
Department 
Used up-to-date sea level data 
in flood management; 
encouraged local builders and 
property owners to be aware 
of future threats from climate 
change 
Yes 
No, acted using 
discretion for integrating 
into policy 
FL-Local 
Bureaucrat-762, 
Lower level 
bureaucrat 
Used up-to-date sea level data 
in flood management; 
encouraged local builders and 
property owners to be aware 
of future threats from climate 
change 
Yes 
No, acted using 
discretion for integrating 
into policy 
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Table 9: Bureaucrats Influencing Policy Change 
Locality Bureaucrat 
Short Description of 
Action or Inaction 
Provided 
Expertise 
(hypothesis 3) 
Argue to Integrate 
Climate Adaptation 
into Existing Policy 
(hypothesis 4) 
M
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n
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o
u
n
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, 
F
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Anne Murray, 
Hydrogeologist 
Worked with group of county 
bureaucrats (engineers) to 
develop a comprehensive 
approach for climate 
adaptation planning 
Yes 
No, interested in 
creating a 
comprehensive plan 
Kathy Fitzpatrick, 
Coastal Engineer 
Worked with group of county 
bureaucrats (engineers) to 
develop a comprehensive 
approach for climate 
adaptation planning 
Yes 
No, interested in 
creating a 
comprehensive plan 
Don Donaldson, 
Director of 
Engineering 
Incorporated latest sea level 
rise data into existing flood 
management 
Yes Yes 
S
t.
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u
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e 
C
o
u
n
ty
, 
F
L
 
Jason Bessey, 
Stormwater 
Program 
Coordinator 
Incorporated latest sea level 
rise data into existing flood 
management 
Yes 
No, acted using 
discretion for integrating 
into policy 
Mark Satterlee, 
Deputy County 
Administrator 
Incorporated latest sea level 
rise data into existing flood 
management 
Yes 
No, acted using 
discretion for integrating 
into policy 
C
it
y
 o
f 
F
er
n
le
y
, 
N
V
 
NV-Local 
Bureaucrat-282, 
City Department 
Head 
Worked with the Water for 
the Seasons Project to develop 
climate adaptation solutions 
to predict drought; purchased 
water rights and developed 
water use strategy to deal with 
shortages 
Yes Yes 
NV-Local 
Bureaucrat-895, 
Lower level 
bureaucrat 
Worked with the Water for 
the Seasons Project to develop 
climate adaptation solutions 
to predict drought; purchased 
water rights and developed 
water use strategy to deal with 
shortages 
Yes 
Already in progress 
when joined, supports 
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Table 9: Bureaucrats Influencing Policy Change 
Locality Bureaucrat 
Short Description of 
Action or Inaction 
Provided 
Expertise 
(hypothesis 3) 
Argue to Integrate 
Climate Adaptation 
into Existing Policy 
(hypothesis 4) 
G
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en
v
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 C
o
u
n
ty
, 
S
C
 Paula Gucker, 
Assistant County 
Administrator for 
Community 
Planning 
Supported Floodplain 
Manager Brian Bishop when 
he argued to incorporate 
climate change into hazard 
mitigation predictions and 
management strategies 
Supported 
subordinate’s 
expertise 
Yes 
Brian Bishop, 
Floodplain Manager 
Argued for incorporation of 
climate adaptation into hazard 
mitigation plan (for future 
updates beyond 2015 draft) 
Yes Yes 
K
it
ti
ta
s 
C
o
u
n
ty
, 
W
A
 
Mark Cook, Public 
Works Director 
Worked with Yakima 
Integrated Plan to incorporate 
climate models into drought 
management practices; 
increased water storage 
capacity; encouraged water 
conservation practices 
Yes 
Supporting efforts that 
are already underway; 
suggesting new 
policies/strategies when 
appropriate 
C
it
y
 o
f 
Y
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a,
 
W
A
 David Brown, 
Water and Irrigation 
Manager 
Worked with Yakima 
Integrated Plan to incorporate 
climate models into drought 
management practices; 
increased water storage 
capacity; encouraged water 
conservation practices 
Yes 
Supporting efforts that 
are already underway; 
suggesting new 
policies/strategies when 
appropriate 
Y
ak
im
a 
C
o
u
n
ty
, 
W
A
 Joel Freudenthal, 
Senior Natural 
Resource Specialist 
Worked with Yakima 
Integrated Plan to incorporate 
climate models into drought 
management practices; 
increased water storage 
capacity; encouraged water 
conservation practices 
Yes 
Supporting efforts that 
are already underway; 
suggesting new 
policies/strategies when 
appropriate 
Scott Revell, 
Director of the Roza 
Irrigation District 
Worked with Yakima 
Integrated Plan to incorporate 
climate models into drought 
management practices; 
continued to implement low-
flow irrigation systems 
Yes 
Supporting efforts that 
are already underway; 
suggesting new 
policies/strategies when 
appropriate 
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2.7a Bureaucrats Providing Expertise to Encourage Adaptation 
Of the 16 bureaucrats who acted, 15 used their expertise to provide information about the 
potential harms from climate change (hypothesis 3). The only bureaucrat who did not provide 
her own expertise for changing adaptation policy was Ms. Gucker from Greenville, SC who used 
information collected by her subordinate Mr. Bishop. There is overwhelming support for 
hypothesis 3: local bureaucrats drive climate adaptation by providing issue-specific expertise 
about potential harms.  
While almost every bureaucrat did use information to influence policy, they did not all do 
so in the same manner. There were three ways local bureaucrats provided information about the 
potential harms from climate change: (1) giving information to their superiors, (2) giving 
information to peers in government, and (3) giving information to community members.  
Nine bureaucrats provided information to their superiors: Ms. Cox, Ms. Murray, Ms. Fitzpatrick, 
NV-Local Bureaucrat-282, NV-Local Bureaucrat-895, Mr. Cook, Mr. Brown, Mr. Freudenthal, 
and Mr. Revell. (These nine bureaucrats represent six cases.) 
Ms. Cox from Pasquotank County presented information on the damage sea level rise 
could cause in the county to her superiors and helped UNC Chapel Hill students complete a 
comprehensive study of the problem and present their results to the county commissioners. Ms. 
Murray and Ms. Fitzpatrick in Martin County were working to compile information about the 
full spectrum of impacts. They produced information at the request of Commissioner Haddox 
that covered sea level rise, potential drinkable water shortages,79 and climate migrants from 
                                                 
79 Florida’s freshwater reserves are at risk of becoming contaminated with saltwater as sea levels rise. Additionally, 
climate change is likely to result in less rainfall, which is instrumental in refilling freshwater reserves in the area. 
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South Florida and Puerto Rico. They have not formally presented their results but shared their 
expertise with Commissioner Haddox. 
Additionally, the two bureaucrats involved in the Water for the Seasons project (NV-
Local Bureaucrat-282 and NV-Local Bureaucrat-895) and the four bureaucrats working on the 
Yakima Integrated Plan (Mr. Cook, Mr. Brown, Mr. Freudenthal, and Mr. Revell) provided 
information to their superiors and the other participants in these projects about local harms likely 
under climate change. For these six bureaucrats, providing information about local harms was 
their way of advocating for their localities’ needs within the group. 
Ten bureaucrats provided information to their peers: Mr. Donaldson, Mr. Bessey, Mr. 
Satterlee, NV-Local Bureaucrat-282, NV-Local Bureaucrat-895, Mr. Bishop, Mr. Cook, Mr. 
Brown, Mr. Freudenthal, and Mr. Revell. (These bureaucrats are from seven cases.) This type of 
information provision is often more informal, representing discussions between peers in 
government. As Mr. Donaldson (Martin County, FL) and Mr. Revell (Yakiam County, WA) 
said, they often speak with other staff members about climate change.  
Sharing information with other local bureaucrats can occur more formally. For example, 
Mr. Bishop was tasked with collecting information on threats from natural disasters for 
Greenville County (SC)’s most recent hazard mitigation plan update by his boss: Ms. Gucker. 
During his research, Mr. Bishop became aware of the county’s climate change risk and the need 
to address it in future hazard mitigation plans.  
Similarly, information sharing is a formalized process in the Water for the Seasons 
project and the Yakima Integrated Plan Working Group. However, in these cases, bureaucrats 
share information with members of their own local government as well as peers in other 
participating local governments. 
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Six bureaucrats provided information to community members: Mr. Meyers, FL-Local 
Bureaucrat-762, Mr. Cook, Mr. Brown, Mr. Freudenthal, and Mr. Revell. (They are from four 
cases.) In these instances, bureaucrats are either communicating with individuals who have 
contacted their department for a service or they are advocating for their department’s actions to 
the community at large. 
Mr. Meyers and FL-Local Bureaucrat-762 communicated directly with property owners 
in Fort Pierce, FL who approached them about risks from sea level rise and flooding due to 
climate change. Mr. Revell from the Roza Irrigation District in Yakima County regularly speaks 
with the growers in his community about water conservation strategies they can use to respond to 
climate induced drought. Mr. Revell both speaks to growers who approach him and he actively 
seeks out growers to speak to. 
Also, local bureaucrats participate in broader education or advocacy efforts to address 
risks related to climate change. Mr. Freudenthal and Mr. Brown both run water use conservation 
campaigns in their communities (Yakima County and the City of Yakima respectively) to reduce 
overall water consumption so droughts will have less of an impact. 
Those bureaucrats who worked cooperatively to address climate adaptation provided 
expertise in several ways to several groups. NV-Local Bureaucrat-282, NV-Local Bureaucrat-
895 worked with the Water for the Seasons project and provided information to both the elected 
officials in Fernley, NV and to their peers (the other bureaucrats working in Fernley 
government). The bureaucrats involved in the Yakima Integrated Plan also provided information 
to elected officials, other bureaucrats, and community members. For both of these projects, 
bureaucrats served as ambassadors from their community in the group and ambassadors from the 
group when presenting to their communities. 
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2.7b Bureaucrats Crafting Arguments about How Communities Should Adapt to Climate Change 
Bureaucrats provided information based on their expertise, but they also framed 
arguments about how policies should look. They did not just present information. Bureaucrats 
crafted arguments and presented information that supported a specific policy approach, like 
developing a comprehensive plan or integrating adaptation into existing policies. 
Hypothesis 4 states that local bureaucrats drive climate adaptation by arguing that climate 
change predictions can be integrated into existing policies. Among the bureaucrats who acted, 
four bureaucrats from four cases80 argued (to their superiors or peers) that climate predictions 
can be integrated into existing policy (Ms. Cox, Mr. Donaldson, NV-Local Bureaucrat-282, and 
Mr. Bishop).  
Ms. Cox presented arguments to the Pasquotank County Board of Commissioners with 
the support of the UNC Chapel Hill student’s study and followed up with remarks about how the 
flood risk maps issued by FEMA and subsequent county flood management policy needed to 
address the risks of climate change. Mr. Bishop presented information about the need to adapt to 
climate change, but rather than speak directly to the elected officials, he presented the 
information in a report to Ms. Gucker (his boss). His argument focused on the need to include 
adaptation planning in the hazard mitigation plan because it might eventually be required by 
FEMA and because climate change was likely to cause problems because of increasingly severe 
storms. 
Mr. Donaldson and NV-Local Bureaucrat-282 also presented arguments that climate 
change adaptation should be included in existing policies, but largely spoke to their peers. While 
                                                 
80 Bureaucrats from the same community argued for different approaches. For instance, Mr. Donaldson argued to 
integrate climate adaptation into existing polices in Martin County, FL while Ms. Murray and Ms. Fitzpatrick were 
working to develop a comprehensive plan to address climate adaptation. 
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Mr. Donaldson’s subordinates in Martin County, FL (Ms. Murray and Ms. Fitzpatrick) were also 
working on climate adaptation, Mr. Donaldson presented a different argument. Ms. Murray and 
Ms. Fitzpatrick thought that climate adaptation needed comprehensive planning, while Mr. 
Donaldson was confident that existing flood management policies could be updated to reflect 
current sea levels to help the community respond to sea level rise.  NV-Local Bureaucrat-282 in 
Fernley, NV focused on expanding water storage to address climate change driven droughts 
while working on the city’s water team. The water team included NV-Local Bureaucrat-282’s 
superiors as well as elected leaders who met occasionally with the water team. Additionally, NV-
Local Bureaucrat-282 was with the city government long enough to advocate for participation in 
the Water for the Season’s project. According to their interview, NV-Local Bureuacrat-282 
helped convince the local elected leaders to participate. 
An additional five bureaucrats benefitted from other actors having already incorporated 
climate adaptation into existing policy. Rather than argue that it should be integrated, they 
supported these ongoing efforts (NV-Local Bureaucrats-895, Mr. Cook, Mr. Brown, Mr. 
Freudenthal, and Mr. Revell). NV-Local Bureaucrat-895 joined the Fernley, NV government too 
late to help initiate the water team efforts or the city’s participation in the Water for the Seasons 
project, although they did support it. Similarly, Mr. Cook, Mr. Brown, Mr. Freudenthal, and Mr. 
Revell supported the efforts of the Yakima Integrated Plan and pre-existing water storage 
projects in their local governments but did not initiate them.  
The group of bureaucrats from Martin County – Ms. Murray, Ms. Fitzpatrick, and Ms. 
Drum – believed that a comprehensive approach to adaptation was necessary. They might 
support limited instances of integration, but they argued for new policies and approaches to deal 
with the climate threat. 
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Five bureaucrats in three communities used climate change predictions while exercising 
their discretion. In this way, they integrated climate adaptation into existing policies, but did not 
present an “argument” for doing so, they just did it. They are Mr. Meyers, FL-Local Bureuacrat-
762, Ms. Gucker, Mr. Bessey, and Mr. Satterlee. As described above, Mr. Meyers and FL-Local 
Bureaucrat-762 said they spoke with property owners about flood risks changing with sea level 
rise and climate change. Ms. Gucker made the decision as head of her department to add climate 
adaptation language to the county’s hazard mitigation plan. Mr. Bessey and Mr. Satterlee used 
their discretion to update flood policy based on the most recent sea levels to account for sea level 
rise.  
2.7c Other Ways Bureaucrats Act to Address Climate Adaptation 
Bureaucrats acted in other ways than providing information about potential harms and 
arguing for integrating policy into existing initiatives. The bureaucrats in this study also (1) 
argued that the cause of climate change does not matter, but we should act anyway to prevent 
potential harms, and (2) encouraged participation in multi-stakeholder groups whose goals 
include climate adaptation. Each is discussed in turn. 
The bureaucrats in this study commonly expressed the sentiment that the cause of climate 
change was not important, what was important was preparing for potential harms and being 
proactive. Greenville County, SC bureaucrats Ms. Gucker and Mr. Bishop repeatedly said they 
were proud of how proactive their disaster management policies were. Similarly, the bureaucrats 
in South Washington state relied on the argument that the causes of climate change were less 
important that the consequences. By focusing on minimizing the negative consequences of 
climate change, bureaucrats like Mr. Cook, Mr. Brown, Mr. Revell, and Mr. Fruedenthal 
justified the need for adaptation in a largely conservative area. 
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This approach relies on the precautionary principle which argues that minimizing 
potential future harms is preferable to inaction to save resources or time in the present 
(Applegate, 2010). It is captured in the colloquial saying “better safe than sorry” and is prevalent 
in economics, environmental conservation, and risk management.81 The argument combines the 
precautionary principle with the depoliticization of climate change policy by arguing that the 
causes of climate change are not as important as the consequences. Focusing on potential harms 
divorces the problem of climate change from the debates around the cause of the problem. Often 
pro-climate actors lay responsibility on the shoulders of high-carbon emitters including fossil 
fuel energy producers, the agricultural sector, and energy users in developed countries.82 It is 
unsurprising, then, that this argument was popular in areas like South Washington state which 
has an agriculture-dependent economy and any community where people use cars for 
transportation, heat their homes with natural gas, and consume electricity from coal or other 
fossil fuels like most of the United States.  
Bureaucrats in this study also advocated for local government participation in multi-
stakeholder groups. While the Water for the Seasons project and the Yakima Integrated Plan 
provided important examples, there are also initiatives in South Florida like Seven50 and the 
Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact which have led to climate adaptation 
initiatives. Seven50 partially inspired Martin County’s effort to craft comprehensive climate 
adaptation planning. While none of the cases in this study are members of the Southeast Florida 
Regional Climate Change Compact, the organization’s success in helping Miami-Dade, 
                                                 
81 The prevalence of the precautionary principal in these fields makes it unsurprising to see the bureaucrats in this 
study embracing it. These bureaucrats include emergency managers, resource managers, and environmental 
managers who likely encountered this attitude in their training and professional societies. 
82 There are some efforts to discredit climate adaptation rooted in conservative political circles in the United States. 
However, adaptation that does not lay blame for climate change avoids some of the most passionate political 
debates. 
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Broward, Monroe, and Palm Beach counties (and 30 municipalities in those counties) create 
adaptation plans is widely cited as a successful multi-stakeholder climate adaptation organization 
(US Department of Energy, 2018; Georgetown Climate Center, 2017). 
Participation in these groups presents several advantages to bureaucrats. First, it allows 
bureaucrats to benefit from the efforts of many participants, essentially outsourcing some of the 
work. For instance, in the Water for the Seasons project, the UNVR researchers are measuring 
climate risk and mapping basin-wide water storage capacity, water flows, and water uses. 
Similarly, the Yakima Integrated Plan spreads work across a wide range of participants allowing 
individual bureaucrats to benefit from a more comprehensive look at the problem. These projects 
can also lead to more creative solutions generated by the participants. Solutions that were too 
expensive (in terms of time or resources) might not have been considered by a single locality but 
are possible with a larger group. For instance, the Yakima Integrated Plan is developing large 
storage reserves like the Kachess Drought Relief Pumping Plant (Yakima River Basin Integrated 
Water Resource Management Plan, 2015) and the Cle Elum Fish Passage Facility and fish 
reintroduction effort (US Bureau of Reclamation, 2016) which would be too expensive for any 
one jurisdiction to afford on its own. 
In sum, bureaucrats act in a wide variety of ways to address climate adaptation in their 
communities. They provide information about potential risks, argue that climate adaptation can 
be achieved by integrating it into existing policies, emphasize the precautionary principal, 
divorce the causes of climate change from the discussion about adaptation, and encourage 
participation in multi-stakeholder groups. The next section tests the model presented in Chapter 1 
which posits that bureaucratic autonomy and problem definition agreement shape bureaucratic 
action. 
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3. Explaining the Variation in Bureaucratic Action 
The theoretical model presented in Chapter 1 argues that bureaucratic action is influenced 
by the interaction of two variables: (1) problem definition agreement between bureaucrats and 
their superiors, and (2) bureaucratic autonomy or independence. This section tests the 
applicability of this model with the 16 bureaucrats in the study who acted to integrate climate 
adaptation into local policy. First, problem definition agreement and bureaucratic autonomy are 
described independently. I address how they were measured and the variation present in the 
sample. Then, the model is presented with the predicted form of action each bureaucrat should 
have taken. The predicted model is juxtaposed with the actual type of action each bureaucrat 
took (presented in section 2.6) to determine the accuracy of the model. Throughout, alternative 
explanations and critiques of the model are discussed. 
3.1 Problem Definition Agreement 
Problem definition in the policy studies literature refers to the way a problem is described 
and understood in the policymaking community. It involves dimensions like problem severity, 
how soon the problem will occur (or if it is currently occurring), who is responsible for solving 
the problem, and if the problem will occur nearby (Rochefort & Cobb, 1994). 
Measuring problem definition agreement for each bureaucrat who acted to address 
climate adaptation requires examining both the stated attitudes of the local bureaucrats and their 
superiors. Only bureaucrats who had been interviewed by the researcher were included in the 
study. Their attitudes were discerned primarily through interviews. Bureaucrats’ statements in 
public documents were also used to supplement their interview statements. Although it would 
have been ideal to also conduct interviews with all of the elected officials in these cases, most 
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local elected officials83 did not respond to requests for interviews. Instead, local elected officials’ 
attitudes were determined by looking at their public statements, newspaper coverage, and how 
bureaucrats described the elected officials. 
Five questions were asked to develop a full picture of the bureaucrats’ and elected 
officials’ attitudes about climate adaptation. They were: 
1. Is climate change the cause for needing to change local flood or drought management 
policy? 
2. Is the local government the appropriate scale for addressing climate adaptation? (As 
opposed to the state or federal government level.) 
3. Will climate change be an issue for this locality? In other words, is the problem 
geographically close? 
4. Will climate change be an issue soon? In other words, is the problem temporally 
proximate? 
5. Will climate change lead to severe problems for the local community? 
Answers to each question were written for each bureaucrat and the local elected leaders as a 
group.84 Then, where bureaucrats and the elected leaders had different answers, it was labeled as 
disagreement. When the opinions were similar, it was labeled as agreement. In several cases, 
local elected officials made no statements on climate change or made statements which could 
only answer a few of the five questions. In these cases, no opinion was treated as slight 
disagreement. This was done because disagreement is a fairer evaluation than agreement. Local 
                                                 
83 The researcher only conducted interviews with Commissioner Paul Jewell in Kittitas County, WA and 
Commissioner Cindy Carter in Grant County, WA. 
84 Bureaucrats often respond to the elected officials as a group. Grouping the opinions of elected officials provides 
the best measure of agreement between the bureaucrat and their superiors. 
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bureaucrats who want to act on climate change and face elected leaders with no opinions on 
climate change are likely to need to convince the local leaders. (If a local bureaucrat faced 
disagreement, she would have to work to convince leaders.) Additionally, according to data from 
Leiserowitz’s climate opinion study (Marlon, Howe, Mildenberger, & Leiserowitz, 2016), the 
counties in this study have low percentages of residents who believe climate change will harm 
them personally (30% to 36% range). Similarly, climate change is often understood as a national 
or global issue meaning it would be more likely that a bureaucrat would have to convince elected 
officials that they need to act. (Data for each country can be found in Appendix D, Table D4.) 
 Agreement between bureaucrats and their superiors on the issue of climate change 
adaptation ranged in the sample from mostly disagreeing (Ms. Cox) to complete agreement (Ms. 
Murray, Mr. Cook, Mr. Revell, and Mr. Freudenthal). (Responses for each bureaucrat are listed 
in Appendix E, Table E1.) 
 In three cases, the local elected officials did not present any public attitude on climate 
change and the local bureaucrats were not aware of their attitudes either. These were the City of 
Fort Pierce, FL, St. Lucie County, FL, and Greenville County, SC. In all three cases, the local 
bureaucrats generally believed climate change was a severe problem that the local government 
could and would have to address. However, a few did think that the consequences from climate 
change would take a while to reach them (Mr. Satterlee, Ms. Gucker, and Mr. Bishop). As 
discussed above, these were coded as disagreement. 
 Furthermore, in Fernley, NV the local officials only presented enough of an opinion on 
climate change adaptation to say it would impact local policies but did not go beyond that. This 
is largely because of the city’s involvement in the Water for the Seasons project. The elected 
officials were informed but did not have any strong opinions on climate adaptation. 
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3.2 Autonomy 
Autonomy is measured in the literature in a variety of ways: structural autonomy 
(Carpenter, 2001; Whitford, 2002), the ability or opportunity to use discretion (Lipsky, 2010; 
Lin, 2000; Teodoro, 2011), and expertise (Altfeld & Miller, 1984; Gailmard, 2002; Teodoro, 
2014). This study sought to capture this variety of ways to understand autonomy and build a 
combined measure. For all components, autonomy was considered in relation to local elected 
officials and the government’s manager or head administrator. 
Structural autonomy describes bureaucratic independence in relation to the organizational 
structure of government. Bureaucrats who run departments can make decisions about how policy 
is implemented, how budgets are distributed, and what takes precedence when there are 
competing priorities. Department heads also influence department culture: can lower level 
bureaucrats innovate in their work? Are they allowed to approach the elected council directly or 
does information flow through department heads and the government manager? 
In this study, structural independence is measured as low, moderate, or high based on the 
bureaucrat’s position in the local government’s organizational chart. Bureaucrats with low 
structural independence answer to more superiors than those with high structural independence. 
Structural independence was also captured using hiring and firing power. If a bureaucrat can be 
hired and fired only by the city council, they have more structural independence than a 
bureaucrat who can be fired by the city manager or county administrator as well.  
Discretion describes how many opportunities a bureaucrat has to make decisions (i.e. on 
a case-by-case basis). As Lipsky (2010) described in his study of street-level bureaucrats, 
bureaucrats who interact with community members have more opportunities for discretion than 
those at the top of the organizational chart who work more on management of other bureaucrats. 
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While it is often true that bureaucrats with higher levels of structural independence have fewer 
opportunities for discretion, it is not always the case. For instance, Ms. Cox runs her own 
department and works directly with property owners to enforce flood management policy.  
In this study, discretion is categorized into three groups: many opportunities, a moderate 
number of opportunities, or a few opportunities. Categories were assigned based on descriptions 
bureaucrats gave of their work during interviews, the description of their position on local 
government websites, and the description of their position in government ordinances. Ms. Cox 
has both high structural independence and many opportunities to exercise discretion. 
A third way the literature measures autonomy is by bureaucratic expertise. Expertise 
gives bureaucrats an information advantage85 over their superiors, allowing them to make 
decisions based on their knowledge. Forms of bureaucratic expertise cover a wide range. For this 
project, expertise was generalized to five categories: (1) emergency management, (2) FEMA 
policies, (3) state emergency management policies, (4) local conditions (present and past 
flooding or drought events), and (5) local politics. 
Expertise was coded based on knowledge demonstrated during the interview, area of 
training (e.g. someone who has a master’s degree in emergency management has expertise in that 
area) and demonstrated knowledge in government documents (e.g. testifying at a city council 
meeting or writing a technical report). This was determined for both the bureaucrats and their 
superiors because areas of common expertise do not represent information advantage. The 
difference in expertise was measured by the number of areas where superiors and bureaucrats 
had shared expertise. For example, if there are people on the elected board with backgrounds in 
                                                 
85 In principal-agent theory, this is referred to as information asymmetry. Information asymmetries are unavoidable 
and often the reason principals seek out agents: people with expertise they do not have to help them accomplish their 
goal (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
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emergency management, bureaucrats have less of an information advantage on emergency 
management. 
Expertise was also captured by determining if bureaucrats had specialized training or 
general training. Described in more detail in Appendix B, (section 3a), specialized training refers 
to degrees or training in technical areas like engineering, land management, forest management, 
biology, conservation, water management, and disaster management. General training refers to 
administrative or public policy training: areas like political science, law, public administration, 
public policy, or government management. 
The last measure in the combined measure of independence is the number of years a 
bureaucrat worked in local government in their position because bureaucrats are the source of 
institutional knowledge in local government. To protect the identities of those bureaucrats who 
requested confidentiality, this measure was categorized as either 0 to 5 years to indicate low 
levels of institutional knowledge or 5 or more years to indicate high levels of institutional 
knowledge. 
These six measures were combined (added together), yielding an overall possible score 
between four and 22. A score of four indicates low autonomy and a score of 22 is high 
autonomy. The range of autonomy scores among the bureaucrats in this study was 7 to 16.86 A 
score of 12 or higher was considered high and 11 or lower considered low. This cut-off point was 
chosen because it was the median of the actual scores.87 (For the scores for each bureaucrat, see 
Appendix E, Table E2; for coding of these measures, see Appendix B, sections 3 and section 4.) 
                                                 
86 Scores were calculated for bureaucrats who did not act as well as those who did. The scores for the bureaucrats 
who did not act are not used to test the model because the model is not meant to be applied to inaction. However, the 
scoring system for autonomy is applicable to both bureaucrats who acted and those who did not.  
87 The theoretical scores of 4 and 22 are extremes and using the mid-point of that scale would distort the data. For 
example, a bureaucrat with a perfect 22 (high) autonomy score could not be fired by the local government, would 
run the entire local government without oversight, and has no shared expertise with her superiors. This bureaucrat 
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Half of the bureaucrats who acted to address climate adaptation had high autonomy 
scores. Eight bureaucrats scored a 12 or higher for their autonomy level. They are Ms. Gucker, 
Ms. Cox, Mr. Meyers, Mr. Brown, NV-Local Bureaucrat-282, Mr. Cook, Mr. Freudenthal, and 
Mr. Revell. The combination of factors that led to these scores varied; there is not one area 
where all eight had high scores or low scores. This speaks to the need to capture multiple 
dimensions of autonomy. 
The remaining eight bureaucrats had low autonomy scores (11 or lower). They are FL-
Local Bureaucrat-762, Ms. Murray, Ms. Fitzpatrick, Mr. Donaldson, Mr. Bessey, Mr. Satterlee, 
NV-Local Bureaucrat-895, and Mr. Bishop. These bureaucrats did share a few commonalities: 
all had low or moderate levels of structural independence and were hired and could be fired by 
both the city manager or county administrator and elected officials. There was variation on the 
other dimensions of autonomy. 
3.3 Predicted Forms of Bureaucratic Action 
To evaluate how well my theory explains the observed outcomes, the bureaucrats who 
acted88 to address climate adaptation in their communities were plotted on the theorized 2x2 
table. I then looked to see which bureaucrats were correctly predicted and which were not by 
comparing their observed action (shown in Figure 7) with their predicted action (shown in Figure 
                                                 
cannot exist. Conversely, a bureaucrat with a score of 4 for low autonomy would have no expertise, could be fired 
by the manager and the council or board of commissioners, and has no structural independence. Again, this 
bureaucrat does not exist in reality. 
88 Those bureaucrats who took no action are not included because this is meant to help describe how bureaucrats 
decided to act. Considering that nearly half of the bureaucrats in this study chose not to act, future research should 
investigate explanations which discern between those who do act and those who do not. Appendix F shows the local 
bureaucrats who thought climate change was happening but decided not to act plotted on the 2x2 theorized table. 
They are not included in Section 3 of this chapter because they did not act. However, including their autonomy and 
agreement scores provides an additional dimension of the model. Three bureaucrats should have acted in a non-
confrontational way (NV-Local Bureaucrat-734, Mr. Bruketta, and Ms. Boone). Two bureaucrats should have acted 
defiantly (NC-Local Bureaucrat-823 and Mr. Holland).  
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8). The bureaucrats who were correctly predicted are in green and those who are incorrectly 
predicted are in red. 
Hypothesis 5 is broken into four subparts – one for each type of behavior in the 2x2 table. 
Each subpart will be evaluated separately and then all four will be considered together to 
evaluate hypothesis 5 overall which states if a bureaucrat acts to integrate climate change into 
existing policy, the form her action takes will depend upon her level of autonomy and the extent 
of problem definition agreement in the policymaking community. 
The first subpart of hypothesis 5 addresses defiant behavior. It says: when the bureaucrat 
is autonomous and there is low problem definition agreement in the policymaking community, 
she will act defiantly. Only one bureaucrat was observed to act defiantly: Ms. Cox from 
Pasquotank County, NC. According to the measures for autonomy and problem definition 
agreement, the model correctly predicts Ms. Cox’s behavior. She has high autonomy and faces a 
policymaking community where her superiors disagree with her that climate change adaptation 
should be integrated into existing policies. Therefore, there is support for this hypothesis, but 
with only one data point, so more data are required to make a strong conclusion. 
According to the model, Ms. Gucker from Greenville County, SC and Mr. Meyers from 
the City of Fort Pierce, FL should also act defiantly.  Both Ms. Gucker and Mr. Meyers have 
high levels of independence and they do not face policymaking communities that agree on the  
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Non-confrontational behavior Politician-led action 
Defiant behavior Cooperative action 
Figure 8: Predicted Forms of Bureaucratic Action, Based on Observed Autonomy and Agreement Measures 
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need to include climate adaptation in existing policy. However, both Ms. Gucker and Mr. Meyers 
were observed to have non-confrontational behavior. In these cases, it is possible that the lack of 
expressed opinion on climate change led both Ms. Gucker89 and Mr. Meyers90 to choose not to 
exercise their available autonomy by taking a more defiant stance. While neither Ms. Gucker nor 
Mr. Meyers expressed trepidation about addressing climate change, neither attempted to draw 
attention of elected officials in their communities to their climate adaptation efforts. 
The second part of hypothesis 5 addresses cooperative behavior. It posits that when there 
is high agreement in the policymaking community and the bureaucrat has high autonomy, we 
should see bureaucrats cooperating and working with politicians to address climate change. Six 
bureaucrats were observed demonstrating cooperative behavior, but according to the model only 
five were predicted to be acting cooperatively. In other words, the model correctly predicted the 
actions of Mr. Brown, Mr. Revell, Mr. Freudenthal, Mr. Cook, and NV-Local Bureaucrat-282, 
but missed for NV-Local Bureaucrat-895. 
NV-Local Bureaucrat-895 was predicted to be in the politician-led action quadrant but 
acted cooperatively. It is possible that the Water for the Season’s organization imposed a 
cooperative structure which overcame the limits that NV-Local Bureaucrat-895 might otherwise 
have encountered due to their low level of autonomy.  Future studies should look at the influence 
                                                 
89 Data on the political leanings and climate change attitudes of residents of Greenville County, SC suggest that the 
county is conservative. In 2008, 37.2% of voters chose the Democratic candidate: Barack Obama for president. In 
2012, 35.2% supported Obama and in 2016, 34.7% voted for Clinton (New York Times, 2009; New York Times, 
2013; New York Times, 2017). However, there is concern about climate change (59% believe climate change is 
happening, 44% are worried about it, and 32% believe it will hurt them personally (Marlon, Howe, Mildenberger, & 
Leiserowitz, 2016). 
90 Data on political leanings of the residents of Fort Pierce, FL and attitudes on climate change for the city are 
unavailable because they are aggregated at the county, not city, level. However, the county level data for St. Lucie 
County (where Fort Pierce is located) suggest a moderate population. Fifty-six percent (55.7%) voted for Obama in 
2008, 53.5% voted for Obama in 2012, and 47.5% voted for Clinton in 2016 (New York Times, 2009; New York 
Times, 2013; New York Times, 2017). Additionally, 62% of St. Lucie County residents believe climate change is 
happening, 51% are worried about climate change, and 34% think it will hurt them personally (Marlon, Howe, 
Mildenberger, & Leiserowitz, 2016). 
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of organizations like Water for the Seasons and the Yakima Integrated Plan which change local 
policymaking dynamics (for work on cooperation in public admininstration generally, see Ansell 
& Gash, 2007; McGuire, 2006). It is likely that participation in these organizations by low-
autonomy bureaucrats gives them more equal footing with their superiors to present ideas and 
work collaboratively when they might not have otherwise.  
Overall, the model correctly predicted five of the six incidents of cooperative behavior. 
The model could be improved by including a dimension measuring the existence and influence 
of an external organization like Water for the Seasons and the Yakima Integrated Plan, especially 
because these organizations often have multiple goals. Individuals and governments may choose 
to become involved because one goal is especially important to them but end up adopting the 
other goals as a byproduct of their involvement. Additionally, this can lower the potential 
political costs for elected officials who might be unwilling to break with their partisan or 
ideological commitments. And this project finds some evidence that politicians who identify as 
conservative are taking action on climate change and working cooperatively with their 
bureaucratic staff to address the issue – like Commissioner Jewell in Kittitas County or 
Commissioner Leita in Yakima County.  
Part three of hypothesis 5 addresses politician-led action. It predicts that politician-led 
action will occur when bureaucrats have low levels of autonomy in a policymaking community 
with high levels of agreement on climate change adaptation. In the model, four bureaucrats were 
predicted to demonstrate politician-led action: NV-Local Bureaucrat-895, Ms. Murray, Ms. 
Fitzpatrick, and Mr. Donaldson. (Ms. Drum was also a participant in this project but is not 
included as a case because she could not be reached for an interview to confirm her actions and 
attitudes as reported by her coworkers.) As discussed above, NV-Local Bureaucrat-895 actually 
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worked cooperatively to address climate change. The model was mostly accurate for this form of 
action, predicting three of the four bureaucrats correctly. 
The final form of action was non-confrontational behavior.  As the fourth part of 
hypothesis 5 says, we expect to see non-confrontational behavior to occur when bureaucrats have 
low levels of autonomy and they face a policymaking community that disagrees about the need 
to adapt. The model predicts that four bureaucrats will engage in non-confrontational behavior: 
Mr. Bishop, Mr. Satterlee, Mr. Bessey, and FL-Local Bureaucrat-762. However, six bureaucrats 
were observed engaging in non-confrontational behavior. As discussed above, Mr. Meyers and 
Ms. Gucker were predicted to behave defiantly but instead acted in a non-confrontational way.  
Another interesting thing to note: for all six bureaucrats who engaged in non-
confrontational behavior, their elected officials did not take a public position on climate change. 
It is possible, then, that defiant behavior emerges in the face of true disagreement but non-
confrontational behavior is more likely when the elected leaders and the bureaucrat’s superiors 
are apathetic on the issue. This inspired a closer look at the power of bureaucrats to shape local 
climate responses without involvement from elected officials. It appears that limited progress can 
be achieved by bureaucrats on their own without help from elected officials or other sources of 
support. 
While the model correctly predicted the behavior of 13 of the 16 bureaucrats in the study 
who acted to address climate change, the inaccurate predictions exposed flaws in the model 
which are worth examining. First, bureaucratic behavior appears to be better predicted by the 
bureaucrat’s understanding of support from other policymakers. Even though the bureaucrats in 
the defiant behavior and non-confrontational behavior categories acted to address climate 
adaptation, they were less committed than those in the politician-led and cooperative action 
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categories. The involvement of elected officials seems to lend a legitimacy (possible a sense of 
democratic accountability) which allows local bureaucrats to make changes in policy. 
Furthermore, non-confrontational behavior was best predicted by an apathetic attitude on 
the need for climate adaptation among elected leaders rather than disagreement that climate 
change adaptation is needed. Many local elected officials did not even comment on climate 
adaptation. It is possible, then, that local elected officials as a group (on average) do not see the 
local level as the correct scale for addressing adaptation. Future studies should examine how 
widespread this sentiment is among local elected officials, because this is potentially a large 
barrier to local adaptation. Additionally, cooperative action was better predicted by the presence 
of a collaborative partnership project than by the bureaucrat’s level of autonomy. This makes 
sense because the partnership externally imposes a cooperative structure which inspired elected 
official involvement and equalizes bureaucratic involvement in the partnership. 
Even though the model had a high accuracy rate: 13 of 16, it should be improved before 
being applied to a larger sample. It revealed the need for including more variables which change 
the dynamic between bureaucrats and their superiors. For instance, including the role of resource 
availability might help explain why some bureaucrats chose to act and others did not as well as 
why some acted in one way and not the other. 
4. Conclusion and Implications 
The central questions of this chapter were (1) do local bureaucrats influence and create 
local climate adaptation policy (in small- to medium-sized cities and counties in conservative 
areas) and (2) how do they achieve this? From a sample of 30 bureaucrats from 18 cities and 
counties, 16 bureaucrats took action (in nine cities and counties) to develop climate adaptation 
policy in their communities. 
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The approach these 16 bureaucrats took varied. Most (15 of 16) used their area of 
expertise to provide information about the risks their community will face as the climate changes 
(supporting hypothesis 3). Many, but not all, thought that integrating climate change into existing 
policies would be the way to begin adapting (supporting hypothesis 4). Four bureaucrats 
presented this argument to their superiors or peers. Five more supported ongoing efforts to 
address climate change they did not initiate themselves. Two bureaucrats thought a 
comprehensive policy approach is needed to address climate change and began working with a 
third co-worker to create one. And five bureaucrats used their discretion to add climate 
adaptation to existing policy. 
Bureaucrats commonly used the precautionary principal to support adaptation. In this 
way, they separated local adaptation efforts from larger debates on cause and blame related to 
climate change. By separating these arguments, they could more easily gain the support of 
conservative politicians who do not believe climate change is the fault of humans (McCright & 
Dunlap, 2011). 
This study also shows the importance of multi-stakeholder organizations which 
encourage cooperation between groups and between politicians and bureaucrats in local 
governments. Projects like Water for the Seasons in Nevada and the Yakima Integrated Plan in 
Washington state provide structures for local governments to address an otherwise expensive and 
overwhelming issue like preparing for sea level rise or mega-droughts. 
Chapter 4 tested the model shown in Figure 1 that argued bureaucratic action – defiant 
behavior, cooperative action, politician-led action, or non-confrontational behavior – is 
influenced by the interaction of bureaucratic autonomy and problem definition agreement. The 
model correctly predicted the behavior of 13 of the 16 bureaucrats. Despite this high success 
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rate, I argue that there is only partial support for the model (and therefore hypothesis 5). The 
three bureaucrats the model did not correctly describe revealed the need for revising the model. 
Bureaucratic autonomy did not interact with problem definition agreement entirely as expected.  
First, defiant behavior is the product of disagreement and high autonomy as expected, but 
this combination is necessary but not sufficient. There were bureaucrats who had high 
disagreement levels and high autonomy who did not act at all: NC-Local Bureaucrat-823 and Mr. 
Holland from Craven County (see Appendix F). Therefore, something else is necessary to 
explain the choice to act defiantly rather than not at all. Potentially the bureaucrat needs to feel 
like she has support for her actions from outside the local government. For Ms. Cox in 
Pasquotank County, this came in the form of UNC Chapel Hill students who completed a sea 
level rise vulnerability analysis and presented it to the local elected officials. It could also have 
resulted from a change in state leadership (see Chapter 5 for a longer discussion of the role of the 
state in local climate adaptation). 
Second, two bureaucrats who were predicted to act defiantly engaged in non-
confrontational behavior instead (Ms. Gucker and Mr. Meyers). Looking at the six bureaucrats 
(from three local governments) who acted non-confrontationally, their behavior is better 
explained by politicians’ non-engagement with climate change adaptation as an issue. This 
supports the idea that bureaucrats can be an alternative policymaking pathway (see Klyza and 
Sousa, 2008). Bureaucrats can act on low salience issues with real consequences for the 
community that elected leaders are uninterested in (due to limited attention, ideological 
commitments, partisan consequences, etc.). Considering this, non-confrontational behavior has 
less to do with autonomy than the model suggests. Instead, the ability to influence policy using 
discretion was the only necessary element in the autonomy measure. In short, non-
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confrontational behavior is better understood as the outcome of (1) unengaged politicians, (2) 
bureaucrats thinking the issue is pressing, and (3) bureaucratic discretionary ability.  
Cooperative action is also underexplained. While bureaucratic agreement with superiors 
is necessary, high autonomy is not. The existence and influence of multi-stakeholder 
organizations does more to explain cooperation than high autonomy. While there is a great deal 
of research looking at collaboration and networks in public administration (see Ansell & Gash, 
2007 for an overview of collaboration and Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004 for an 
overview of networks), none to date examines how these structures influence the relationship 
between bureaucrats and the elected officials they serve or how collaborative structures and 
networks alter bureaucrats’ level of autonomy. The data in this project suggest that multi-
stakeholder organizations shape bureaucrat-elected leader relationships by encouraging them to 
cooperate more, becoming partners representing their locality instead of principal and agent. 
While the politician-led action category fit the model well, this does not provide insight 
into bureaucratic behavior because it represents the straightforward elected-leader-as-principal 
and bureaucrat-as-agent model expected in politician-bureaucrat relationships. This category just 
represents those bureaucrats who agree with the politicians they serve, so moral hazard is not a 
problem.91 
Overall, this chapter demonstrates that bureaucrats play a significant role in the 
development of local climate adaptation policy. They move policy through exercising discretion, 
arguing that potential costs of inaction outweigh the costs of preparedness (precautionary 
principal), and participating in multi-stakeholder organizations to share costs and tackle larger 
                                                 
91 Moral hazard is a frequently studied concern in the bureaucratic politics literature. Moral hazard describes the 
situation where agents do not share the same values as their principals, forcing principals to create incentive 
structures so agents will act in line with principal’s values (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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projects. Not all bureaucrats who thought climate adaptation was important acted, but the 
majority did (16 of 21). 
In the next chapter, I examine how policymaking dynamics for climate change adaptation 
change when we look at states as the principals and bureaucrats as agents representing their 
localities.   
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CHAPTER 5: THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONTEXT AROUND DISASTER MITIGATION AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 
1. Introduction 
 Local government bureaucrats’ actions are shaped by their intergovernmental context in 
addition to the preferences of local political leaders. This chapter seeks to describe the 
intergovernmental signals bureaucrats receive on climate adaptation and understand how those 
signals shape bureaucratic action in the realm of disaster management policy.  
Disaster management policy is largely set by the federal government through FEMA and 
administered by local governments. FEMA provides resources, sets standards, and encourages 
local participation in its programs through a mix of grants and funding incentives. State 
governments set additional standards and serve as an intermediary between FEMA and local 
governments. Local governments who participate in FEMA’s programs – including hazard 
mitigation planning and floodplain management – can receive grants and other fiscal benefits. 
 While local governments have effectively ceded authority over the shape of disaster 
management policy to the federal government, scholars have described this as a willing trade by 
local governments who lack the resources to act on their own (Birkland & Waterman, 2008). 
This arrangement is described by Conlan (2006) as opportunistic federalism instead of the more 
cooperative federalism that dominated intergovernmental relations at the close of World War II. 
In an opportunistic federalism system, individual governments work to pursue their best interest 
without concern for institutional arrangements and effective policy implementation. For disaster 
management, local governments must cope with a system that encourages them to craft disaster 
management policies in the hope of pleasing multiple principals in order to secure the funds and 
other resources they need to prepare for and respond to disasters. When an agent responds to 
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multiple principals, they are responding to a dynamic and often competitive environment where 
their principals are jostling for power – and in this case policy outcomes (Whitford, 2005). 
 Local bureaucrats tasked with disaster management are then left to interpret a 
complicated intergovernmental environment. As Figure 9 (below92) shows, FEMA crafts policy 
requirements and provides funding for disaster mitigation policy to state governments, 
specifically state emergency management agencies. Those agencies then set additional 
                                                 
92 This is also described in Chapter 1, Section 7. 
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requirements and potentially add extra money to FEMA funds, but they do not implement 
disaster management policy. The role of implementer is left to the local government, which in 
this case is specifically the local bureaucrat in charge of disaster management. The local 
bureaucrat is the individual who crafts local policies and ensures they are aligned with state and 
federal requirements so that the local government can receive funding in the event of a disaster 
or for completing projects to minimize the impacts of predictable disasters. 
 Local bureaucrats, therefore, are answerable to three sets of principals: FEMA, state 
emergency managers, and local elected officials. As it pertains to climate change adaptation, all 
three sets of principals are not likely to be pleased by the same action. For this study, cases were 
chosen specifically so that conflict would be likely between these principals. As this chapter will 
show, FEMA and state governments often send conflicting signals which are compounded by 
local principals’ anti-climate attitudes or apathy for disaster management policymaking (except 
in times of crisis, as described in Chapter 4).  
 Taking into account this complex intergovernmental arrangement, this chapter tests the 
hypothesis that money talks in deciding how local bureaucrats navigate the disagreements 
between their various principals. Since bureaucrats must follow the chain of command where 
they must first interact with state governments before accessing resources from FEMA, I test the 
following: When state governments oppose climate change action, local bureaucrats are less 
likely to act for fear of losing an important source of disaster mitigation or relief funding 
(Hypothesis 6).  
To test this hypothesis, this chapter is organized as follows: In section 2, I describe the 
signals from the federal government on climate change, focusing on President Barack Obama93 
                                                 
93 President Obama was in office for the entirety of the data collection for this study, and therefore the President 
whom local bureaucrats would be responding to. 
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and FEMA. Then, in section 3, I look at state governments’ attitudes on climate change. Section 
4 describes the status of local climate policy for each case as well as how local bureaucrats’ 
actions are understood vis-à-vis state principals. Finally, in section 5, I evaluate hypothesis 6 and 
find that only one local government chose not to address climate change because it might 
endanger their relationship with the state and subsequent opportunities to receive disaster 
mitigation funding. Although bureaucrats are responding to multiple principals, it does not 
appear that they craft disaster management and climate adaptation policy to please state 
principals. This may be due to the low salience of disaster management policy, the highly 
technocratic (bureaucrat-expert controlled) nature of disaster management policy, and the 
relative freedom many local governments have in creating their own policy free from state 
oversight. These reasons are described in more detail in the conclusion. 
2. Signals from the Federal Government on Climate Change 
 This section considers the signals sent by President Obama and FEMA about climate 
change adaptation in disaster management policy. First it addresses President Obama’s 
leadership on climate change because it shapes FEMA’s policy priorities. Second, it examines 
FEMA’s climate adaptation and disaster management policies.  
2.1 President Obama’s Administration and Climate Change Adaptation 
 During his presidency, President Obama issued several executive orders directing federal 
agencies to consider climate change mitigation and adaptation. Executive Order 13514 – 
“Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance” – established 
climate mitigation as an important goal of the Obama Administration and federal agencies. 
Section 16 of this order addressed climate adaptation, saying: 
“In addition to other roles and responsibilities of agencies with respect to 
environmental leadership as specified in this order, the agencies shall participate 
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actively in the interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force, which is 
already engaged in developing the domestic and international dimensions of a 
U.S. strategy for adaptation to climate change, and shall develop approaches 
through which the policies and practices of the agencies can be made compatible 
with and reinforce that strategy.” (Executive Order No. 13514, 2009). 
Four years later on November 1, 2013, President Obama issued Executive Order 13652 – 
“Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change.” This order instructed agencies 
to promote:  
“(1) engaged and strong partnerships and information sharing at all levels of 
government, (2) risk-informed decision-making and the tools to facilitate it, (3) 
adaptive learning in which experiences serve as opportunities to inform and adjust 
future actions, and (4) preparedness planning.” (Executive Order No. 13652, 
2013) 
This Executive Order also established the State, Local, and Tribal Leaders Task Force on 
Climate Preparedness and Resilience, a body representing all levels of U.S. government and 
indigenous governments. The Task Force was charged with making recommendations to the 
president for how federal government agencies could help communities respond to climate 
change. They issued their recommendations to the President in a public document published in 
November 2014 and a subsequent update in July 2015. 
The Executive Order and recommendations from the Task Force pushed federal agencies 
to develop climate adaptation plans and, where possible, encourage and support local efforts to 
adapt to climate change. The next section describes how FEMA addressed climate change 
adaptation under the Obama Administration. 
2.2 FEMA Climate Change Adaptation Policies 
First, it is important to understand how FEMA’s policies are administered to understand 
how they address climate change adaptation. FEMA’s policies are administered at the local level 
(see Figure 9). While FEMA does employ some of their own emergency responders who help 
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local emergency responders, most FEMA employees work at an administrative level: drawing 
flood maps, approving local hazard mitigation plans, and helping develop disaster response and 
mitigation measures. While FEMA relies on local bureaucrats to implement their policies, the 
agency rarely has a direct relationship with local bureaucrats. Instead, they work through state 
governments and interact with local governments only in the aftermath of disasters or during 
specific projects (like disaster preparation efforts). FEMA, then, largely provides resources to 
local governments. With these resources, FEMA provides information and sets standards which 
encourage local governments to approach emergency management in a certain way – in this case 
in a way that is sensitive to climate adaptation.  
 The federal government addresses flooding and drought through two FEMA programs: 
Hazard Mitigation Planning (disaster preparation and response programs94) and the National 
Floodplain Insurance Program (NFIP). Both programs are structured so that local governments 
implement large portions of the programs. I will briefly describe the role local governments play 
in implementing these policies. First, I describe hazard mitigation plans. Second, I describe the 
NFIP. 
 Local governments craft their own disaster preparedness plans – called hazard mitigation 
plans – which outline steps they will take to minimize potential damage from likely disasters 
(e.g. severe storms, hurricanes, floods, droughts, and earthquakes) and how they will respond 
                                                 
94 Hazard mitigation plans address drought as well, but mostly focus on the frequency of drought. These plans are 
not necessarily equipped to address the complex water storage solutions needed to truly address drought. Instead, 
water storage is addressed through the Bureau of Reclamation which addresses drought management in the U.S. 
west by attempting to store enough water for agriculture, commercial, and domestic use in aquifers and reservoirs. 
Hazard mitigation plans do not address expanding these storage basins, but rather include plans for responding to 
drought like enforcing water restrictions (not watering lawns every day, rationing water, etc.). This project does not 
address the Bureau of Reclamation because it does not have the same principal-agent relationship to local 
governments that FEMA does. The Bureau of Reclamation works in partnership with local governments, but it only 
maintains water storage on federal land. Local governments have an interest in how much water is stored on federal 
land because that water eventually leaves federal land and is used by localities. However, localities do not 
implement the Bureau of Reclamation’s policies in the same way they implement FEMA’s policies. 
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should a disaster strike. If FEMA approves a local government’s hazard mitigation plan,95 the 
local government qualifies for increased levels of federal government support in the aftermath of 
a disaster and is eligible for disaster mitigation grants (i.e. preventing the worst impacts of 
predictable disasters). 
Although FEMA has some first responders who arrive on the scene of major disasters – 
like Hurricane Katrina, Superstorm Sandy, etc. – local governments’ first responders are the first 
on the scene and the last to leave. Furthermore, local government bureaucrats (in departments 
like engineering, land management, zoning enforcement, building code enforcement, and 
emergency management) work to implement disaster preparedness programs. These programs 
include strategies like setting up early warning systems, keeping buildings out of flood-prone 
areas, and setting up evacuation plans and shelters. Most of the time, FEMA’s role is to support 
local government bureaucrats with data, best practice suggestions, and other resources so that 
local bureaucrats can effectively implement disaster management efforts. 
Similarly, the NFIP is implemented by local actors. FEMA employees provide guidelines 
for local flood ordinances that local governments must meet to qualify for insurance and issue 
flood maps to help them determine areas where flooding is most likely to occur.96 FEMA also 
developed a ranking system called the Community Rating System which evaluates the strength 
of flood management policies in a community. Higher rankings for the Community Rating 
System lead to lower insurance rates for members of a community. However, local governments 
are responsible for enforcing flood ordinances which address things like how high buildings need 
                                                 
95 State governments approve the plans before they are sent to FEMA. This means that both the state government 
and FEMA have veto power over local government hazard mitigation plans. 
96 Flood maps are complex, negotiated political documents as much as they are reflections of a scientifically 
measured flood risk. FEMA issues maps based on flood models and satellite imaging, but local governments can 
appeal the maps. Sometimes these changes are motivated by a greater understanding of local conditions. However, 
they are also motivated by economic or political reasons which distort objective flood risk (Pralle S., 2017). 
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to be above base flood elevation and where habitable structures can be built. Flood policy is 
enforced through a combination of zoning rules, building codes (and inspections), and land use 
planning documents. While FEMA sets policy parameters, they do not engage in implementation 
of flood insurance policy.  
FEMA began to incorporate climate adaptation into their policies following President 
Obama’s Executive Order 13514. In January 2012, FEMA Administrator W. Craig Fugate and 
FEMA Office of Policy and Program Analysis Director David J. Kaufman signed and released a 
new administrative policy on climate change adaptation. The policy’s purpose was: 
“…to establish an Agency-wide directive to integrate climate change adaptation 
planning and actions into Agency programs, policies, and operations.” 
In line with this policy, FEMA’s guidebook for local hazard mitigation planning was updated to 
include climate change adaptation. In the October 1, 2011 edition, the guide first mentioned 
climate change as a factor local governments could include in their plans. The guide said that 
including extra elements like climate change adaptation signals that the community is genuinely 
interested in hazard mitigation and that these communities “will be better positioned to receive 
FEMA technical and financial assistance to implement their actions or projects,” (p. 6). In the 
March 2013 update to the guidebook, FEMA took this a step further by encouraging local 
governments to address climate change adaptation and giving more guidance on how to do so: 
“The planning team may decide to include a discussion of the impacts of climate 
change in the risk assessment. This is not required by federal mitigation planning 
regulation, but can provide a better understanding of how risk may change in the 
future. Climate change in and of itself may not be a hazard, but it may change the 
characteristics of the hazards that currently affect the planning area. The planning 
team can include climate change as a separate section in the plan or within 
descriptions of the existing hazards, such as severe storms, flooding, wildfire, and 
drought.” (p. 5-8) 
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 Similarly, the NFIP and Community Rating System programs encouraged communities 
to consider climate change and sea level rise in their planning. NFIP went through several policy 
changes and revisions since Hurricane Katrina revealed serious flaws in the program.97 To 
address climate change, FEMA began incorporating sea level rise into their flood modeling 
(although it did not make it into the official maps sent to communities) and added climate change 
as a dimension for local communities to consider in crafting their flood plans. The agency also 
announced that applications for community flood ratings and hazard mitigation programs that 
take climate adaptation into account are more likely to be funded. While they are not requiring 
climate adaptation planning, they are sending strong signals encouraging it. 
FEMA’s strategic plan (2014-2018) included several references to the importance of 
climate adaptation for disaster management. The document called for the emergency response 
community to take the risks from climate change seriously. They wrote: 
“A changing climate is already resulting in quantifiable changes to risks 
communities face, showing that future risks are not the same as those faced in the 
past. State, tribal, territorial, and local demands for climate-enabled risk 
management information and tools are expected to rise and evolve as the need to 
adapt to climate change increases.” (p. 29) 
FEMA developed climate adaptation resources and made them available on its website.98 
They included tools for (1) sea level rise mapping, calculators, and a guide for sea level rise 
adaptation, (2) a new process for threat and hazard identification which includes climate 
modelling, (3) access to climate.gov – a large federal data repository for climate data, and (4) 
links to other government agencies’ efforts on climate adaptation.  
                                                 
97 For a complete history of these changes, see “A Broke, and Broken, Flood Insurance Program” in The New York 
Times (Walsh, 2017) 
98 Data collection for this project ended in November 2016. All conclusions reflect Obama-era only FEMA climate 
actions. Since then, several of these resources have been removed from FEMA’s website. 
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FEMA also launched several pilot programs to encourage climate adaptation innovation 
including the Community Resilience Innovation Challenge. This program funded 30 
communities’ climate adaptation projects. It is a public-private partnership, funded by the 
Rockefeller Foundation and administered by the Los Angeles Emergency Preparedness 
Foundation. 
 In sum, under the Obama Administration, FEMA began to incorporate climate adaptation 
into their policies and encouraged local governments to start considering how they might need to 
adapt to climate change. It incorporated climate adaptation goals into its hazard mitigation plan 
program and its flood insurance program, sending strong signals that climate adaptation is 
important for local governments. 
3. State Government Climate Change Attitudes  
 In this section, I describe the attitudes of each state government on climate change and 
the signals they send to local governments about the issue. First, however, it is useful to 
understand the different forms of state-local relationships. State-local relations are often 
described as Dillon’s rule or home rule states. These classifications do not come from the U.S. 
Constitution, it does not mention local governments. Instead, the evolution of state-local 
relationships has been largely left up to interpretation by the courts. Two court cases in particular 
defined the spectrum of state-local relations. Both were written in the aftermath of the Civil War 
when the courts began ruling on questions pertaining to state-local relationships as city 
governments grew in size and influence. Judge John Dillon from Iowa wrote in an 1868 ruling 
(Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and the Missouri River Railroad, 1868) that local governments were 
subordinate to state governments. They could not craft their own policies independent of state 
approval. In contrast, Judge Thomas Cooley from Michigan ruled in 1871 that local governments 
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had an inherent right of self-governance (People v. Hurlbut, 1871). These two perspectives – 
commonly known as Dillon’s Rule and home rule (Cooley’s ruling) – came to define the 
spectrum state-local relationships (Richardson, Jr., 2011).  
 However, modern scholars of federalism argue that juxtaposing Dillon’s Rule and home 
rule is an oversimplification of state-local relationships (Richardson, Jr., 2011; Grumm & 
Murphy, 1974; Wolman, McManmon, Bell, & Brunori, 2008). Instead, home rule and Dillon’s 
Rule represent two different and not entirely conflicting interpretations of state-local 
relationships. According to Richardson (2011), Dillon’s Rule is a statutory interpretation used by 
courts to clarify legislative intent whereas home rule is a way to clarify the separate spheres of 
state and local power and responsibility. Grumm and Murphy (1974) argue that over time the 
move towards or away from Dillon’s Rule or home rule interpretations of state-local 
relationships is less meaningful than the concentration of power in bureaucracies over elected 
politicians.  
 Wolman et al. (2008) constructed a measure of state-local relationships to describe the 
amount of autonomy local governments have in each state to create and implement their own 
policies, going beyond the home rule-Dillon’s Rule dichotomy. Their measure attempts to 
capture the range of areas where local governments have influence over policy and fiscal 
freedom to achieve those policy goals. As the authors describe, the measure: 
“define[s] local government autonomy conceptually as a system of local 
government in which local government units have an important role to play in the 
economy and the intergovernmental system, have discretion in determining what 
they will do without undue constraint from higher levels of government, and have 
the means or capacity to do so.” p. 377 
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Wolman et al. build their measure based on: (1) local government importance in the 
intergovernmental system, (2) policy discretion,99 and (3) local government capacity. According 
to their measure, the five states in this study range from high local autonomy in Florida to low-
to-moderate local autonomy in Washington State. Wolman et al.’s scores range from the highest 
local autonomy in New York State (score = 0.845) to the lowest autonomy in Delaware (score = 
-0.982). The scores for the five states in this study below are: 
Table 10: Wolman et al. Scores for Local Autonomy 
State Score Low or High Local Autonomy 
Florida 0.378 Moderate-high autonomy 
South Carolina 0.201 Moderate-high autonomy 
North Carolina 0.131 Moderate autonomy 
Nevada 0.103 Moderate autonomy 
Washington -0.073 Moderate-low autonomy 
 
 Although not representing the extremes of high- and low-autonomy, Wolman et al.’s 
scores show that there is variation in local autonomy across the five states in this study. As this 
chapter will demonstrate, local governments in moderate-high autonomy states (Florida and 
South Carolina) are more able to act without worrying about state attitudes. 
 Next, I discuss the attitudes of each state government on climate adaptation. The states 
are arranged from most anti-climate change adaptation to pro-climate change adaptation.  
3.1 North Carolina 
 North Carolina’s government alternated between Democratic control and Republican 
control since 2010. During periods of Democratic control, the state encouraged climate 
                                                 
99 Discretion is used by Wolman et al. (2008) slightly differently than by scholars focused on bureaucratic action 
(like Teodoro (2011) and Lipsky (2010)). In this chapter, Wolman et al.’s version of discretion is referred to as 
“policy discretion” and street-level bureaucratic discretion is referred to as “implementing discretion”. Both 
represent important aspects of local bureaucrats’ autonomy as representatives of their local government (agents) to 
the state government (the principal).  
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adaptation and during periods of Republic control, the state actively discouraged climate 
adaptation. The reversals of policy in 2012 which continued until 2016 drew national attention – 
including that of comedian and satirist Stephen Colbert100 - for changing policy to downplay the 
threat of sea level rise along the state’s vulnerable coastline. 
 In 2010, the North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission released a sea level rise 
assessment which determined that the coast will experience 39-inches in sea level rise by the 
year 2100. This analysis was completed by a panel of scientists and engineers who generated 
predictions using historical trends and climate change prediction models (N.C. Coastal 
Resources Commission's Science Panel on Coastal Hazards, 2010). The 39-inch rise in sea level 
rise would devastate the coast – washing away most of the Outer Banks and flooding cities in the 
Inner Banks region, as Figure 10 shows. 
The report drew opposition from the newly created NC-20 advocacy group.101 NC-20 
represents the 20 coastal counties in North Carolina and is comprised of public officials, county 
managers, and business leaders (Dewitt, 2014). In 2010, the state legislature (the General 
Assembly) was controlled by Democrats and the Governor – Beverly Perdue – was a Democrat. 
During Purdue’s tenure as governor, NC-20’s initial lobby efforts made no changes in the 
Coastal Resources Commission’s conclusions on sea level rise or state policy. 
                                                 
100 On June 4, 2012, Stephen Colbert’s Colbert Report news-comedy-satire program drew national attention to a law 
which prevented the North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission from using climate change models to predict 
future sea level rise. This move was mocked by the comedian who said, “I think this is a brilliant solution, if your 
science gives you a result that you don’t like, pass a law saying the result is illegal. Problem solved.” 
101 According to the group’s website, NC-20 formed to oppose new state stormwater regulations proposed by the NC 
Department of Environmental Quality’s Environmental Management Commission. The group saw the new 
regulations as onerous. It quickly turned its advocacy efforts to fighting the Coastal Resources Commission sea level 
rise estimates when they were released as well. 
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Figure 10: Map of Predicted Sea Level Rise along North Carolina Coast 
167 
 However, in 2011 Republicans won a majority of seats in the General Assembly. In 2012, 
the legislature passed a four-year moratorium on new sea level rise reports and directed the 
Coastal Resources Commission to revise its prediction based on a 30-year limited outlook 
(Dewitt, 2014). This policy change was welcomed by members of the NC-20 organization. The 
changes drastically limited the predicted sea level rise to 8 inches by privileging historical data 
over climate modeling (Rawlins, 2012).  
 By 2013, when Republican Governor Pat McCrory took office, sea level rise had become 
a hot button issue in the state. As Governor, McCrory supported appointments to the Coastal 
Resources Commission who were interested in protecting economic development over providing 
sea level rise predictions and included members of NC-20 on the Commission.102 When the 
commission met in spring 2014, it voted to limit sea level rise studies to a 30-year outlook 
corresponding with the term of a typical home mortgage (WUNC News, 2014).103 
 Governor McCrory repeatedly attributed climate change to natural cycles and questioned 
the extent to which humans were causing changes in global temperature and climate (Associated 
Press, 2014). Therefore, from 2011 to 2016, North Carolina’s local governments received strong 
signals from the legislature and the governor to avoid discussion of climate change or sea level 
rise. 
                                                 
102 The Coastal Resources Commission members (13 total) are appointed by the Governor, Speaker of the House, 
and Senate President Pro Tempore. During this period of Republican control in North Carolina government (2013-
2014), two thirds of the Coastal Resources Commission were replaced (WUNC News, 2014).  
103 At the end of the data collection phase of this study, no new sea level rise predictions had been issued. However, 
the election of Democratic Governor Roy Cooper led to changes in the state’s climate change and sea level rise 
policy. Governor Cooper joined the US Climate Alliance in September 2017 to address climate change in-lieu of the 
federal government withdrawing from the Paris Agreement (Bennett, 2017; Friedman & Plumer, 2017). 
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3.2 Florida 
 Florida’s state government similarly changed positions on climate change adaptation. It 
initially supported action under Governor Charlie Crist, and then rescinded this support under 
Governor Rick Scott. However, the policy changes matched changes in the governorship more 
than changes in partisan control of state government. (Florida has been dominated by Republican 
legislators and Republican governors since 2010.) Charlie Crist became Governor of Florida in 
2007 (as a registered Republican, but he later switched to be an Independent in 2010, (Lazar, 
Konstantinides, Rossoll, & Greve, 2013)) and made climate change an immediate priority. He 
addressed it in his first State of the State address, convened a summit in Miami to discuss climate 
risks, and signed legislation encouraging renewable energy and greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions. In direct contrast to Crist’s actions, Governor Rick Scott began his term in 2011 and 
started deprioritizing the issue and dismantling Crist’s efforts (Dennis & Fears, 2017; Dearen & 
Kay, 2015). According to Associated Press writers Jason Dearen and Jennifer Kay, 
“[Florida state government] has yet to offer a clear plan or coordination to address 
what local officials across Florida’s coast see as a slow-moving emergency. 
Republican Gov. Rick Scott is skeptical of man-made climate change and has put 
aside the task of preparing for sea level rise, an Associated Press review of 
thousands of emails and documents pertaining to the state’s preparations for rising 
seas found.” (Dearen & Kay, 2015) 
 Governor Scott’s administration also banned state environmental bureaucrats from using 
the phrases climate change, global warming, or sustainability (Korten, 2015). While the 
governor’s office has denied that this is an official policy – unwritten or otherwise – critics of the 
governor point to quotes from former state bureaucrats and a hearing where Brian Koon (Chief 
of the Florida Division of Emergency) engaged in verbal gymnastics to avoid saying “climate 
change” during questioning from the Florida Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on 
Transportation, Tourism, and Economic Development (Elfrink, 2016). Furthermore, scientists 
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working on a wide range of reports for the state have confirmed they were encouraged or 
pressured to remove references to climate change from reports they were working on (Allen, 
2015). 
 However, Florida’s state legislature took steps to address climate change and sea level 
rise, albeit small ones, during Governor Scott’s tenure. In May 2015, the legislature passed, and 
Governor Scott signed, a bill which mandated local government comprehensive plans include sea 
level rise as a cause of flood risk (Florida Sea Grant, 2015). The law targeted flood risk planning 
generally, and the inclusion of sea level rise as a required element expands on earlier versions of 
the law that allowed and encouraged local governments to consider sea level rise but did not 
require it. 
 While Florida’s governor is not actively working to address climate change, the 2015 sea 
level rise requirement for comprehensive planning demonstrates he is not trying to stop all 
climate action. However, neither the state Division of Emergency Management nor the 
Department of Environmental Protection (two agencies most likely to address climate change in 
Florida) have resources to help local governments adapt to climate change on their websites. 
3.3 South Carolina 
 The South Carolina state government largely stayed silent on climate change. Governor 
Nikki Haley has made no public comments on climate change104 but has often pointed to the 
efforts her state made to protect the environment (Phillips, 2014). Even during Hurricane 
Joaquin, which dumped up to 20 inches of rain in parts of South Carolina (Weather.gov, 2015), 
leading to historic flooding in October 2015, Governor Haley did not address the potential link 
                                                 
104 As Governor, Haley was largely silent on the issue. However, in her new role as United Nations Ambassador for 
the United States, she has spoken on the issue representing President Trump’s position on the issue (Skiba, 2017). 
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between the storm’s unusual severity and intensity and climate change. Instead she focused on 
emergency response efforts. 
 The state legislature has not directly addressed climate change either. Conservationists in 
the state characterize the body as catering to special interests instead of addressing 
environmental concerns. Nancy Cave – the north coast director of South Carolina’s Coastal 
Conservation League – spoke about a bill, which on its face was responding to sea level rise for 
the community of Debordieu Beach, saying:  
“I don’t think our legislature has acknowledged climate change in any way, shape, 
or form, so I don’t think that’s something they really think about as they make 
decisions and vote on issues. I think that this is special interest legislation that a 
group of wealthy and influential voters are able to influence.” (Atkin, 2014) 
Debordieu Beach is a wealthy coastal community. The bill approved building a sea wall around 
beach houses. Environmental and climate advocates argue that this is a band-aid solution because 
the sea wall will encourage erosion and provide a false sense of security for beach residents 
against rising sea levels and storm surges.  
 South Carolina’s only government report addressing climate change was written by the 
state’s Department of Natural Resources in 2011. The report outlined the expected rate of 
warming in South Carolina and the consequences this warming will have on ecosystems and 
species. The report generated some controversy because it was not immediately released when 
finished. According to environmental and climate advocates, the report was shelved for more 
than a year. 
 The report was finished in November 2011 under the leadership of Department of Natural 
Resources Director John Frampton. Shortly after its completion, Frampton said he was pressured 
to leave his position as director by an administrative appointee of Governor Haley (who was in 
her first year as governor). Although Frampton believed the report was ready for public release, 
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it was not released until after an article came out on February 23, 2013 in The State newspaper in 
Columbia, SC. The article, written by Sammy Fretwell, said: 
“A team of state scientists has outlined serious concerns about the damage South 
Carolina will suffer from climate change – threats that include invading eels, 
dying salt marshes, flooded homes and increased diseases in the state’s wildlife. 
“But few people have seen the team’s study. The findings are outlined in a report 
on global warming that has been kept secret by the S.C. Department of Natural 
Resources for more than a year because agency officials say their ‘priorities have 
changed.’” 
The document was released but has not appeared to influence state policy. 
3.4 Nevada 
 The State of Nevada has done very little to address climate change – neither encouraging 
nor discouraging local governments to prepare for the impacts of climate change. Governor 
Brian Sandoval became Nevada’s governor in 2011 and has been taking the drought problems in 
Nevada seriously while in office, although he is not linking them to climate change. California’s 
drought problems were more dramatic than those in Nevada,105 but the same drought system was 
impacting both states. In 2015, Governor Sandoval organized a drought summit and a panel of 
eight experts called the Nevada Drought Forum to develop solutions to the chronic water 
shortages in the state (Rindels, 2015; Snyder, 2015; Associated Press, 2015). 
 When asked about climate change, Governor Sandoval carefully avoided addressing its 
cause (mainly human driven greenhouse gas emissions), but he also committed his state to 
reducing their greenhouse gas emissions by investing in renewable energy. In an interview with 
                                                 
105 California experienced a historic mega-drought which devastated water supplies in the state. The drought spurred 
serious questions about sustaining California’s thirsty agricultural economy, if people have the right to buy extra 
access to water, and how to govern extreme water shortages which may become more common with climate change 
(Fountain, 2015; Nagourney, Healy and Schwartz, 2015). 
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RealClearPolitics, Governor Sandoval was asked if humans were the main driver of climate 
change. He responded,  
“I’m not qualified to answer that question… let me tell you what we’ve done, 
without getting to whether it’s human-caused or whatever that may be.” (June 
2014) 
While the Governor was unwilling to take a firm stance on the causes of climate change, in 2017 
he supported several state bills to encourage clean energy development in the state.106 
Additionally, Governor Sandoval fought to attract Tesla’s battery factory to the Reno-Sparks 
area in 2014 (Ward, 2014). 
 The only state document to address climate change comes from the Department of 
Conservation and Natural Resources’ Nevada Natural Heritage Program. The report – “State 
Wildlife Action Plan” – was published in 2012 and acknowledges the threat climate change 
poses to wildlife and ecosystems in Nevada.  
 Overall, Nevada’s state government is neither encouraging nor discouraging local 
government action on climate change, and it is not taking any definitive steps of their own to 
address the issue. 
3.5 Washington State 
 Washington State, unlike the other four states in this project, is actively working on 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. These efforts are driven by the state’s Democratic 
leadership and liberal population centers around Seattle.107 Washington State began its efforts in 
2008 after Governor Christine Gregoire issued Executive Order 07-02 which ordered state 
                                                 
106 The Nevada legislature meets once every two years. A search of the 2013, 2015, and 2017 legislative sessions 
revealed only one bill which identified climate change as a reason to change state or local policy. Senate Joint 
Resolution No 10 in 2017 addressed the problems with overconsumption and water shortages in the Colorado River 
Basin. It identified climate change as an additional stressor on the river. 
107 King County was the first county to publish an adaptation plan in 2007 (Georgetown Climate Center, 2015). 
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agencies to mitigate climate change and develop adaptation strategies (Washington State 
Executive Order, No. 07-02, 2007). A year later, the legislature approved the State Agency 
Climate Leadership Act (SB 5560) which ordered state agencies to craft an integrated response 
to climate change to “better enable state and local agencies, public and private businesses, 
nongovernmental organizations, and individuals to prepare for, address, and adapt to the impacts 
of climate change.”  
Since becoming governor in 2013, Jay Inslee worked to maintain Washington State’s 
reputation as a climate leader. He introduced several mitigation initiatives, including a 
controversial carbon tax. His efforts faced opposition in the legislature (Brunner, 2015). 
Members of the legislature cited the costs of these programs and the potential harm they might 
cause to the economy as reasons to oppose them. According to the Seattle Times, opposition is 
coming from both the Republican-controlled state Senate and moderate Democratic members of 
the state House of Representatives (mostly from rural areas) (Brunner, 2015). 
 Governor Inslee took several steps on his own including traveling to the UNFCCC 
COP21108 meeting in Paris where he signed agreements committing his state to greenhouse gas 
reduction agreements with other nations (Governor Jay Inslee's Office, 2015a; Governor Jay 
Inslee's Office, 2015b; Bernton, 2015). He also supported projects related to climate adaptation. 
As Mr. Revell from Yakima County, WA said, climate change projects almost always draw the 
governor’s attention. He said,  
“If you are going to get a hold of the Governor's attention, just talk about carbon 
reduction and climate change. He came up to look at our reservoir, and that was 
the price of his visit. He wanted to talk about climate change. Which we agreed 
because if in fact the climate is changing and getting warmer, we need to be more 
drought resilient.” (Interview with Scott Revell, September 16, 2016). 
                                                 
108 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties 21 
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 The state’s agencies, especially the Department of Ecology, are developing and 
implementing their own climate adaptation strategies. Reports from various state agencies cover 
sea level rise, ecosystem and habitat health, and transportation vulnerability (Georgetown 
Climate Center, 2017). However, the most inclusive report was published by the Department of 
Ecology in April 2012. The report – “Preparing for a Changing Climate: Washington State’s 
Integrated Climate Response Strategy” – addresses how existing policies and programs can be 
updated to prepare the state for the likely impacts of climate change. 
4. Local Governments Climate Policy 
 Sections 2 and 3 established that local bureaucrats are responding to many (often 
conflicting) signals on climate change. Local governments in North Carolina are actively told not 
to adapt to climate change. Florida is sending signals that climate adaptation is not their policy 
priority, but because of home rule and local policy autonomy rules, they cannot forbid local 
action. In South Carolina and Nevada, climate adaptation is not on the state agenda and state 
leaders’ avoidance of the subject does not encourage (or, to be fair, explicitly discourage) local 
action. In only one state – Washington – are local governments actively encouraged to address 
climate adaptation. As hypothesis 6 suggests, local governments respond to signals from state 
governments so they can access money from the state and money from the federal government 
funneled through state governments.  
 To evaluate hypothesis 6, this section covers two things. First, it gives an overview of the 
status of climate adaptation policy in each case. Chapter 3 addressed if climate adaptation was on 
the agenda and which actors brought the issue onto the agenda. Chapter 4 described local 
bureaucrats’ actions to integrate climate change into existing policies. However, this project has 
thus far not outlined the status of any local policies. It is important for evaluating hypothesis 6 to 
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understand the status of climate adaptation policy, especially because many localities in this 
study are addressing climate adaptation through hazard mitigation plans that are required by 
FEMA to be eligible for disaster management grants.109 
 The second part of this section re-examines bureaucratic action in light of state attitudes. 
It employs the same five categories of action used in Chapter 4 but changes the principal in the 
principal-agent relationship from local elected leaders to state governments. If bureaucrats were 
acting as hypothesis 6 suggests, they would avoid conflict with the state because we would 
expect to see fewer bureaucrats acting in a defiant way110 and more seeking to follow the state’s 
lead (state-led/politician-led action), cooperating with the state’s wishes (cooperative action), or, 
if they choose to act against the state’s wishes, trying to minimize any potential harm by acting 
in a non-confrontational way.   
4.1 Climate Change Policy Status for Each Case 
 The status of climate change policy across these 18 cases varies a great deal; in some 
cases, it is not on the agenda and in others, climate adaptation policies are in the implementation 
stage. Each case is described in Table 11. Each locality’s climate change adaptation policy status 
was labeled as either (1) not on the agenda, (2) on the agenda, (3) policy formulation, (4) policy 
adoption, or (5) policy implementation.111  
                                                 
109 To be clear: local governments are not (yet) required to include climate adaptation in documents they submit to 
FEMA. They are required to evaluate their disaster risk and outline steps for minimizing risk before disasters and 
responding to disasters should they occur to minimize harm. FEMA has encouraged the inclusion of climate 
adaptation in these documents. 
110 Considering only one bureaucrat acted defiantly, as identified in Chapter 4, we should see no bureaucrats acting 
defiantly.  
111 These categories are based on Anderson, Brady and Bullock III’s model of the policy process in Public Policy 
and Politics in the United States (1978). Where Anderson, Brady and Bullock III have five categories, they slightly 
differ from those presented here. The authors use five categories: agenda setting, formulation, adoption, 
implementation and evaluation. Here, the evaluation stage is dropped because adaptation policies are new, and few 
are being evaluated. The fifth category used here is “not on the agenda”. 
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 Additionally, this project recognizes the difference between policies that are adopted 
awaiting implementation (i.e. the strategies for implementing the policy are not yet in place) and 
policies that are adopted but are largely unimplemented. In a few cases, climate change 
adaptation was included in a policy document, but the local bureaucrats and politicians are not 
aware of the policy. Therefore, it has been adopted, but that adoption is not changing how the 
government operates. 
 As Table 11 shows, climate change adaptation is not on the agenda in three cases, four 
cases have climate adaptation on the agenda but there is no further action, two cases are 
formulating policies, four cases have adopted policies but these policies are not implemented, 
two cases have adopted policies that are awaiting implementation, and three cases are 
implementing their climate adaptation policies.  
Table 11: Status of Local Government Climate Change Adaptation Policy 
 Case Policy Status Evidence 
N
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h
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Craven 
County 
Adoption of 
policy, but 
unimplemented 
There was action in 2009 by integrating climate adaptation into the Land Use 
Plan (October 2009), but these actions were for “monitoring” and “cooperation” 
with other governments. There were no independent efforts except one project: 
a bulkheading project. Interview indicated that this action was not actively 
implemented. In many ways the local government was not committed to the 
plan. 
They are currently doing nothing to address threat of climate change, and not 
including climate change in any updated plans. 
City of 
Elizabeth 
City 
On the agenda, 
but no action 
The issue has been discussed, but there is no discussion about policy responses 
or efforts to formulate a policy.  
Heard from group of students about need to adapt to sea level rise, but not 
crafted any response. 
City of 
Havelock 
Adoption of 
policy, but 
unimplemented 
Climate adaptation is on the agenda and even incorporated into the 
comprehensive land use plan from 2009. However, interview indicated that this 
is not something that is being actively pursued. There is no evidence that 
Havelock is doing anything about this aspect of the plan. In many ways the plan 
is unimplemented. 
177 
Table 11: Status of Local Government Climate Change Adaptation Policy 
 Case Policy Status Evidence 
N
o
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h
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City of 
New Bern 
On the agenda, 
but no action 
Interviews and documents show climate adaptation is being discussed, and an 
EPA grant was used by UNC students to do a study and make recommendations 
about policy change. Interviews indicate that climate change is not being 
actively considered to be integrated into existing policy. 
Pasquotank 
County 
Policy 
formulation 
Climate adaptation has been discussed and elected officials are not signaling 
support for sea level rise studies/climate action. However, climate adaptation 
has been introduced into the Albemarle Regional HMP which included 
participation from two Pasquotank bureaucrats. Additionally, Shelley Cox 
assisted UNC students in their study of sea level rise issues in Pasquotank 
County. Cox and Christy Saunders (Emergency Management) are making some 
efforts to work on climate adaptation, but the elected officials’ stances are likely 
preventing any action. 
F
lo
ri
d
a
 
F
lo
ri
d
a
 
City of 
Fort Pierce 
On the agenda, 
but no action 
(government-
wide) 
Local bureaucrats are using discretion to discourage development in areas 
threatened by climate-driven flooding. There is no government-wide policy. 
Martin 
County 
Adoption of 
policy, but no 
implementation 
yet 
Climate adaptation was integrated into the Local Mitigation Strategy as a 
hazard to be considered, but there are no steps to respond. Also, there are efforts 
by bureaucrats in the engineering department about creating a separate policy 
for adaptation, but again no concrete steps to implement. 
St. Lucie 
County 
Adoption of 
policy, but no 
implementation 
yet 
Climate adaptation (especially to sea level rise and increasingly severe tropical 
storms) is included in their hazard mitigation documents – the old and the 
updated. They have a long section on sea level rise. However, there are no 
indications that implementation is happening in any way for adaptations to 
these threats. They are being studied, recognized, and incorporated into 
documents that would allow for concrete steps, but there is no indication of 
building infrastructure, hiring adaptation planners, or creating adaptation 
systems. 
N
ev
a
d
a
 
Carson 
City 
Adoption of 
policy, but 
largely 
unimplemented 
Climate change is included in the hazard mitigation plan, including lengthy 
descriptions of the hazards posed by climate change. However, no concrete 
actions have been taken to implement the policy. During interviews, climate 
change was not acknowledged as part of their drought management strategy. 
City of 
Fernley 
On the agenda, 
but no local 
government 
action 
The city is working with the Water for the Seasons project but have not 
integrated any of the project’s recommendations into their own policy efforts. 
178 
Table 11: Status of Local Government Climate Change Adaptation Policy 
 Case Policy Status Evidence 
S
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Greenville 
County 
Policy 
formulation 
Local bureaucrats are discussing climate adaptation, but not taking any action to 
integrate it into existing plans. Discussion about putting climate adaptation into 
the update for hazard mitigation plan but it did not make it into existing plan 
beyond a brief mention that it should be studied. It is possible that forward 
progress would be stopped if FEMA did not require climate adaptation to be 
considered. 
City of 
Mauldin 
Not on the 
agenda 
Climate change is not mentioned in meeting minutes, planning documents, 
media coverage of local government, or interviews with bureaucrats. 
City of 
Greer 
Not on the 
agenda 
Climate change is not mentioned in meeting minutes, planning documents, 
media coverage of local government, or interviews with bureaucrats. 
Oconee 
County 
Not on the 
agenda 
Climate change is not mentioned in meeting minutes, planning documents, 
media coverage of local government, or interviews with bureaucrats. 
W
a
sh
in
g
to
n
 
Grant 
County 
Adoption of 
policy, but 
unimplemented 
Climate change is included in the hazard mitigation plan, including lengthy 
descriptions of the hazards posed by climate change. However, no concrete 
actions were taken to implement the policy and the current emergency 
management program coordinator and county commissioner did not 
acknowledge it when asked about climate change policy. This is an instance 
where the document reflected unimplemented policy. 
Kittitas 
County 
Implementation 
of policy 
Climate change is fully integrated into the Kittitas County Hazard Mitigation 
Plan with action items. Interviews indicate there are steps being taken to meter 
water and require low-flow fixtures. Not all of this is solely driven by climate 
change (there was an over-allocation problem in the county for groundwater 
supplies) but worry about climate change is integrated in the need for action. 
Additionally, the county is a full participant in the Yakima Integrated Plan, 
which takes climate change seriously and is taking concrete steps to deal with 
climate change-drought. 
City of 
Yakima 
Implementation 
of policy 
There is a budget line for aquifer storage and delivery to address climate 
adaptation. Additionally, the city is a full participant in the Yakima Integrated 
Plan, which takes climate change seriously and is taking concrete steps to deal 
with climate change-drought. 
Yakima 
County 
Implementation 
of policy 
The city’s water utility is attempting to address climate change. They are also 
participants in the Integrated Plan which has taken concrete steps to adapt to 
climate change. Interviews indicated participation in the Integrated Plan is 
important for the irrigation districts and the county.  
The Roza Irrigation District in the county is also pursuing many projects to 
increase water storage as a precaution against drought from climate change. 
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4.2 Local Governments’ Actions Vis-à-vis State Bureaucrats 
Table 12: Types of Bureaucratic Action, with State Governments as Principals 
Form of Action Description 
Defiant Behavior 
Bureaucrats know that the state government does not want the local government 
adapting to climate change, but the bureaucrat acts anyway. 
Examples: write policy documents, change department policy, use discretion to change 
implementation of existing policies to make them fulfill adaptation goal while voicing 
need to adapt so that state leaders can be aware of their actions 
Cooperative 
Action 
Local bureaucrats work with the state government to address climate change adaptation 
through local government policy. Local bureaucrats or the state government can initiate 
policy changes. Both bureaucrats and the state government stay involved in policy 
development past the initial idea to start addressing climate change. 
Examples: state government representatives work with bureaucrats at regular meetings 
to create adaptation policy, state government representatives and bureaucrats become 
involved in a multi-stakeholder organization to develop a climate adaptation strategy 
Politician-Led 
Action 
The state government initiates climate change adaptation policy development, but 
unlike cooperative action they do not stay involved. In other words, the state 
government “assigns” climate change adaptation to local governments, and bureaucrats 
in local governments take up the issue. 
Examples: state government requires climate change adaptation included in planning 
documents then leave to bureaucrats to enforce, state government requires local 
governments to consider the impacts of sea level rise on their communities and create 
an action plan to prepare then leave to local governments to find strategy to achieve 
this 
Non-
Confrontational 
Behavior 
Local bureaucrats take steps to adapt to climate change but try to avoid attention of the 
state government. Bureaucrats may avoid drawing the attention of the state government 
because they know the state government will disagree or they do not know the attitudes 
of the state government but do not want to involve them for other reasons. 
Examples: bureaucrats include climate adaptation in a document they write which the 
state government does not evaluate or review, bureaucrats use discretion to achieve 
climate adaptation goals through existing policies but do not announce to the state 
government 
No Action 
Local government and the local bureaucrat do not take steps to address climate change 
adaptation through role as government employee. Bureaucrats can believe climate 
change is a problem. They can also think that their local government should do 
something to adapt. However, they are not doing anything themselves (either initiating 
or supporting someone else) to address the impacts of climate change. 
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Local bureaucrats’ action (or inaction) to address climate change is viewed differently 
when state politicians and agencies are the principals instead of local politicians. Furthermore, 
inaction in several cases might be the local bureaucrat following the wishes of politicians. In this 
section, local bureaucrats’ efforts on climate change are reconsidered in light of state principals’ 
attitudes about climate change.112 This uses the five categories of action: (1) defiant behavior, (2) 
cooperative action, (3) politician-led action (here also called state-led action for clarity), (4) non-
confrontational behavior, and (5) no action. Table 12 describes these five categories considering 
state politicians and agencies as the principals. 
4.2a Defiant Behavior 
 Seven bureaucrats in three cases – all in Florida – acted defiantly to a limited extent. St. 
Lucie County, the City of Fort Pierce, and Martin County all took small steps to start addressing 
climate adaptation, including adding it to their hazard mitigation plans. However, their efforts to 
address climate adaptation outside the hazard mitigation plans is not defiant because the state 
government does not review bureaucrats’ discretionary behavior or local policies. 
 As described in Chapter 4, Section 2.4, Marc Meyers and FL-Local Bureaucrat-762 from 
Fort Pierce, FL acted non-confrontationally vis-à-vis their local principals. They encouraged 
local property owners and developers to be aware of the threats sea level rise and climate-driven 
flooding posed in the city. This behavior is also non-confrontational in regard to state principals 
because the state of Florida cannot review the independent discretionary actions of local 
bureaucrats. However, the inclusion of sea level rise and climate adaptation in the St. Lucie 
County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan (that Fort Pierce was a participant in) is a 
                                                 
112 See Section 3 of this chapter for state principals expressed attitudes and Section 2.7 in Chapter 4 for a description 
of local bureaucrats’ actions vis-à-vis local principals. 
181 
defiant behavior. The state government reviews these plans before they are sent on to FEMA for 
review.  
 Similarly, the actions of Mark Satterlee and Jason Bessey from St. Lucie County were 
non-confrontational vis-à-vis their local principals. As described in Chapter 4, Section 2.4, they 
used existing policies to adapt to sea level rise – making sure to update sea levels so that flood 
management policies reflect increased risk. Again, this action is non-confrontational both for 
local principals and state principals because they are using their discretion and implementation 
power to achieve climate adaptation. However, including climate adaptation and sea level rise in 
the St. Lucie County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan is a defiant action. 
 The bureaucrats from Martin County took more defiant actions overall compared to their 
peers in Fort Pierce and St. Lucie County. Their efforts vis-à-vis their local principals were 
politician-led, as described in Chapter 4, Section 2.3. Anne Murray, Kathy Fitzpatrick, and 
Deborah Drum were asked by Commissioner John Haddox to begin developing a comprehensive 
sea level rise plan. Director of Engineering Don Donaldson’s efforts to keep flood management 
policies up-to-date also contributed to this effort, although Mr. Donaldson did not begin acting 
upon the request of Commissioner Haddox. In a way, he took initiative on his own, but his 
efforts did fit the larger goal set by Commissioner Haddox. When the state government is the 
principal, however, Martin County’s efforts are defiant. They are aware of the state 
government’s policy preferences (to not address climate change) but began a comprehensive 
planning effort. Additionally, Martin County included sea level rise and climate change as 
threats in their hazard mitigation plan. By acting in defiance of the state’s preferences, Martin 
County’s efforts firmly fit the defiant behavior category. 
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 While bureaucrats in all three Florida cases acted defiantly, they did so at lower risk than 
in other states. Florida local governments have a great deal of autonomy over policymaking. 
Because of the state’s home rule structure (high local autonomy), local governments do not need 
the permission of the state to take on new policy objectives like sea level rise. This was 
confirmed in an interview with Jamie Leigh Price, the Mitigation Planning Manager for the 
Florida Division Emergency Management: 
“… we have what is called a home rule state in Florida, which means the counties 
have more power than the state, so we cannot tell them what to profile or how … 
we can suggest, but we can't tell them how or what to do.” (Interview with Jamie 
Leigh Price, February 26, 2016) 
She went onto say that the Division of Emergency Management also sees its job as to support 
local efforts, even if those are to include climate change as a hazard: 
“A lot of our local counties have profiled sea level rise. Some of them as an 
effect, and some as their own hazard. Oh, especially our southeast counties. They 
have always been very proactive in general. They have a Southeast Florida 
Climate Change Compact - that's not the right name of it, that's the vague name of 
it. So they have been focusing on and looking at these types of effects and the 
changes moving forward for quite some time now. And we've recently approved 
multiple plans that have sea level rise as an option. … We do support the counties 
doing whatever they want to do, and we will help them find the information they 
need for whichever hazard they want to profile, how they want to profile them - 
regardless of what any state legislature might say, the locals govern themselves so 
we support the way they want to do things.” (Interview with Jamie Leigh Price, 
February 26, 2016) 
 Interestingly, Ms. Price’s statements confirm the contradictory nature of Florida’s state 
climate change adaptation policies. The state government – both the governor and the legislature 
– are not supporting state-wide climate adaptation. However, state agencies whose job it is to 
work with local governments are supporting those governments who choose to take on climate 
adaptation.  
183 
 While the actions of Florida counties still fit the categorization of defiant behavior, their 
defiance is “safer.” They are receiving support from the state agency which reviews plans before 
they are sent to FEMA, and the other actions they have taken are not reviewable by the state 
government partially because they rely on bureaucratic discretion and partially because Florida is 
a home rule state. 
4.2b Cooperative Action 
 Four bureaucrats’ actions (from three cases) are cooperative with the state government, 
and all four also fit the cooperative action category when local politicians are the principals. 
They are Mark Cook from Kittitas County, WA, Joel Fruedenthal and Scott Revell from Yakima 
County, WA, and David Brown from the City of Yakima, WA. As described in Chapter 4, 
Section 2.2, these local bureaucrats worked cooperatively to integrate climate change adaptation 
into their drought management policies through the Yakima Integrated Plan. Through the 
Integrated Plan, local bureaucrats work cooperatively with a variety of actors to address drought 
management and climate adaptation: their local principals, other local bureaucrats, state 
bureaucrats from the Washington Department of Ecology, federal bureaucrats from the Bureau 
of Reclamation, representatives from the Yakima Nation, and representatives from advocacy 
organizations.  
 The Yakima Integrated Plan is unique and grew out of decades of conflict over water in 
the Yakima Basin. Before the Integrated Plan, stakeholders were embroiled in litigation over 
water use, eventually leading them to seek a way to break the litigation-driven gridlock. Mr. 
Fruedenthal from Yakima County described the unusually cooperative atmosphere around 
drought management in the area: 
“With the Integrated Plan there is a great deal of cooperation, and that is unusual. 
And so it is painful for folks to get approval to certain things - the regulations and 
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the ordinances are set up in an adversarial way, and we are not totally adversarial 
here.” (Interview with Joel Fruedenthal, September 19, 2016) 
This was echoed by Mr. Cook from Kittitas County: 
“Kittitas County is part of the Yakima Basin Integrated Water Plan, so Yakima 
County, the Yakima Nation, Kittitas County, Kittitas Conservation District, 
Ellensburg Water Company, all these private irrigators, all these various 
municipalities, we all pulled together in and are all managed comprehensively 
under a multi-county, multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional plan. So it is unique in 
the country.” (Interview with Mark Cook, September 21, 2016) 
When describing the history and origins of the Yakima Integrated Plan, Mr. Van Gundy also 
pointed to the unusually cooperative nature of the project: 
“We developed a lot of trust - mutual trust - and started pulling together this 
program that we've got now. “And it's being looked at nationwide as being pretty 
much a historically successful process that everybody can do. And they are 
spreading the word among areas where there is a lot of controversy and legal 
action and so forth, and telling them, 'Look at the Yakima Project and what 
they've done, and that's what you need to do.' And to help promote that, we are 
getting a tremendous amount of state support and a tremendous amount of federal 
government support to make it a success, so they can continue to promote it 
among everybody else.” (Interview with Ron Van Gundy, September 26, 2016) 
 This cooperation – across jurisdictions, levels of government, and public and private 
organizations – has enabled the region to attempt and to finish projects that would otherwise be 
unachievable by individual local governments, including projects addressing climate adaptation. 
As described in Chapter 4, Section 2.2, the structure of the Yakima Integrated Plan also 
encourages bureaucrats to take on politically charged or unpopular issues in addition to other 
more politically palatable and popular goals. As several people expressed, the causes of climate 
change are not important in their discussions relative to the need to respond to the changes: 
“And we could debate why it is changing and what you can do about it, ... But, if 
it is changing, it is changing. It doesn't matter why, it just is.” (Interview with 
Scott Revell, September 16, 2016) 
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Furthermore, the structure and scope of the Yakima Integrated Plan makes it somewhat insulated 
from changes in state or federal government climate change attitudes and priorities. As Mr. Cook 
said: 
“And I think, to [the organization’s] credit, that the Integrated Plan is such a big 
animal, that it is kind of moving along with or without the state.” (Interview with 
Mark Cook, September 21, 2016) 
The institutional path dependency literature supports this, showing that organizations like the 
Integrated Plan set up institutions and systems that are difficult to change after they become 
established (Pierson, 2000; Pierson 2004). Climate change was incorporated into the Integrated 
Plan at its conception, so it is likely the organization will maintain its commitment to addressing 
climate change.113 
4.2c Politician- or State-Led Action 
 Of the 16 bureaucrats who acted to address climate change adaptation, zero did so 
because states led the way. This result should not be interpreted as evidence that states cannot or 
do not encourage, force, or coerce local bureaucrats to adopt climate adaptation policies. Rather, 
this result is likely due to the purposeful selection of cases where local bureaucrats faced an anti-
climate change political environment. With the exception of Washington State, all of the state 
governments in this study were either apathetic to climate adaptation or actively sought to 
discourage climate adaptation efforts in their states. 
 In Washington State, the local governments who acted to address climate adaptation did 
so cooperatively through the structure of the Integrated Plan. The one local government in 
Washington State that did not act on climate change was Grant County. To some extent, Grant 
                                                 
113 The first test of this was the transition from the Obama Administration to the Trump Administration. The Trump 
Administration’s move away from climate change has not led to the Integrated Plan removing climate adaptation 
from their priorities, although the lack of funding for the project has led to delays (Yakima Basin Integrated Plan, 
2018)  
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County did respond to pressure from the state government to adapt to climate change: they 
incorporated climate change into their hazard mitigation plan published in 2013. The 
Washington State Department of Ecology reviews local hazard mitigation plans before they are 
submitted to FEMA and encouraged local governments to include climate change. However, 
when interviewed, neither Emergency Management Department Project Manager Sandi Duffey 
nor County Commissioner Cindy Carter were aware of climate adaptation or drought 
management efforts. This indicates that inclusion of climate adaptation in the hazard mitigation 
plan was more lip-service rather than an actual policy commitment. Thus, Grant County is most 
appropriately labeled as no action. 
4.2d Non-Confrontational Behavior 
 With state governments as the principals, the second largest group of bureaucrats fit in 
the non-confrontational behavior category. Five of the 16 bureaucrats who acted to adapt to 
climate change through their flood or drought management policies acted non-confrontationally 
vis-à-vis their state principals. They were from three cases: Greenville County, SC, Fernley, NC, 
and Pasquotank County, NC. There is a great deal of variety in how these bureaucrats acted: 
ranging from low-effort/low-impact to high-effort/high-impact approaches.  
 Of the five, two were also in the non-confrontational behavior category when local 
politicians are the principals: Brian Bishop and Paula Gucker from Greenville County, SC. Two 
had been in the cooperative action category: NV-Local Bureaucrat-895 and NV-Local 
Bureaucrat-282 from Fernley, NV. One had been in the defiant behavior category: Shelley Cox 
from Pasquotank County, NC. In the following paragraphs, I describe the range of actions these 
five bureaucrats took, why they are non-confrontational vis-à-vis their state principals, and why 
the three bureaucrats who changed categories did so.  
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 As described in Chapter 4, Section 2.4, Paula Gucker and Brian Bishop from Greenville 
County, SC took minimal steps to incorporate climate change adaptation into their local flood 
management efforts. They added a line to Greenville County’s hazard mitigation plan 
acknowledging that climate change is a threat multiplier for existing natural disasters like 
flooding, and they committed to study climate adaptation for inclusion in future iterations of the 
plan. This action is non-confrontational because Ms. Gucker and Mr. Bishop had no reason to 
expect mentioning climate adaptation would go against the wishes of the state government 
because the South Carolina government does not have a strong or clear position.114 Furthermore, 
neither mentioned potential opposition from the state government in their interviews. 
  In Fernley, NV, NV-Local Bureaucrat-895 and NV-Local Bureaucrat-282 worked to 
address their city’s climate change-driven drought risk by working cooperatively with local 
elected officials and other local entities through the Water for the Seasons project (see Chapter 4, 
Section 2.2 for a full description). However, when the state is the principal, the local bureaucrats’ 
efforts are no longer cooperative because the State of Nevada is not an active participant in the 
Water for the Seasons project. The group is comprised of local water rights holders, local 
governments, indigenous governments115, and researchers from the University of Nevada-
Reno.116 Furthermore, Fernley’s participation in the Water for the Seasons project to address 
their climate-driven drought risk is not defiant for two reasons. First, the state government does 
                                                 
114 South Carolina’s state government has to approve hazard mitigation plans before they are submitted to FEMA, so 
the state government had the opportunity to see and object to the inclusion of climate adaptation. The key for 
labeling this action as non-confrontational is that the local government did not expect the state to be upset by this. 
115 The indigenous groups are the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe, the Washoe Tribe of Nevada and California, and 
the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe. 
116 The group has one representative from the Nevada Division of Water Resources – Kevin Hickenbottom – listed 
as a participant stakeholder on its website. However, unlike the Washington Department of Ecology playing an 
active role in the Yakima Integrated Plan, the Division of Water Resources is not running the group or playing a lead 
role in the group, as far as the Water for the Season’s website and publications show. Personal communication 
between Loretta Singletary and the author did not emphasize a large role of the Division of Water Resources as well. 
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not review the Water for the Seasons project outcomes. Second, the state government does not 
have any clear anti-climate change policies. If anything, the governor and legislature are 
ambivalent on the topic. Therefore, the Water for the Seasons project and its participants are 
neither following the state’s lead or defying the state’s preferences by addressing drought and 
climate change. 
Shelley Cox – the Planning Director from Pasquotank County – acted non-
confrontationally by limiting her action to the local level. She worked to address climate 
adaptation by bringing up the potential threats from climate change in the county and supporting 
a group of local students who researched the impacts of sea level rise in the county. As described 
in Chapter 4, Section 2.1, Ms. Cox’s actions were defiant vis-à-vis her local principals because 
she acted to address climate change fully aware the local politicians did not support climate 
adaptation. Although Ms. Cox’s actions were taken with full knowledge of the state’s 
disagreement, she did not act in a way that the state could review or comment on her actions. Ms. 
Cox’s efforts focused on presenting information to local officials on the need to adapt. Her 
behavior would have been defiant if she incorporated climate adaptation into a document that 
North Carolina state government officials would review – like a hazard mitigation plan. 
4.2e No Action 
 The same bureaucrats who were in the category of “no action” vis-à-vis local principals 
are in this category for state principals: their lack of action does not change based on who the 
principal is. (While an argument could be made that not acting to address climate change could 
fit the state-led/politician-led action category, this label means not acting on climate adaptation.) 
Why bureaucrats chose not to act, however, is important. Only one of the bureaucrats in this 
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category did not act because he expected the state to object and prevent them from addressing 
climate adaptation.  
As described in Chapter 4, Section 2.5, there is one bureaucrat who did not act because 
he felt the state would prevent any climate adaptation efforts: Landin Holland, a consultant 
planner for Craven County and other coastal North Carolina local governments. Mr. Holland 
pointed directly to the North Carolina state government’s anti-climate adaptation attitudes as a 
reason not to act. He said: 
“Well, one thing that is quite interesting and intriguing is that, in our [hazard] 
mitigation plans, under this cycle, under our current regime in terms of governor 
and our legislature, we are not allowed to acknowledge or discuss in any way 
shape or form sea-level rise in these mitigation plans. I mean it is basically, I 
won't use the word illegal. But we are not allowed to discuss it. And if it is in 
there, the State of North Carolina State Office of Emergency Management makes 
you remove it prior to submitting it to FEMA.” (Interview with Landin Holland, 
September 11, 2015) 
Since he is a consultant for many local governments, other local governments (beyond the cases 
in this study) also held back from acting on climate adaptation because of Mr. Holland’s 
understanding of the political climate in the state.117  
 None of the other bureaucrats who did not act to address climate change pointed to state 
pressure as a reason they did not act. Two acknowledged that the state would have more 
resources and therefore would be a better level of government to address climate change: 
Kimberly Hamel from the City of Mauldin, NC and Amanda Boone from New Bern, NC. The 
remaining 11 bureaucrats in the study who did not act on climate change did so for other reasons 
including not thinking climate change would be a problem for them or feeling the issue would 
                                                 
117 Mr. Holland spoke specifically about Craven County for most of the interview he gave for this project. However, 
on this topic he broadened his comments to more areas in coastal North Carolina. 
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never reach the local government’s agenda (see Chapter 4, Section 2.5 for a more complete 
description). 
 As stated at the beginning of Chapter 5, we would expect to see fewer bureaucrats acting 
defiantly if they were worried about the state government blocking access to disaster 
management funding. However, more bureaucrats’ actions are considered defiant from the 
perspective of a state principal than from the perspective of a local principal. Thus, the way 
bureaucrats chose to act on climate adaptation does not support hypothesis 6 which states that 
bureaucrats will avoid climate change if the state government is against climate change 
adaptation efforts. 
 Next, I turn to look at federal grant data to see if receiving federal grants or having the 
potential to receive federal grants makes a local government less likely to choose to adapt to 
climate change if their state government does not support climate adaptation efforts. 
5. Local Government Reliance on State and Federal Grants for Disaster Management 
This section evaluates hypothesis 6 by looking at which localities rely on federal grant 
money for disaster mitigation and which local governments have included climate adaptation in 
the hazard mitigation plans they submit to FEMA to be eligible for federal disaster funding. If 
local governments have received federal grant money, we would expect them to understand the 
importance of satisfying the state government in order to access federal dollars. Additionally, 
state governments must approve hazard mitigation plans before they are submitted to FEMA. 
Due to this, local bureaucrats might seek to avoid climate adaptation in their hazard mitigation 
plans to avoid drawing the ire of state governments and improve their chances of securing grant 
funding. 
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5.1 FEMA Grants and Hazard Mitigation Plans 
Grants are one of the most common tools FEMA uses to encourage states and localities to 
prepare disaster mitigation plans. As the literature on fiscal federalism shows, the federal 
government’s large budget (relative to state and local governments) allows it to use the promise 
of funding and grants to shape subordinate governments’ actions (Oates, 1999). FEMA provides 
grants through their hazard mitigation planning programs to states and localities so they can 
prepare for and minimize the potential damage of natural disasters. As the federal government 
moved to embrace climate adaptation, they encouraged grant applicants to address climate 
change in their applications.  
 Not all local governments have received grants from FEMA for disaster preparation. 
Table 13 (below) indicates the FEMA grants received since 2000. 
Table 13: Grants from FEMA 
S
ta
te
 
Case 
Budget Size in 
FY2016 
(Summer 2015- 
Summer 2016)˚ 
Number of Grants from 
FEMA since 2000† 
Total Dollar Amount 
in Grants from 
FEMA 
N
o
rt
h
 C
a
ro
li
n
a
 Craven County $101,527,342 
22  
(Years: 2002, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015, 
2016, 2017) 
$7,461,587 
City of Elizabeth City $64,923,424 0 $0 
City of Havelock $15,466,475 0 $0 
City of New Bern $37,774,254 0 $0 
Pasquotank County $41,217,450 0 $0 
F
lo
ri
d
a
 
City of Fort Pierce $35,853,263 0 $0 
Martin County $370,733,628 
9 
(Years: 2002, 2004, 2008) 
$12,006,241 
St. Lucie County $472,621,450 
14 
(Years: 2004, 2008, 2010, 2013) 
$16,840,081 
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Table 13: Grants from FEMA 
S
ta
te
 
Case 
Budget Size in 
FY2016 
(Summer 2015- 
Summer 2016)˚ 
Number of Grants from 
FEMA since 2000† 
Total Dollar Amount 
in Grants from 
FEMA 
N
ev
a
d
a
 
Carson City $118,011,039 
3 
(Years: 2005, 2014) 
$237,037 
City of Fernley $9,665,060 0 $0 
S
o
u
th
 C
a
ro
li
n
a
 Greenville County $252,695,643 
5 
(Years: 2004, 2006, 2008, 2014, 
2015) 
$5,622,547 
City of Mauldin $3,137,491 0 $0 
City of Greer $20,605,900 0 $0 
Oconee County $41,848,004 
4 
(Years: 2006, 2014, 2015 2016) 
$474,704 
W
a
sh
in
g
to
n
 
Grant County $861,478 
2 
(Years: 2005, 2009) 
$91,446 
Kittitas County $91,778,331 
4 
(Years: 2001, 2009 2015, 2016) 
$562,317 
City of Yakima $228,105,939 0 $0 
Yakima County $70,142,907 
5 
(Years: 2006, 2009, 2011, 2016) 
$3,720,804 
˚ This is the most recent fiscal year for all the cases before interviews concluded in November 2016. Budget size 
generally does not fluctuate year to year, except in the case of unusual circumstances like an influx of jobs from a 
new business moving in or a loss of property value from a significant disaster. The only cases where this is possible 
are Carson City, NV and Fernley, NV which were affected by the new Tesla plant outside Reno, NV. 
†FEMA grant programs include Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, Severe Repetitive Loss (from flooding), 
Repetitive Flood Claims Program, Pre-Disaster Mitigation, and Flood Mitigation Assistance. 
 
 As shown in Table 13, not all local governments received hazard mitigation grants from 
FEMA. Nine of the 18 cases received zero grants from FEMA: The City of Elizabeth City, NC, 
the City of Havelock, NC, the City of New Bern, NC, Pasquotank County, NC, the City of Fort 
193 
Pierce, FL, the City of Fernley, NV, the City of Mauldin, SC, Greer, SC, and the City of Yakima, 
WA. In interviews with bureaucrats in these cities, several pointed to resource limitations which 
prevented them from even drafting grant proposals. For instance, Amanda Boone from New 
Bern, NC said: 
“I love grants, I wish I could get grants. Grants kind of come with their own 
problems. First of all, it takes a lot of time to even put in an application for a 
grant. That is something that is very challenging for local governments to do, 
because they don't have extra staff just sitting around doing nothing to write up 
grant proposals. ... And then of course most of them require some sort of financial 
match and working with the financial portions of the city to make sure that even 
though you have that all put together the way it needs to be put together. So, 
grants are difficult also because many, many, many places are underfunded.” 
(Interview with Amanda Boone, September 24, 2015) 
 Six of the nine cases that did receive FEMA grants received five or fewer grants. The 
remaining three cases – Craven County, NC, Martin County, FL, and St. Lucie County, FL – 
received many grants. Craven County received 22 grants, Martin County received nine grants, 
and St. Lucie County received 14 grants. Most of the grants for these counties were for 
purchasing property in the floodplain to turn into parks or green space118 or raising existing 
properties above the base flood level.119 St. Lucie County, FL received the highest dollar value in 
grants at $16.8 million. Most of this money funded flood management through storm water 
management systems.120 retrofitting public buildings to withstand high winds, and elevating 
structures above the floodplain. 
                                                 
118 The acquisition of property in floodplains minimizes flood risk in two ways: (1) it reduces the number of people 
in the path of floods, and (2) it allows water to soak into permeable ground instead of pooling on impermeable 
surfaces like parking lots. 
119 This describes the expected height of a 100-year flood, expressed in terms of feet above sea level. 
120 Storm water systems in Florida were not included in original subdivision plans (Interview with Jason Bessey, 
March 10, 2016). Therefore, these systems need to be installed through retrofitting. This process of installing storm 
water drainage pipes, digging ditches, and installing pumping systems is an expensive endeavor.  
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 As Table 13 shows, FEMA granted significant quantities of money to minimize the 
impact of future disasters in several cases. While local government budgets are large, these 
grants demonstrate how expensive disaster mitigation – not just climate adaptation specifically – 
is for local governments. (Local budgets for FY2016 are given as context.) This point was 
underscored by several bureaucrats. Commenting on the cost-benefit ratio for elevating houses, 
SC-Local Bureaucrat-413 from Oconee County, SC said: 
“That [elevating a home] is a great concept, but when you look at cost and 
feasibility, so often it is more feasible and cost-effective for someone to have their 
house destroyed than it is for them to have it raised. So, you are making someone 
raise their home which costs more money than if it was to be destroyed during a 
disaster.” (Interview with SC-Local Bureaucrat-413, March 28, 2016) 
Due to the high number of cases in which local governments received no grant money 
from FEMA, it is difficult to evaluate hypothesis 6 (“When state governments oppose climate 
change action, local bureaucrats are less likely to act for fear of losing an important source of 
disaster mitigation or relief funding”) solely on this data. Therefore, I also consider the potential 
for grant funding. This is expressed in the form of having approved hazard mitigation plans. As 
described above, FEMA approves hazard mitigation plans for local governments. If a locality has 
an approved plan, they are eligible for financial assistance in the wake of disasters and have 
access to specific disaster mitigation grants.  
Table 14 shows the approval date of each locality’s most recent hazard mitigation plan or 
plan update and indicates whether the plan addresses climate adaptation. It also shows whether 
the locality’s action on adaptation would defy the state government’s wishes on climate change. 
In total, there were 12 hazard mitigation plans that included climate adaptation. This reflects in 
part the high risk of climate change these areas face – especially in coastal areas where they are 
already experiencing sea level rise. However, the high number of hazard mitigation plans that 
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address climate change also captures the proactive attitude of many of these communities who 
are working to include a new threat (or threat multiplier) that FEMA encouraged them to 
consider121. 
The inclusion of climate change adaptation in three plans went against the expressed 
preferences of the state government (shown in bold in Table 14). They are Pasquotank County 
(the Albemarle Sound Regional plan, also covers the City of Elizabeth City), Martin County, FL, 
and St. Lucie County (which includes the City of Fort Pierce, FL as well). As described above, 
local Florida governments have high policy autonomy. Ms. Price from the Florida Division of 
Emergency Management emphasized that this autonomy limits the state’s ability to dictate the 
terms of a local government’s hazard mitigation plan.  
Table 14: Hazard Mitigation Plans 
S
ta
te
 
Case 
Date Hazard 
Mitigation Plan 
Approved 
Does the Hazard 
Mitigation Plan 
Address Climate 
Adaptations? 
Would the State 
Government Disapprove 
of the Inclusion (or 
Exclusion) of Climate 
Change 
N
o
rt
h
 C
a
ro
li
n
a
 
Craven County 
2015 (Pamlico Sound 
regional plan) 
No No 
City of Elizabeth 
City 
Included in the Pasquotank County plan (Pasquotank is in the Albemarle 
Region plan) 
City of Havelock Included in the Craven County plan (Craven is in the Pamlico Sound plan) 
City of New Bern Included in the Craven County plan (Craven is in the Pamlico Sound plan) 
Pasquotank 
County 
2015 (Albemarle Sound 
regional plan) 
Yes Yes 
                                                 
121 It is not possible to determine if the high number of hazard mitigation plans with climate adaptation included is 
reflective of a greater trend or an anomaly of the cases studied here. The author is not aware of any research that has 
systematically studied if local hazard mitigation plans are increasingly addressing climate change. 
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Table 14: Hazard Mitigation Plans 
S
ta
te
 
Case 
Date Hazard 
Mitigation Plan 
Approved 
Does the Hazard 
Mitigation Plan 
Address Climate 
Adaptations? 
Would the State 
Government Disapprove 
of the Inclusion (or 
Exclusion) of Climate 
Change 
F
lo
ri
d
a
 
City of Fort Pierce Included in the St. Lucie County plan 
Martin County 2015 Yes Yes 
St. Lucie County 2016 Yes Yes 
N
ev
a
d
a
 Carson City 2015 Yes Governor ambivalent 
City of Fernley 
2013 (Included in the 
Lyon County plan) 
Yes Governor ambivalent 
S
o
u
th
 C
a
ro
li
n
a
 Greenville County 2015 Yes Governor ambivalent 
City of Mauldin Included in the Greenville County plan 
City of Greer Included in the Greenville County plan 
Oconee County 
2012 (Part of the 
Western Piedmont plan) 
No Governor ambivalent 
W
a
sh
in
g
to
n
 
Grant County 2013 Yes No 
Kittitas County 2012 Yes No 
City of Yakima Included in the Yakima County plan 
Yakima County 2015 Yes No 
 
The inclusion of climate adaptation in the Albemarle Sound plan (which also covers 
Pasquotank County and the City of Elizabeth City) seems strange considering North Carolina 
localities have limited autonomy. Moreover, Mr. Holland acknowledged that the North Carolina 
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government would reject any plans that mentioned climate change and would ask for revisions 
before it sending it to FEMA for approval. Upon examination of the document, the low-lying 
Outer Banks communities at extremely high risk from sea level rise drove the inclusion of 
climate change in the document. Sea level rise and climate change are identified as hazards for 
the entire region, but only the low-lying Outer Banks communities mention plans to address 
them. It is possible that these communities saw the threat as significant enough to include climate 
adaptation anyway. 
5.2 Are Bureaucrats’ Decisions Shaped by State Government Attitudes on Climate Change? 
By considering both actual grants received and the potential for grants received, ensuring 
access to disaster mitigation funding is important. However, the fear of potential state 
displeasure does not determine whether local governments address or neglect climate change 
adaptation. As shown in Table 15 below, three cases support hypothesis 6. The authors of the 
Pamlico Sound Hazard Mitigation Plan chose not to address climate change in the document (the 
Pamlico Sound plan includes Craven County, New Bern and Havelock, NC) because the North 
Carolina government does not want localities to work on climate change. However, during the 
interview, NC-Local Bureaucrat-823 acknowledged that there was little local political support 
for addressing climate change as well. 
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Table 15: Support for Hypothesis 6 
 Case 
Grants from 
FEMA 
Hazard Mitigation Plan 
Approved 
Includes 
Climate 
Adaptation 
Supports Hypothesis 6 
N
o
rt
h
 C
a
ro
li
n
a
 
Craven County 
Yes 
$7,461,587 
2015  
Pamlico Sound regional plan 
No Yes 
City of 
Elizabeth City 
No 
2015  
Albemarle Sound regional plan 
Yes No 
City of 
Havelock 
No 
2015  
Pamlico Sound regional plan 
No 
Partially – plan does not 
mention climate change, but 
does not receive grants 
City of New 
Bern 
No 
2015  
Pamlico Sound regional plan 
No 
Partially – plan does not 
mention climate change, but 
does not receive grants 
Pasquotank 
County 
No 
2015  
Albemarle Sound regional plan 
Yes No 
F
lo
ri
d
a
 
City of Fort 
Pierce 
No 
2015  
In the St. Lucie County plan 
Yes No 
Martin County 
Yes 
$12,006,241 
2015 Yes No 
St. Lucie 
County 
Yes 
$16,840,081 
2016 Yes No 
N
ev
a
d
a
 Carson City 
Yes 
$237,037 
2015 Yes 
No – state government 
ambivalent on climate change 
City of Fernley No 
2013  
Included in the Lyon County 
plan 
Yes 
No – state government 
ambivalent on climate change 
S
o
u
th
 C
a
ro
li
n
a
 
Greenville 
County 
Yes 
$5,622,547 
2015 Yes 
No – state government 
ambivalent on climate change 
City of Mauldin No 
2015  
Included in the Greenville 
County plan 
Yes 
No – state government 
ambivalent on climate change 
City of Greer No 
2015  
Included in the Greenville 
County plan 
Yes 
No – state government 
ambivalent on climate change 
Oconee County 
Yes 
$474,704 
2012  
(Part of the Western Piedmont 
plan) 
No 
No – state government 
ambivalent on climate change 
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Table 15: Support for Hypothesis 6 
 Case 
Grants from 
FEMA 
Hazard Mitigation Plan 
Approved 
Includes 
Climate 
Adaptation 
Supports Hypothesis 6 
W
a
sh
in
g
to
n
 
Grant County 
Yes 
$91,446 
2013 Yes No 
Kittitas County 
Yes 
$562,317 
2012 Yes No 
City of Yakima No 
2015   
Included in the Yakima County 
plan 
Yes No 
Yakima County 
Yes 
$3,720,804 
2015 Yes No 
 
Grant County, WA presents an interesting example of a local government that chose to 
include climate change, potentially to appease the state governments’ enthusiasm for climate 
adaptation planning. Grant County’s hazard mitigation plan includes an extensive discussion of 
adaptation, but the local bureaucrats and politicians interviewed for this project were not aware 
of it when asked about local climate change policy. This does speak to hypothesis 6 but does not 
provide direct support because the local government’s actions fit Governor Inslee’s wish to adapt 
to climate change. Their lack of implementation efforts demonstrates that they were not 
committed to the policy change because they saw climate change as a threat they needed to adapt 
to. 
However, for the remaining 14 cases, local bureaucrats and their governments did not act 
in a way that indicates they wanted to conform to the state’s wishes or attitudes on climate 
adaptation. It is more likely that local governments are picking up on the signals sent from 
FEMA on climate adaptation and working to make their relationship with FEMA stronger. It is 
also possible that state emergency managers who review local hazard mitigation plans and grant 
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applications to FEMA agree that climate adaptation is becoming an important part of disaster 
planning. The state bureaucrats might be engaging in non-confrontational behavior – approving 
local documents to be sent to FEMA even though the Governor or legislature may prefer not to 
act on climate change. 
6. Conclusion  
 This chapter tested the hypothesis that local governments, and specifically local 
bureaucrats working on flood and drought management, would make strategic decisions about 
climate change adaptation in order to secure funding from FEMA. Funding from FEMA must 
pass through state governments to reach local governments, so we might expect local 
governments to align with state governments to secure this funding source. However, the data do 
not support this conclusion. Most local governments in this sample did not avoid the subject of 
climate change, even when their state governments had clearly expressed preferences that 
climate adaptation not be addressed. In only one instance did local actors consciously make the 
decision not to include climate adaptation in a document that would be reviewed by their state 
government because they were aware of state disapproval: that is the Pamlico Sound Regional 
hazard mitigation plan (which covers three cases: Craven County, NC, New Bern, NC, and 
Havelock, NC). Craven County received a large number of grants from FEMA in the past 10 
years, suggesting that they might be more likely to avoid touchy subjects in order to maintain 
access to this funding. Additionally, the local consulting planner who helped craft the Pamlico 
Sound Regional plan acknowledged they did not address climate change out of concern for state 
censorship.  
 However, no other cases in this study expressed similar concerns about the state 
interfering with their disaster management planning due to the existence of climate adaptation 
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provisions. There are a number of factors which help explain this pattern. First, disaster 
management policy is generally a nonpartisan policy area (in contrast to climate change 
adaptation policy which is highly polarized). In part, this is because disaster management is a 
low-salience issue until a disaster strikes. During the periods between events, it is only technical 
experts (in this case bureaucrats) who are concerned with the issue (May, Koski, & Stramp, 
2016). When politicians become involved, it is often to provide relief to constituents affected by 
the disaster. Generally, this is a politically beneficial activity, and politicians “enjoy” the ability 
to provide aid (Birkland & Waterman, 2008).122  
 Second, disaster management policy is largely a technocratic exercise where policy 
development and implementation are dominated by bureaucrats trained in emergency 
management. Emergency management as a discipline relies heavily on the precautionary 
principle. A colloquial phrase captures the precautionary principle well: “An ounce of prevention 
is worth a pound of cure.” Disaster management experts often work to minimize the impacts of 
disasters before they happen. Similarly, many climate change policy debates are rooted in the 
precautionary principle (Applegate, 2010). It is no surprise that a similarly structured argument – 
prevent the worst impacts of climate change through pre-disaster adaptation efforts – is 
appealing to disaster managers.  
 Third, only one state government – North Carolina – had both (1) an active anti-climate 
adaptation agenda and (2) control over local government policy development (i.e. local 
governments had low levels of policy autonomy). In Florida, the state government discouraged 
action on climate adaptation and sea level rise adaptation, but local governments have high 
                                                 
122 I do not intend to suggest that politicians look forward to disasters or hope they happen. However, disaster 
management policy in the US is structured so politicians can take on a “hero” role by providing aid, going to the site 
of a disaster, and generally be seen providing comfort (Birkland & Waterman, 2008).  
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autonomy. In Nevada and South Carolina, the state government neither encouraged nor 
discouraged action on climate adaptation. In Washington State, the governor actively encouraged 
climate adaptation. Future research would benefit from the inclusion of more cases where state 
governments actively discouraged local action on climate adaptation and local governments have 
low policy autonomy. However, the results from this study question the notion that a 
combination of anti-climate adaptation signals from the state government and low local 
autonomy is enough to prevent local adaptation efforts. Even during the state of North Carolina’s 
most active anti-sea level rise efforts, the Albemarle Sound’s Regional hazard mitigation plan 
addressed climate adaptation and sea level rise. This piece of evidence lends more support to the 
argument that disaster management is controlled by expert bureaucrats trained in emergency 
management who are less worried about the political ramifications of their work and more 
interested in acting on their best judgment. 
 These findings speak to the larger point made by this dissertation: local bureaucrats exert 
a great deal of influence over the shape of local climate adaptation policy. While only about half 
of the bureaucrats acted to include climate change adaptation in local flood or drought 
management policy, it was the bureaucrats who acted to integrate climate adaptation in local 
policy. Even in the context of intergovernmental relationships, local bureaucrats are important 
actors. Their efforts should not be minimized.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 Throughout this dissertation, I sought to answer the question: What role do bureaucrats 
play in shaping local policy, especially local climate adaptation policy? Bureaucrats are not 
typically seen as policymakers, but at the local level they are uniquely situated to shape climate 
adaptation policy. They are knowledgeable about the needs of the community, local 
policymaking channels, and intergovernmental relations. Additionally, they are isolated from the 
partisan (electoral) consequences of taking a position on climate change, so they can be more 
open to addressing climate adaptation when elected leaders might shy away.  
I show that not all bureaucrats took on the issue of climate adaptation – even in areas 
where the risk of climate change flooding or drought was high. However, half of the cases in this 
project did have bureaucrats working to address climate change adaptation in their communities. 
They were agenda setters, worked to craft new policies with and without support from 
politicians, used discretion to encourage community members to take climate risk seriously, and 
worked with other governments (local, state, and federal) and community groups to take on large 
climate adaptation projects.  
I also sought to comment on why bureaucrats would be interested in stepping out of their 
role as implementers and take on an issue as controversial and partisan as climate change. The 
answer to this question is in two parts. First, local bureaucrats are not only implementers. They 
hold institutional knowledge which makes them invaluable advisors to elected officials, 
especially because elected official turnover is significantly higher in local government than 
bureaucratic turnover. They are accustomed to being involved in policymaking, so stepping into 
this role for one issue is not breaking significantly with their role in local governments. Since 
they are motivated to be successful at their jobs, and increasingly their work in emergency 
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preparedness involves climate change adaptation, bureaucrats in this study talked about 
responding to climate change like it was just the next step. Climate change was going to be a 
problem, so they needed to come up with a response. 
Local bureaucrats are key players in the development of these policies, and climate policy 
scholars, climate policy advocates, and others need to pay attention to them. As several cases 
demonstrated (Martin County, FL, St. Lucie County, FL, Fort Pierce, FL, Greenville County, SC, 
and Pasquotank County, NC), local bureaucrats are working on climate adaptation without the 
active involvement – or even awareness – of elected officials. Bureaucrats are running the show 
in developing climate adaptation policy. They are paying attention, when few others (if any) in 
local government are working on this threat. 
Second, bureaucrats are concerned with addressing on-the-ground problems in their 
communities. Bureaucrats also acted because they are members of these communities and they 
care about their communities. Bureaucrats in Washington State were worried about the impact a 
drought would have on their neighbors – the farmers in the area. Florida bureaucrats worried 
about how their communities would react to both the next storm and the potential wave of 
migrants they would absorb from places harder hit to the south.  
 In summary, this project shows that local governments – driven by the efforts of local 
bureaucrats – are beginning to address climate change adaptation. Although these efforts are 
constrained by limited resources and occasional hostility from superior governments, some local 
governments are taking climate adaptation seriously. Broadly, this demonstrates that local 
bureaucrats, and the governments they work for, are important players in the development of 
climate adaptation policy. While bureaucrats are not the only actors – and they were more 
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successful when they acted with the assistance or partnership of others – they are important 
players in the development of local policy.  
1. Bureaucrats Drive Local Climate Adaptation Policy Development 
 As this project showed, local bureaucrats are active players in the development of local 
climate change adaptation policy – from setting the agenda to implementing policies. In some 
cases, local bureaucrats dominated the development of climate adaptation policy from start to 
finish. In other cases, local bureaucrats drove the process, but worked with politicians, interest 
groups, and other policy makers throughout. 
 Chapter 3 showed that local bureaucrats acted as policy agenda-setters. In nine of the 18 
cases, local bureaucrats were the first actors in their respective governments to introduce climate 
adaptation to the agenda. In seven of the 18 cases, local bureaucrats raised the salience of the 
issue after it was first mentioned by others. Although bureaucrats rarely used public meetings to 
discuss climate adaptation, they shaped the local agenda by (1) writing policy language and 
crafting entire policy documents like land use plans and hazard mitigation plans with sections 
that addressed climate adaptation, and (2) having conversations with other bureaucrats and 
elected officials about the need for climate adaptation.  
 In addition to being agenda setters, local bureaucrats were active players in the 
formulation of policy.123 Bureaucrats are vital players in local policy formulation for several 
reasons. First, bureaucrats often have more institutional knowledge in local government than 
elected officials. Those that have been in the same government for many years understand how 
local systems work, are familiar with the culture of the local government, and understand 
intergovernmental obligations and requirements. For instance, NC-Local Bureaucrat-823 worked 
                                                 
123 Agenda-setting and policy formulation overlap. For instance, writing emergency management plans to address 
climate change adaptation both sets the agenda and formulates new policy. 
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in Craven County, NC’s government for more than 20 years and spoke about being patient and 
picking your battles when dealing with new elected officials. Mr. Van Gundy worked for the 
Roza Irrigation District for 40 years and initiated the Yakima Integrated Plan as well as Yakima 
County’s groundbreaking drought management strategies. Many bureaucrats do not have the 
impressive tenure of Mr. Van Gundy and NC-Local Bureaucrat-823, but they often outlast 
elected officials. As many bureaucrats pointed out, they are regularly approached by elected 
officials for both their specific expertise (e.g. flood management) and knowledge of systems in 
local government. Bureaucrats also used their expertise to encourage the citizens they served to 
take climate change threats seriously. As the bureaucrats from St. Lucie County, FL indicated, 
when citizens or developers came to them to discuss flood risk they would emphasize that flood 
risk is impacted by climate change as well. These (rare) informal conversations changed the 
expression of policy even if they did not change the written policies.  
 Second, local bureaucrats have area-specific expertise which elected officials, city and 
county managers, and other bureaucrats call upon and defer to when policies are written. This 
dynamic represents an important difference between local governments and state or federal 
governments. State and federal legislators and executives are more likely to have professional 
staffs that can advise them on policy and draft new policies. The elected officials themselves also 
have more time to study policy (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2017; Boushey & 
McGrath, 2017). (There are some exceptions: some states have volunteer legislators and some 
large cities or county governments can afford staff assistants who serve legislators. However, 
this is not common.) Therefore, in local governments, bureaucrats work both to craft policy 
language and implement it. This happened in several cases in this project. The team of 
bureaucrats in Martin County was asked by an elected official, Commissioner Haddox, to 
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research policies to address sea level rise. Commissioner Haddox did not write the policy or do 
his own research, he delegated it to the bureaucrats. In every case with an emergency 
management plan that addressed climate adaptation, local bureaucrats – not elected officials – 
wrote the policy. For instance, in Greenville County, SC, climate adaptation was added to the 
emergency management plan by bureaucrats without consulting elected officials; Ms. Gucker 
and Mr. Bishop felt no need to consult with them.  
 This project also showed that bureaucrats occasionally had informal conversations with 
members of the public to make climate-friendly choices. In St. Lucie County, FL, local 
bureaucrats encouraged property owners and developers to be aware of their climate-related 
flood risk. In Yakima County, the Director of the Roza Irrigation District worked with local 
farmers to reduce their water use to minimize the impacts of drought. However, this did not 
happen often. More often, bureaucrats worked on climate adaptation by including it in existing 
policies and plans like hazard mitigation plans. 
 Local bureaucrats are involved at every stage of local policy development. We fully 
expect them to be policy implementers and evaluators, matching what bureaucrats at the state 
and federal level do. However, as this project shows, they are also active agenda setters and 
policy implementers. Elected officials at the local level set the general direction of policy but are 
much more hands off – at least for climate adaptation, flood management, and drought 
management. 
 This finding demonstrates that principal-agent modeling provides a useful tool for 
focusing on important aspects of politician-bureaucrat relationships, but it is a limited picture of 
local bureaucratic influence in policymaking. Moving towards a stewardship model of 
bureaucratic behavior might help (e.g. Van Slyke, 2006). Stewardship models of principal-agent 
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behavior cast bureaucrats and their superiors as cooperative partners in the implementaiton of 
policy (i.e. they both believe in the same goal so principals do not need to use coercive measures 
to ensure bureaucratic buy-in). However, this approach again is not a complete picture because 
bureaucrats can act non-confrontationally or defiantly to change policy. 
 I am not arguing for moving away from principal-agent theory for the study of 
bureaucrats. Instead, this project demonstrates that it should be considered in addition to other 
theories of bureaucratic behavior inclduing treating bureaucrats as independent policy actors 
with their own motivations, policy preferences, and institutional capacity to shape policy. 
Furthermore, when principal-agent theory is employed, we need to take Whitford’s argument 
about multiple principals (2005) to heart and acknowledge that bureaucrats are often making 
choices between their bureaucratic superiors, elected officials, and the publics they serve.  
2. Climate Change Adaptation Is a Low Salience Issue 
 Climate change adaptation policy is strongly tied to emergency management and natural 
disaster policy in all nine cases where it is being addressed. While this is a product of case 
selection (I deliberately looked at flood and drought management), climate adaptation is often 
framed as a way to prevent damage from new and increasingly severe natural disasters caused by 
climate change. The IPCC Working Group on Adaptation looks at natural disasters like droughts, 
floods, heat waves, fires, and severe storms (IPCC, 2012; IPCC Working Group II, 2007). 
Similarly, the US EPA and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
reference natural disasters in their work on climate adaptation (NASA, 2018; EPA, 2018).  
 Emergency and natural disaster management are issues where salience is low until an 
emergency occurs (Birkland T. A., 2006). Most people, most of the time, do not think about 
emergency or disaster management. This includes emergency preparedness, what they would do 
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in the case of an emergency, or how to recover from an emergency. The bureaucrats who work 
on these issues think about emergency and disaster management in their day-to-day work. The 
bureaucrats that I spoke with noted that they are often the only people thinking about the 
community’s flood and drought management, and they expect to be the only ones because it is 
their job. They would bring it up with elected officials and even members of the public 
(encouraging them to take their climate risks seriously), but few said they were approached by 
elected officials, their bureaucratic superiors, or members of the public with concerns about 
emergency management much less climate change adaptation. People do not usually associate 
natural disaster response with local governments, even though they expect local firefighters, 
EMTs, and police officers to respond in the case of a disaster. People tend to connect disaster 
response with FEMA even though FEMA is not involved in most natural disasters – they only 
step in during disasters that are large enough or severe enough to warrant a federal disaster 
declaration.  
 These two factors combine to mean that – in a local government – the only people who 
are consistently thinking and talking about emergency and disaster management are bureaucrats.  
My research supported this. When I contacted local government officials to speak about their 
flood and drought policies (and how those policies related to climate adaptation), I was 
redirected to one or two bureaucrats whose job focused on emergency management. The few 
people I spoke with whose work was unrelated to emergency management had little or nothing to 
say on the topic and pointed me to the bureaucrats who were tasked with it. Even the bureaucrats 
who were not pursuing climate adaptation acknowledged that climate change could make floods 
or droughts worse (although maybe not in their area). Several admitted that elected officials 
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largely ignored emergency management until a disaster occurred and indicated that as 
bureaucrats they would be tasked with climate adaptation in their communities.  
 Bureaucrats in areas that experienced repeated floods or droughts – like the droughts in 
the Yakima Basin (Yakima County, Kittitas County, and the City of Yakima), floods and 
hurricanes in coastal North Carolina, and floods and hurricanes in Florida – had an easier time 
raising the issue with elected officials, although they often had to justify their actions by 
mentioning negative economic impacts. When emergency management and economic 
development clashed, emergency management and related climate change adaptation lost. For 
example, a bureaucrat in Craven County, NC lamented that expanding the tax base often 
outweighed emergency management. The bureaucrat did not believe that they could pursue 
climate adaptation projects because they already faced an uphill battle fighting to mitigate 
current flood threats. In Martin County and St. Lucie County, FL, the creation of the Seven50 
plan to address climate change threats in the area received significant pushback from citizens and 
elected officials because it was seen as limiting economic growth. 
3. Consequences of Bureaucrats Driving Local Climate Adaptation Policy Development 
What are the consequences of bureaucrats dominating the development of local climate 
adaptation policy? First, and most obviously, if local bureaucrats control the development of this 
policy, they are the actors that advocates should approach to influence the direction of policy. 
Their predilections or any biases they have are likely to show up in climate adaptation. As this 
project found, many local bureaucrats emphasized the need to focus on adaptation but did not 
want to get entangled in discussions of the causes of climate change. Additionally, local 
bureaucrats referenced the precautionary principle – mentioning that it was important to be 
prepared for increasingly severe droughts and floods rather than hoping they will not occur. 
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Thus, if emergency managers are more likely to embrace the precautionary principle, then 
climate adaptation will embody a risk averse approach.  
Second, local bureaucrats are constrained and aware of their constraints, which means 
that local adaptation efforts are inherently limited. While they are important actors, they cannot 
craft effective solutions alone. One of the ways bureaucrats are restrained is through limited 
resources. Several bureaucrats in this study acknowledged that a lack of money, staff time, or 
other resources were the reasons they could not pursue climate adaptation – either at all or to a 
level they would like to. Calls to adapt to climate change at the local level should acknowledge 
these inherent limitations. Furthermore, advocates should focus on helping bureaucrats build 
coalitions of support to raise necessary resources and overcome other barriers. 
Local bureaucrats also acknowledge limits from superior governments. State 
governments’ and the federal government’s control over resources coerces local governments to 
comply with state and federal priorities. One way to interpret this is to say that progress on 
climate adaptation will only occur under climate-friendly state and federal government 
administrations – i.e. liberal or Democratic administrations, especially those who prioritize 
climate adaptation. Another way this can be interpreted is that local governments will need to 
solicit support from alternative sources – like multi-stakeholder cooperative organizations (e.g. 
Water for the Seasons or the Yakima Integrated Plan) to secure resources they cannot get from 
hostile or apathetic state or federal government administrations. 
Last, bureaucrat-driven policy change is not enough to completely adapt to climate 
change. In the communities where climate adaptation policy had developed the most, the local 
bureaucrats acknowledged the role of including many stakeholders and members of the 
community in the conversation. In the Yakima Integrated Plan, participants pointed to the 
212 
inclusion of advocacy groups and other community members as one of its strengths. In Martin 
County, the three bureaucrats working on a comprehensive adaptation plan stressed the need for 
community and politician buy-in. While bureaucratic action is a step – and in many cases it is a 
crucial first step – climate adaptation is a huge task requiring cooperation between governments, 
buy-in from stakeholders, and community participation.  
4. How Do Bureaucratic Autonomy and Problem Definition Agreement Shape 
Bureaucratic Action? Testing the Model 
 This project posited that bureaucrats’ choice regarding climate adaptation could be 
explained by the interaction of their level of autonomy and the amount of problem definition 
agreement there was in the policymaking community. It suggested that high autonomy and high 
problem definition agreement would yield cooperative action, high autonomy and low problem 
definition agreement would yield defiant behavior, low autonomy and low agreement would 
yield non-confrontational behavior, and low autonomy and high agreement would yield 
politician-led action. Although the model accurately predicted how 13 bureaucrats acted (of the 
16 bureaucrats who acted to address climate adaptation), the model presents an incomplete 
picture of bureaucratic action.  
Bureaucratic autonomy does not appear to explain action as much as the model predicted. 
Bureaucrats who have high levels of autonomy do not necessarily use their autonomy. For 
example, Ms. Gucker from Greenville County, SC was an assistant county administrator who ran 
the community planning department and could have addressed climate adaptation through her 
department. However, she only included it in the hazard mitigation plan – even though she 
acknowledged that Greenville County would need to address climate adaptation. Similarly, NV-
Local Bureaucrat-895 had low levels of bureaucratic autonomy suggesting the bureaucrat should 
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have followed the lead of the bureaucrat’s superiors in Fernley, NV. However, the Water for the 
Seasons project created a cooperative framework for the elected officials and the bureaucrats to 
work on climate-driven drought preparedness. While this does not negate the importance of 
bureaucratic autonomy, autonomy is better conceived as a potential for action.  
 Instead, we should look at both autonomy and external sources of support bureaucrats 
can draw upon when crafting policies. When bureaucrats can draw on support from a multi-
stakeholder organization, a nearby university, other governments (local, state, or federal), or a 
powerful community group, they are more likely to act defiantly or cooperatively. Shelley Cox 
acted defiantly while relying on UNC Chapel Hill students to argue for the importance of climate 
adaptation. All the bureaucrats who acted cooperatively had the support of multi-stakeholder 
organizations (Water for the Season and the Yakima Integrated Plan). However, this needs to be 
tested with a larger sample of communities and bureaucrats (discussed in more detail below).  
5. Role of Intergovernmental Relations and Pressure from Superior Governments  
Local bureaucrats are not able to tackle climate adaptation on their own. Without support 
from the state, local elected officials, and other local bureaucrats, the bureaucrats’ ability to 
make significant changes is limited. In other words, local bureaucrats’ efforts seem necessary but 
not sufficient to tackle climate adaptation. 
 As shown in Chapter 5, local government decisions to act on climate change adaptation 
are influenced, but not determined by state government preferences. In only one case – Mr. 
Holland in Craven County, NC – did a local bureaucrat admit he did not pursue climate 
adaptation because he felt the state would object. In Florida, bureaucrats in all three communities 
acted to integrate climate change despite the state’s objections. Several bureaucrats in 
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Washington State indicated that state support for climate change action helped them find 
resources, but claimed it was not the determining factor for why they acted.  
 However, local governments did point to the vast resources in state governments and the 
federal government (FEMA) as critical for the implementation of emergency management 
projects in general. Several local bureaucrats mentioned that the state or federal government is 
better suited to act on climate change than they are because they have more resources. Support 
from the Washington State Department of Ecology breathes life (specifically money) into 
Yakima Integrated Plan projects. Many local bureaucrats in this study said that they develop and 
update hazard mitigation plans in order to access federal resources. These findings underline the 
importance of intergovernmental cooperation in the development of climate adaptation policy, 
especially when it comes to resources. 
 Finally, Chapter 5 supports the conclusion that climate adaptation policy is often 
dominated by bureaucrats. Local bureaucrats wrote emergency management plans and these 
plans were reviewed by state bureaucrats (like Jamie Leigh Price in Florida). Local bureaucrats 
also interacted with federal representatives in the creation of hazard mitigation plans, as was the 
case with Brian Bishop’s conversations with FEMA, NOAA, and NWS. This could enhance 
climate adaptation policy development generally because bureaucrats do not face significant 
partisan constraints. Indeed, during interviews with local bureaucrats, none mentioned a partisan 
commitment as a reason for inaction. Of those who did mention their partisan affiliation,124 they 
often said they were addressing climate change despite being Republican.  
                                                 
124 Bureaucrats’ partisan affiliations were not asked for during the interview. The interviews were focused on the 
development of policy and talking to the bureaucrats about their partisan identification would have derailed this 
conversation (especially close to the 2016 presidential election). 
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Additionally, if bureaucrats control climate change adaptation, it is likely we will see 
climate adaptation efforts build on existing emergency management efforts. This policy layering 
(Beland, 2009; Hacker, 2004; Thelen, 2003) can lead to the neglect of innovative solutions, 
unintended consequences, and concentration of influence in existing institutional structures. For 
example, the NFIP program was designed in part to move people out of flood-prone areas. 
However, the program focuses more on providing financial assistance to people who live in 
floodplains whose homes were damaged during floods. The main goal of reducing the number of 
people living in floodplains was lost (Wright, 2000). If we deal with climate change driven 
flooding using the same program, we might never achieve the needed goal of moving people out 
of flood-prone areas. Instead, we will see more of what several bureaucrats in this study 
lamented as a silly idea: putting houses on stilts in flood-prone areas so the homes themselves 
will not flood.  
Downsides of integrating climate adaptation into existing policies are discussed in detail 
by Adelle and Russel (2013). They point out that climate adaptation policies that do not rethink 
existing strategies for flood management, urban development, storm preparedness, etc. will not 
be flexible enough to truly deal with the unpredictable nature of climate change threats.  
While Adele and Russel’s argument is sound, policy layering has advantages, especially 
in the polarized U.S. context. Layering climate adaptation onto existing policies might bypass a 
drawn-out political debate around the creation of new policies, thus speeding up the development 
of adaptation efforts. As described by McCright and Dunlap (2011), Antonio and Brulle (2011), 
and Leiserowitz and colleagues’s (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Ropser-Renouf, & Hmielowski, 2011; 
Marlon, Howe, Mildenberger, & Leiserowitz, 2016) conservative strategies to stall the 
development of climate policy. By creating new policy “from scratch” opponents can stall policy 
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progress at more junctures. Defenders of the status quo have many strategies at their disposal to 
defend the status quo (Cobb & Ross, 1997). When policies are layered on existing policy, 
changes happen more subtly and incrementally, but they build into larger more significant 
changes (e.g. Hacker, 2004; Beland, 2009).  
Bureaucrats are better positioned to engage in policy layering than introducing new 
policy, especially when they can capitalize on their expertise. As this project showed, most 
bureaucrat-driven policy change built on existing policy areas rather than crafting a new program 
or plan. (Only Martin County, FL sought to craft a new plan focused on climate adaptation.) 
Bureaucrats in this project made arguments that climate change was an important element to 
layer onto existing projects like hazard mitigation planning, comprehensive land use 
management, drought management, and flood management.  
These findings bolster the argument that local governments engage in opportunistic 
federalism: seeking to derive the most benefits from their relationship with FEMA or state 
governments as possible without necessarily complying with the superior governments’ policy 
preferences. It also demonstrates that when the federal and state governments do not act on 
climate change adaptation, local governments are left to patch together solutions of their own. 
Due to their limited resources, local adaptation efforts do not progress far beyond the policy 
formulation or adoption stages. The huge challenge that climate adaptation poses means that 
local governments cannot truly address the issue without support from other governments or 
organizations with more resources. While the federalism literature sometimes points to this 
situation (subordinate governments filling in policy gaps with superior governments do not act) 
as an opportunity for innovation (Berry & Berry, 2007), for climate change adaptation the lack of 
support from superior governments stymies local action.  
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6. Future Research 
This project is an important first step towards understanding local bureaucrats’ role in 
policy development beyond implementation. However, it is limited by its focus on one issue area 
(climate change adaptation) and a small number of cases (both in terms of communities 
represented and the number of bureaucrats studied). These limitations were necessary for this 
qualitative exploratory study. However, expanding our understanding of the role of local 
bureaucrats in policy development requires looking at a larger representative sample of 
bureaucrats and communities. The larger number of cases would allow researchers to develop 
models that explain what distinguishes bureaucrats who act from those who do not and identify 
additional factors affecting the type of action bureaucrats take (e.g. defiant behavior vs. non-
confrontational behavior). Future studies should also expand to other policy areas to determine if 
climate change adaptation policy is unique or if this model applies to other policy areas. 
Potentially, we would see bureaucrat-driven policy development around many low salience 
problems that carry serious consequences if left unaddressed. These types of studies are natural 
successors to this project and will help determine the frequency of local bureaucrat-driven policy 
development. 
This project also represents a snapshot of climate adaptation policy development. After 
data collection concluded, the climate-friendly Obama Administration was replaced by the 
climate-hostile Trump Administration, and new governors in South Carolina and North Carolina 
took office.125 These changes in political administrations came with changes in attitudes towards 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. Additionally, the 2017 hurricane season demonstrated 
                                                 
125 Governor Henry McMaster in South Carolina is more openly anti-climate action than his predecessor Nikki 
Haley (Petersen, 2017). Governor Roy Cooper in North Carolina is much more climate-friendly than his predecessor 
Pat McCrory (Bennett, 2017). 
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the devastating costs that may be associated with climate disasters, as Hurricane Harvey 
overwhelmed Houston, Texas and Hurricanes Irma and Maria devastated Puerto Rico. The 
massive flooding in Houston led to a national re-examination of local flood management efforts, 
especially when it became clear that actual flood risk was minimized by development-driven 
local planners in Houston (Pralle S., 2017; Boburg & Reinhard, 2017). In short, a lot has 
changed since data collection concluded in November 2016. Revisiting these same cases in the 
coming years would be a good next step. It would indicate whether and how climate adaptation 
policy and bureaucratic action have changed, speak to the permanency of bureaucrat-driven 
policy change, shed light on how changes in national attention to climate disasters affect local 
action, and reveal how changes in superior government policy or attitudes on climate change 
influence local action.  
 A notable finding of this study centers on the role of multi-stakeholder cooperative 
organizations. These organizations helped local governments tackle climate adaptation, even if 
the group’s focus was not solely on climate adaptation. This was an unexpected finding and 
warrants further examination to understand exactly how these organizations help governments 
tackle climate adaptation. Do multi-stakeholder organizations have more resources? Which 
resources (time, staff expertise, money, etc.) are the most important? Do these organizations 
encourage cooperative behavior because they were formed to prevent future litigation battles? 
The participants in the Yakima Integrated Plan and the Water for the Seasons project touted the 
uniqueness of their endeavors. However, future research should examine the accuracy of this 
claim. What about the Yakima Integrated Plan and the Water for the Seasons project made them 
successful? Are these traits shared with other multi-stakeholder cooperative organizations like 
219 
the Southeast Florida Climate Change Compact or the Mayors Climate Change Protection 
Agreement? How effective are these organizations? This is a rich area for future study. 
Throughout this dissertation, I focused on the political and institutional barriers to 
crafting climate adaptation policy. Intentionally, I have not evaluated the efficacy of adaptation 
strategies. However, it is an important next step will be to evaluate how effective bureaucrat-
driven climate adaptation policy is. The potential loss of life, economic costs, and political and 
social disruption climate change will cause are so significant that we need to understand if these 
policies will be effective. 
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A: Search Strings 
Searches in Atlas.ti used to identify portions of the documents that are relevant for this research project. 
The emboldened word indicates how the phrase was automatically coded by the program. The researcher 
then manually evaluated all computer-identified codes to remove false positives. For instance, “business 
climate” does not relate to “climate change”, but both terms would be identified by computer auto-coding. 
- climate change will be searched for using: climat|warming|greenhouse|global  
- adaptation will be searched for using: adapt|resilien 
- severe weather will be searched for using: sea level|extrem|storm|hurricane 
- flooding will be searched for using: flood 
- drought will be searched for using: drought|water short| 
 
Many of the search terms of shortened or root words – for instance “resilien” instead of “resilient” or 
“resiliency”, or “climat” instead of “climate” or “climatology” – so that multiple words with the same 
root can be found in a single search. 
For searches related to the bureaucrats of interest, their last name and key words from their position were 
used. Because some of the bureaucrats of interest requested that their names not be identified with this 
study, the list of bureaucrats will not be included in its entirety here. However, two examples are 
presented below which are representative of other searches. 
1. Name of Bureaucrat: Anne Murray, Position: Martin County Hydrogeologist 
Search: Murray|hydrogeologist 
2. Name of Bureaucrat: Shelley Cox, Position: Planning Director and Floodplain Manager 
Search: Cox|floodplain manager|planning director 
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Appendix B: Codebook for Qualitative Data Analysis 
Note: common synonyms for words in the codebook will be acknowledged as that word. For instance, 
adapt can also be referred to as “respond” “prepare” “adjust” “acclimate.”  
1. Agenda-setter  
1a. Determining when climate change arrives on the local agenda 
As described in Chapter 2: Methods determining when climate change adaptation arrives on the local 
agenda requires looking through government reports, meeting minutes, media articles, and the interviews 
with local government officials. These documents are compiled into a single Atlas.ti hermeneutic unit for 
analysis where searches for “climate change,” “flooding,” and “drought” were auto-coded by the program 
(see the search strings used in Appendix A).  
The auto-coded sections were then analyzed manually by the researcher to remove false positives (i.e. “a 
flood of positive response to the school levy” instead of a physical flood of water). The researcher then 
determined when climate change was first introduced onto the agenda by looking for the following types 
of terms to indicate adaptation:  
• adapt 
• respond 
• prepare 
• adjust 
• acclimate 
• become accustomed 
These terms needed to be in the same idea expression as terms which refer to climate change or the 
effects of climate change including:  
• climate change 
• changes climate 
• global warming 
• greenhouse effect 
• long-term changes in the weather 
• [the climate OR the regular weather is] not like how it used to be around here 
As all of these documents are dated, the first chronological mention of climate change adaptation in the 
available data will be considered the moment when climate change was introduced onto the agenda. As 
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the issue attention cycle shows us (Downs, Up and down with ecology - the "issue-attention cycle", 1972) 
the first mention of an issue does not necessarily mean that decision-makers will pay a lot of attention. 
Therefore, after the first mention, the researcher identified subsequent discussions of climate change to 
determine when climate change adaptation had achieved low salience on the agenda. When climate 
change was discussed by at least two individuals on two separate occasions with a 30-day period,126 it will 
be considered on the agenda with low salience. Examples of this coding include: 
Local bureaucrat A introduces climate change in a discussion on Day 1. On Day 15 at a subsequent public 
meeting, local bureaucrat B brings up climate change adaptation again. Climate change is on the agenda 
with low salience. 
Local elected official A is quoted saying “climate change adaptation is important” on Day 1 in a local 
media article. Three weeks later at a local government meeting, local bureaucrat A and local bureaucrat B 
both mention climate change adaptation in their reports. Climate change is on the agenda with low 
salience. 
Local bureaucrat A introduces climate change adaptation in a hazard mitigation planning document on 
Day 1. On Day 15, local bureaucrat A discusses the hazard mitigation plan and climate change adaptation 
in the local government meeting. On Day 17, local bureaucrat A discusses climate change adaptation with 
a member of the local newspaper. Climate change was mentioned several times within a 30-day period, 
but only by one individual is advocating for the issue. It is not on the agenda with low salience. 
Local elected official A introduces climate change adaptation in a discussion on Day 1. Three months 
later, Local elected official A gives an interview to a newspaper and reasserts that climate change 
adaptation is an important issue. Climate change is not on the agenda with low salience because of the 
long time between mentions. 
Local elected official A introduces climate change adaptation in a discussion on Day 1. Three months 
later, Local bureaucrat A gives an interview to a newspaper and reasserts that climate change adaptation 
is an important issue. Climate change is not on the agenda with low salience because of the long time 
between mentions, even though two people brought up the issue. 
1b. Identifying the individual(s) who introduced the issue 
The identity and position of the individual(s) who introduced climate change onto the agenda will be 
noted.  
If the identity of the individual is kept confidential (i.e. in an interview or a media article), then the 
individual’s position will be identified as: local citizen, local elected official, local bureaucrat, state 
elected official, state bureaucrat, federal elected official or federal bureaucrat. 
                                                 
126 A month was chosen to allow for the variation in meeting schedules and activity levels of different jurisdictions. 
Jurisdictions that meet biweekly would then be discussing an issue at two back-to-back meetings in order to qualify. 
Any longer period might miss-measure jurisdictions that meet at a more frequent interval, like weekly meetings. 
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2. Status of climate change adaptation policy 
This project identifies five potential stages for the status of climate change adaptation policy in any 
jurisdiction. Coding decisions for each are discussed below: 
1. Not on agenda: No-one has introduced climate change adaptation onto the agenda of the local 
government. To qualify for this, the “agenda status” variable would be coded as “not on the 
agenda with low salience.” In other words, it is possible that only one person brought up the 
issue, or it has been brought up sporadically but not discussed by two or more individuals within 
a two-month timespan.  
2. No action: climate change adaptation is on the agenda, but policy actors decided not to address 
climate change adaptation. Discussions addressing climate change exist, but there is either no 
follow up or there is an active discussion not to act.  
3. On the agenda: climate change adaptation is being discussed by members of the local 
government and policymaking community.  
4. Policy formulation: local policymakers are crafting policies to address climate adaptation, 
although they are not necessarily adopting any.  
5. Policy adoption: the policy to address climate adaptation has been approved by necessary 
officials (elected officials but could also be discretionary policy adopted by bureaucrats). The 
policy is “on the books.” 
6. Implementation of an adaptation policy: a plan is in place for adapting to climate change and 
the local government is creating programs or developing infrastructure to respond to climate 
change. 
These categories are based on Anderson, Brady, and Bullock III (1978). I am not including evaluation because 
adaptation policy is in its infancy. 
3. Bureaucratic background  
3a. Training and Expertise 
Bureaucratic background will be coded as either (a) general administrative or public policy background or 
(b) specific policy area expertise. General administrative or public policy backgrounds include individuals 
whose education and training are in broad areas of public administration and/or management. Those with 
specific policy area expertise are individuals who have specialized training in an area like engineering, 
land use management, hydrology, disaster management, or water management. Examples of each are 
provided below: 
General administrative or public policy background: 
• degree in political science 
• degree in law 
• degree in public administration 
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• degree in public policy 
• job experience in government management 
Specific policy area expertise:  
• degree or training in engineering 
• degree or training in land management 
• degree or training in forest management 
• degree or training in biology 
• degree or training in conservation 
• degree or training in water management 
• degree or training in disaster management  
Some government employees are likely to have training in multiple areas, which can include choices from 
each list. Any individual with training both in a specialized and a general area will be evaluated to see 
which area they have spent the most time or training dedicated to. If an individual has a political science 
degree but has spent 15 years as a water manager (including attending trainings, membership in the water 
managers association, etc.), they will be labeled as having more specific policy expertise. Similarly, if an 
individual was trained as a public engineer, but has spent the majority of their 20-year career as a city 
manager then they will be coded as having a general administrative background. 
When used in the measure of autonomy, this is coded 0 = general training and 1 = special training. This is 
coded with only two options because it is intended to have a lower weight than the four types of 
autonomy listed in the next section 
3b. Years in Current Job 
The number of years an individual spent in their current job is determined by looking at her resume, 
public biography, or asked during interview. The number of years is recoded into one of two categories: 
zero to five years, or more than five years.  
When used in the measure of autonomy, this is coded 0 = 0-5 years and 1 = five or more years. This is 
coded with only two options because it is intended to have a lower weight than the four types of 
autonomy listed in the next section 
4. Bureaucratic autonomy 
4a. Expertise-based autonomy 
As described in Chapter 2: Methods, differing knowledge-bases change what type of expertise the 
bureaucrat is likely to have. When the principal is at the federal or state government levels, it is likely the 
bureaucrat will share knowledge about disaster management with their principal but the bureaucrat will 
have specialized knowledge about the local community. Therefore, determining when bureaucrats have 
expertise-based autonomy requires two steps.  
First, the principal is identified and the principal’s forms of expertise are identified. For instance, if the 
principal in question is the state emergency manager’s office, then the principal is identified as having 
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expertise in emergency management. However, if the principal is a local elected official, then the local 
elected official is likely to have knowledge about local conditions. For each principal, the researcher will 
use written biographies, descriptions of the position, and any written documents produced by the 
principal127 to determine which issues the individual (or organization) has expertise on. Their expertise 
can be identified as being in at least one of the following categories: 
• emergency management 
• FEMA policies 
• state emergency management policies 
• local conditions (present and past disasters) 
• local politics 
Second, the bureaucrat’s areas of expertise are identified. Data come from interviews, written 
biographies, resumes, reports written by the bureaucrat, and meeting minutes where bureaucrats provide 
information to the community and elected officials. Similarly, bureaucratic expertise can be identified as 
being in one or more of the following categories:  
• emergency management 
• FEMA policies 
• state emergency management policies 
• local conditions (present and past disasters) 
• local politics 
For principals and bureaucrats, Atlas.ti will be used to facilitate qualitative content analysis to determine 
forms of expertise. First, the researcher uses Atlas.ti to search for the name of the principal (i.e. Jane 
Smith) and for the name of their position (i.e. Director of Flood Management) in documents for each case. 
This auto-coding step allows the researcher to identify documents and sections of documents where the 
individual spoke or wrote. Those sections will then be manually coded by the researcher to identify what 
types of expertise were displayed. 
Phrases and words to indicate expertise in each area are listed below: 
• emergency management:  
o discussing emergency preparedness, response, or mitigation programs;  
o discussing the emergency management policy cycle 
o discussing specific emergency situations (i.e. natural disasters, man-made disasters) 
including flood management and drought management 
• FEMA policies:  
o discussing details of programs like the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, the National 
Flood Insurance Program, Community Rating System;  
                                                 
127 For instance, if a state emergency manager is the principal, a guidebook written by the state emergency manager 
helps identify the forms of expertise that individual has.  
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o discussing FEMA’s operating procedures (vis-à-vis the local community’s experience 
with FEMA or how FEMA policies apply to local governments) 
• state emergency management policies: 
o discussing details of state-level emergency management policies (will vary by state 
context) 
o discussing details of state emergency management operating procedures (vis-à-vis the 
local community’s experience with the agency) 
In all areas, expertise can be shown by providing detail about management strategies, the implementation 
of existing policies, and debates or discussions about management and implementation strategies.  
For expertise concerning the local community’s present or past disasters and political situation, the 
following phrases and words would indicate expertise. However, lack of discussion of the local 
community will also be taken as a lack of expertise. For example, if FEMA does not produce documents 
about how Onondoga County, New York deals with natural disasters, they will be assumed to lack that 
form of expertise. 
• local conditions (present and past disasters): 
o discussions about specific events (natural disasters) that have hit the community  
o discussions about recovery efforts following disaster events 
• local politics: 
o working in local government 
o attending public meetings 
o discussing political differences or political debates occurring in the local community 
The measure of expertise-based autonomy is built by comparing the principal’s expertise to the 
bureaucrat’s expertise; more areas where the bureaucrat has expertise that the principal does not indicate 
more bureaucratic expertise-based autonomy. 
Values were assigned in this way: 
1 = complete overlap in expertise 
2 = three or four (but not all five) areas of overlap 
3 = two areas of overlap 
4 = one area of overlap 
5 = no overlap 
4b. Structural independence 
Structural independence will be determined by looking at organizational charts and budgets. 
Organizational charts show if the local bureaucrat runs their own department or program, and therefore is 
expected to make decisions separate from their superiors. However, this form of organizational 
independence is limited to local principals’ relationship to bureaucrats. Therefore, fiscal independence 
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from state and federal governments is also considered. If the local bureaucrat’s department and/or 
programs are reliant on grants from the state or federal government, they have less structural 
independence.  
Values were assigned in this way: 
1 = low  
3 = medium 
5 = high 
4c. Hiring and firing power 
For all cases, only local principals will have hiring and firing power. Therefore, when the local 
government is the principal, bureaucrats have less autonomy. When the state or federal government is the 
principal, bureaucrats have more autonomy. 
Values were assigned in this way: 
1 = council/board of commissioners AND manager 
3 = only council/board of commissioners 
5 = no hiring and firing power 
4d. Opportunities for exercising discretion 
Determining the opportunities that local bureaucrats have to exercise discretion in their work is measured 
by looking at the programs and policies they administer. In areas where they are in charge of writing 
planning documents or dealing with citizens (on a case-by-case basis), bureaucrats will be coded as 
having more opportunities for discretion. For instance, if Bureaucrat A is in charge of approving building 
plans to make sure they are compliant with the flood insurance policy, they have the opportunity to use 
discretion for each construction plan they approve. Conversely, if Bureaucrat B does not approve plans, 
rather her job is primarily to write grants for the department, than Bureaucrat A will have more 
opportunities for exercising discretion than Bureaucrat B. Bureaucrats will be coded as having a few, a 
moderate number, or many opportunities for exercising discretion. Indicators for each level are described 
below: 
• A few:  
o bureaucrat does not work on cases 
o bureaucrat’s main responsibilities do not require engagement with the public generally or 
individual stakeholders; mainly works with other governments 
• A moderate number: 
o bureaucrat works on some cases  
o bureaucrat’s main responsibilities are a mix of engaging with the public and working 
within government 
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• Many: 
o bureaucrat’s main responsibility is to work on cases 
o bureaucrat works with members of the public or stakeholders often 
Values were assigned in this way: 
1 = a few areas 
3 = a moderate number  
5 = many 
5. Problem definition agreement 
To capture the elements of problem definition agreement described in Chapter 2: Methods, the following 
measures is captured for each individual bureaucrat and their superiors. Then, a combined measure of 
agreement is built by comparing the individual measures to determining how much agreement there is. 
Omitted elements (i.e. the bureaucrat did not mention her opinion about scale or geographic proximity), it 
will be coded as “missing data”. When constructing the combined measure of agreement, these values 
will not be considered either “agreement” or “disagreement” because assuming a measure for either 
would be mis-measuring attitudes. Instead, these elements with missing data will be considered on a case-
by-case basis but weighted less than data where there are solid responses.  
5a. Individual attitudes on need for climate change adaptation 
1. Climate change is the cause or need for changing local flood and/or drought management 
policy. 
• we need to prepare for climate change in our [flood or drought] policy 
• climate change will make [floods or droughts] worse 
• the future is changing, we need to respond in our [flood or drought] policy 
• we will consider how climate change will affect [flood or drought] 
2. The local government is the right scale for adapting to climate change instead of another scale, 
like the state or federal government. 
Local Government is the Right Scale Another Scale is More Appropriate 
Climate change is something we will have to 
deal with or address 
We cannot deal with climate change 
We can tackle the challenges of climate 
change here 
Climate change adaptation should be done by 
the states [federal government] 
 [Name of state or federal government agency] 
will or is already dealing with climate change 
adaptation 
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3. Climate change will be an issue for the local government; in other words there is geographic 
proximity. 
Geographically Close Geographically Far Away 
Climate change is happening here Climate change won’t happen here 
We are dealing with climate change already 
around here 
Climate change isn’t an issue here 
[Naming areas in jurisdiction] are already 
experiencing the effects of climate change 
 
 
4. Climate change will be an issue for the local government soon; in other words there is 
temporal proximity. 
Temporally Close Temporally Far Away 
We are already experiencing climate change Climate change will not hit us for a long time 
Climate change is a concern now Climate change and its effects is something 
we will see in the future 
We are worried about the effects of climate 
change coming soon 
 
 
5. The problem is severe. Flooding or drought will be a problem for the local community. 
Climate change’s effects are severe Climate change’s effects are not severe 
Climate change will be a big problem [discuss positive outcomes of climate change] 
[List many effects of climate change] We are not too worried about problems from 
climate change 
[Discuss high cost of climate change]  
 
5b. Combined measure of agreement 
The combined measure of agreement is determined by comparing the problem definitions for the 
bureaucrat of interest with her superior(s). The more elements of agreement, the higher the combined 
measure of agreement is. 
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6. Bureaucratic action 
As described in Chapter 2: Methods, determining which category of bureaucratic action the bureaucrat 
fits into relies on three questions. Coding determinations for each of the three questions are below: 
1. Did the bureaucrat work with her superior(s)? 
Yes No 
I worked with [city manager, elected 
official, anyone above bureaucrat in 
organizational chart] 
I worked alone 
I did this myself 
I worked with [equals/coworkers] 
I worked with [subordinates] 
 
2. Did the bureaucrat introduce the idea of climate action? 
Uses variable for agenda setter to answer. 
3. Did the superior say not to act to address climate change? 
Uses variable for problem definition agreement, focus on superior(s)’s position(s).  
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Appendix C: Interview Solicitation Forms and Scripts 
 
Interview Recruitment Scripts 
Telephone: 
Hello [NAME], my name is Bridget Fahey128 and I am studying for my PhD in political science.  My 
dissertation research project is studying local government [FLOOD or DROUGHT – whichever is 
appropriate] policy development in the face of new challenges.  I found your name [WEBSITE, OTHER 
INDIVIDUAL, MEDIA REPORT, etc.] and I think you could give me some really good information 
about [LOCALITY NAME]’s efforts at [FLOOD/DROUGHT] management.   
Would you be willing to participate in an interview – either in person or over the telephone – with me?  It 
should only last 45 minutes to an hour at most.  You have the option to make your statements confidential 
if you wish, which means I will not use your name in any reports from this research. 
[IF LEAVING A MESSAGE, SKIP TO CONTACT INFORMATION AT END] 
[IF INITIAL POSITIVE RESPONSE]: I can provide more information about the purpose of the research 
as well as how your interview responses will be managed.  I can offer you confidentiality if you so desire.  
I have this information in an electronic document that I can email you, could you give me an email 
address?   
[IF YES, AND GIVES EMAIL] Thank you.  To confirm, your email is [REPEAT EMAIL TO THEM].  I 
will be sending you more information within the hour.  Please look it over and then we can set up an 
interview time and location.  The location and mode of the interview is up to you.  If you wish to speak 
face-to-face, and it would be great to meet you in person, I can travel to you area during [STATE DATES 
OF POTENTIAL TRAVEL].   
[IF NO EMAIL]: That’s ok, I can also answer any of your questions about the project now. 
[IF INITIAL NEGATIVE RESPONSE}: Ok, thank you.  If you change your mind and would like to 
participate in an interview, please feel free to get in touch with me at any time. 
[AT END OF CONVERSATION] You can contact me for more information by emailing me at 
bkfahey@syr.edu or calling at 720-884-6363. 
  
                                                 
128 During the data collection phase of this research, the researcher used the last name of Fahey. Between ending 
data collection and completing the dissertation, the researcher changed her last name to Kelley. All documents 
reflect the researcher’s maiden name. 
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Email: 
Dear [NAME], 
I’m Bridget Fahey, a doctoral candidate studying Political Science at the Maxwell School at Syracuse 
University.  For my dissertation research project, I am studying local government [FLOOD or 
DROUGHT] management policy.  Specifically, I’m interested in how these policies develop in the face of 
new challenges. 
 
I found your name [WEBSITE, OTHER INDIVIDUAL, MEDIA REPORT, etc.] and I am interested in 
speaking with you about your important role in [FLOOD or DROUGHT] management in [LOCALITY].  
I know that your on-the-ground experiences and work in this important policy area will provide valuable 
insight for my research.  Would you be willing to participate in an interview – either in person or over the 
telephone – to speak about your role in [FLOOD or DROUGHT] management as well as where you see 
the policy area changing in the future?  The interview would only take 45 minutes to an hour maximum. 
 
I have attached a brief description of my project, a copy of the consent form I am using for interview 
participants, and a few sample questions for you to look over at your convenience.  I am also completely 
willing to answer questions about the nature of the study and how any information you provide will be 
used for my research (contact information in signature).  If you wish, I can provide confidentiality in any 
reports, papers, or other written projects that emerge from this research (your name will not be identified). 
 
I look forward to hearing from you.  Please feel free to email bkfahey@syr.edu or call 720-884-6363 for 
more information.  You can also get in touch with the Syracuse Office of Research Integrity and 
Protections at 315-443-3013 with questions about the research process. 
 
Sincerely,  
Bridget K. Fahey 
 
Email: bkfahey@syr.edu | Phone: 720-884-6363 
 
 
[Not for email, for IRB information **NOTE: Time, date and location of interview will be determined if 
they respond to the initial email inquiry.  It is not solicited here because a brief and direct email about 
their participation increases the chances of hearing back from potential interview participants.  Longer 
emails might get pushed aside and forgotten. ] 
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Project Description:  
This project seeks to uncover and understand how elected politicians and public administrators act when 
governments face new problems which fundamentally challenge an existing policy area.  This project 
looks specifically at flood management and drought management. It hypothesizes that how these actors 
behave and their relationships shapes changes to the existing policy areas. 
Drawing on the policy development and bureaucratic politics literatures, this study proposes that four 
categories of bureaucratic action are possible: (1) defiant bureaucratic behavior where autonomous 
bureaucrats take action without support from politicians, (2) cooperative action where autonomous 
bureaucrats and politicians accept the same problem definition and act together to make policy, (3) 
politician-led action where politicians create policies and bureaucrats lack the autonomy to influence the 
outcomes, and (4) non-confrontational behavior where bureaucrats disagree with politicians but do not 
have the autonomy to openly defy them and instead they work under-the-radar.  Essentially, this project 
juxtaposes (a) problem definition agreement (Rochefort & Cobb, 1994) concerning the importance of 
integrating new information into existing policies and (b) level of autonomy public administrators have 
from politicians (Rourke, 1979; Waterman & Rouse, 1999; Carpenter, 2001; Walters, 2013).  While this 
project recognizes the importance of other variables like government capacity to change policy and the 
role of non-governmental actors, the main goal is to understand how bureaucrats and politicians relate to 
one another, even if their interests differ. 
In order to understand these relationships, this study has identified local communities in six sites across 
the U.S. where the researcher will conduct in-depth case studies.  For these case studies, the researcher 
will speak with important players in the policy community including elected officials, public 
administrators, community activists, and experts to understand the local policy and how these players see 
it changing due to new pressures.  Additionally, the researcher will collect government reports, meeting 
minutes, memos, and media reports where available to paint a complete portrait of these local policy 
issues.   
The goal of this research is to contribute to theoretical debates in political science as well as collect 
important information about the people working on the front-lines of these issues.  Floods and droughts 
can be incredibly damaging disasters and our understanding of local actions to protect communities is 
woefully incomplete. 
 
This project is a requirement for Bridget K. Fahey to complete her PhD.  Therefore, the immediate 
material goal is to collect data for a dissertation. 
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Appendix D: Case Similarities and Differences 
Below are tables showing similarities and differences between the cases for variables like geographic location, climate risk, government structure, 
budget size, strength of economy, etc. Cases are presented alphabetically by state for each table. Similarities are shown using color coding when 
possible.  
Table D1: State and Climate Risk 
Case State Climate Hazard129 
City of Fort Pierce Florida Flooding - Sea Level Rise; Drought - Lack of Precipitation 
Martin County Florida Flooding - Sea Level Rise; Drought - Lack of Precipitation 
St. Lucie County Florida Flooding - Sea Level Rise; Drought - Lack of Precipitation 
Carson City and County Nevada Drought - Lack of Precipitation 
City of Fernley Nevada Drought - Lack of Precipitation 
City of Elizabeth City North Carolina Flooding - Sea Level Rise and Increased Precipitation 
City of Havelock North Carolina Flooding - Sea Level Rise and Increased Precipitation 
City of New Bern North Carolina Flooding - Sea Level Rise and Increased Precipitation 
Craven County North Carolina Flooding - Sea Level Rise and Increased Precipitation 
Pasquotank County North Carolina Flooding - Sea Level Rise and Increased Precipitation 
City of Greer South Carolina Flooding - Increased Precipitation 
City of Mauldin South Carolina Flooding - Increased Precipitation 
Greenville County South Carolina Flooding - Increased Precipitation 
Oconee County South Carolina Flooding - Increased Precipitation 
City of Yakima Washington Drought - Lack of Precipitation 
Grant County Washington Drought - Lack of Precipitation 
Kittitas County Washington Drought - Lack of Precipitation 
Yakima County Washington Drought - Lack of Precipitation 
                                                 
129 Hazards identified through GIS Analysis of NCAR and USGS data (see Chapter 2, Section 1). 
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Table D2: Government Structure and Department in Control of Climate-Related Hazard 
Case State Government Structure130 Department(s) in Control of Flooding OR Drought131 
City of Fort Pierce Florida Commissioner-Manager Building Department   
Martin County Florida Commissioner-Manager Engineering Utilities 
Emergency 
Management 
St. Lucie County Florida Commissioner-Manager Building Department Public Works  
Carson City and 
County 
Nevada Council-Manager Public Works Department   
City of Fernley Nevada Council-Manager Public Works Department   
City of Elizabeth 
City 
North Carolina Council-Manager Building Department   
City of Havelock North Carolina Commissioner-Manager Building Department Public Services  
City of New Bern North Carolina Aldermen-Manager Building Department Public Works  
Craven County North Carolina Commissioner-Manager Emergency Management 
Planning 
Department 
 
Pasquotank County North Carolina Commissioner-Manager Building Department Engineering  
City of Greer South Carolina Council-Administrator Engineering 
Planning and 
Zoning 
Department 
 
City of Mauldin South Carolina Council-Administrator 
Business and Development 
Services 
  
Greenville County South Carolina Council-Administrator Public Works Department 
Community 
Planning 
Engineering 
Oconee County South Carolina Council-Administrator Emergency Management   
City of Yakima Washington Council-Manager Utilities Services Division   
Grant County Washington 
3 Commissioners (elected 
managers) 
none - local irrigation districts 
manage water and drought 
  
Kittitas County Washington 
3 Commissioners (elected 
managers) 
Public Works Department   
Yakima County Washington 
3 Commissioners (elected 
managers) 
Water Resources Division (in 
the Public Services 
Department) 
Emergency 
Management 
 
                                                 
130 Data from local government websites. All variations on Manager or Administrator are considered the same for the purposes of this project 
131 Data from local government websites, interviews, and email correspondence with the local governments. 
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Table D3: Vote Share for Democratic Presidential Candidates (Partisanship) 
Case State Vote for Obama 2008  Vote for Obama 2012  Vote for Clinton 2016  
City of Fort Pierce  
(Data for St. Lucie County) 
Florida 55.70% 53.50% 47.50% 
Martin County Florida 42.80% 38.20% 35.20% 
St. Lucie County Florida 55.70% 53.50% 47.50% 
Carson City and County Nevada 49.10% 44.10% 38.40% 
City of Fernley  
(Data for Lyon County) 
Nevada 39.80% 34.40% 25.90% 
City of Elizabeth City  
(Data for Pasquotank County) 
North Carolina 56.60% 57.50% 49.80% 
City of Havelock  
(Data for Craven County) 
North Carolina 42.60% 40.70% 37.80% 
City of New Bern  
(Data for Craven County) 
North Carolina 42.60% 40.70% 37.80% 
Craven County North Carolina 42.60% 40.70% 37.80% 
Pasquotank County North Carolina 56.60% 57.50% 49.80% 
City of Greer  
(Data for Greenville County) 
South Carolina 37.20% 35.20% 34.70% 
City of Mauldin  
(Data for Greenville County) 
South Carolina 37.20% 35.20% 34.70% 
Greenville County South Carolina 37.20% 35.20% 34.70% 
Oconee County South Carolina 30.40% 27.90% 23.80% 
City of Yakima  
(Data for Yakima County) 
Washington 43.50% 42.00% 39.40% 
Grant County Washington 35.00% 32.40% 27.50% 
Kittitas County Washington 44.90% 42.60% 39.20% 
Yakima County Washington 43.50% 42.00% 39.40% 
Data from the New York Times Presidential Elections Results Maps 2008, 2012, and 2016 
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Table D4: Attitudes on Climate Change from the Yale Climate Change Communication Project (2014) 
Case State 
Global 
Warming is 
Happening 
Global Warming is 
Mostly Caused by 
Human Activities 
Worried 
About 
Global 
Warming 
Global Warming is 
Already Harming the 
US Now or Within 10 
Years 
Global 
Warming 
Will Harm 
Them 
Personally 
Global 
Warming 
Will Harm 
People in the 
US 
City of Fort Pierce  
(Data for St. Lucie County) 
Florida 62% 44% 51% 41% 34% 50% 
Martin County Florida 62% 45% 50% 40% 33% 49% 
St. Lucie County Florida 62% 44% 51% 41% 34% 50% 
Carson City and County Nevada 64% 51% 52% 41% 34% 51% 
City of Fernley  
(Data for Lyon County) 
Nevada 56% 41% 46% 37% 30% 47% 
City of Elizabeth City  
(Data for Pasquotank County) 
North Carolina 62% 45% 50% 43% 35% 50% 
City of Havelock  
(Data for Craven County) 
North Carolina 62% 45% 50% 41% 33% 49% 
City of New Bern  
(Data for Craven County) 
North Carolina 62% 45% 50% 41% 33% 49% 
Craven County North Carolina 62% 45% 50% 41% 33% 49% 
Pasquotank County North Carolina 62% 45% 50% 43% 35% 50% 
City of Greer  
(Data for Greenville County) 
South Carolina 59% 44% 48% 41% 32% 48% 
City of Mauldin  
(Data for Greenville County) 
South Carolina 59% 44% 48% 41% 32% 48% 
Greenville County South Carolina 59% 44% 48% 41% 32% 48% 
Oconee County South Carolina 58% 45% 47% 39% 31% 47% 
City of Yakima  
(Data for Yakima County) 
Washington 62% 49% 54% 42% 36% 52% 
Grant County Washington 62% 46% 53% 41% 35% 51% 
Kittitas County Washington 67% 52% 58% 45% 36% 54% 
Yakima County Washington 62% 49% 54% 42% 36% 52% 
Data from the Yale Climate Change Communication Project, 2014 Survey (Howe, Mildenberger, Marlon, & Leiserowitz, 2015) 
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Table D5: Demographics: Population Size, Age, and Educational Attainment 
Case State 
Population, 
Census, April 
1, 2010 
Households, 
2011-2015 
Persons 
under 5 
years, 
percent, 
April 1, 
2010 
Persons 
under 18 
years, 
percent, 
April 1, 
2010 
Persons 65 
years and 
over, 
percent, 
April 1, 
2010 
High school 
graduate or 
higher, percent 
of persons age 
25 years+, 2011-
2015 
City of Fort Pierce Florida 41,590 16,522 8.2 25.9 15.2 76.1 
Martin County Florida 146,318 61,952 4.2 17.6 27.3 89.8 
St. Lucie County Florida 277,789 107,898 5.9 22.3 19.9 85.4 
Carson City and County Nevada 55,274 21,594 5.8 21.4 16.5 86.8 
City of Fernley Nevada 19,368 6,875 8.0 27.7 11.8 88.0 
City of Elizabeth City North Carolina 18,683 6,602 7.5 22.4 13.9 80.5 
City of Havelock North Carolina 20,735 6,454 11.4 27.0 4.2 94.9 
City of New Bern North Carolina 29,524 12,746 7.5 22.8 17.9 83.8 
Craven County North Carolina 103,505 40,131 7.4 23.4 15.3 87.3 
Pasquotank County North Carolina 40,661 14,448 6.6 22.6 13.6 83.8 
City of Greer South Carolina 25,515 10,339 8.5 26.6 10.9 84.5 
City of Mauldin South Carolina 22,889 9,363 6.8 24.5 11.8 93.3 
Greenville County South Carolina 451,225 179,862 6.9 24.2 12.8 86.7 
Oconee County South Carolina 74,273 30,556 5.6 21.1 19.0 83.2 
City of Yakima Washington 91,067 33,081 8.6 28.3 13.1 73.3 
Grant County Washington 89,120 30,358 9.1 30.5 11.8 75.5 
Kittitas County Washington 40,915 16,953 5.0 18.3 12.7 90.8 
Yakima County Washington 243,231 79,972 8.8 30.4 11.6 71.9 
Data from the U.S. Census Bureau: Quick Facts 
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Table D6: Demographics: Housing Statistics 
Case State 
Housing units, 
April 1, 2010 
Owner-occupied 
housing unit rate, 
2011-2015 
Median value of owner-
occupied housing units, 
2011-2015 
Persons per 
household, 2011-
2015 
City of Fort Pierce Florida 21,357 44.6 85,900 2.58 
Martin County Florida 78,131 75.5 200,200 2.39 
St. Lucie County Florida 137,029 72.8 125,600 2.64 
Carson City and County Nevada 23,534 56.1 186,000 2.43 
City of Fernley Nevada 7,975 65.8 136,800 2.79 
City of Elizabeth City North Carolina 8,167 43.1 125,300 2.49 
City of Havelock North Carolina 6,810 39.8 142,000 2.85 
City of New Bern North Carolina 14,471 50.3 147,700 2.34 
Craven County North Carolina 45,002 62.6 154,500 2.51 
Pasquotank County North Carolina 16,833 62.5 158,800 2.61 
City of Greer South Carolina 11,127 53 143,800 2.62 
City of Mauldin South Carolina 9,929 67 153,600 2.60 
Greenville County South Carolina 195,462 66 156,200 2.58 
Oconee County South Carolina 38,763 74.1 147,000 2.43 
City of Yakima Washington 34,829 53.9 156,700 2.74 
Grant County Washington 35,083 60.5 157,500 3.00 
Kittitas County Washington 21,900 57.6 242,900 2.34 
Yakima County Washington 85,474 62.5 158,200 3.05 
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Table D7: Demographics: Income and Employment 
Case State 
In civilian labor force, total, 
percent of population age 
16 years+, 2011-2015 
Median household 
income (in 2015 
dollars), 2011-2015 
Per capita income in 
past 12 months (in 
2015 dollars), 2011-
2015 
Persons in 
poverty, 
percent 
City of Fort Pierce Florida 52.5 43,459 23,657 16.4 
Martin County Florida 52.4 51,593 34,742 11.2 
St. Lucie County Florida 54.7 25,635 17,027 36.6 
Carson City and County Nevada 59.7 47,668 26,127 16.4 
City of Fernley Nevada 59.7 52,001 23,189 11.1 
City of Elizabeth City North Carolina 56.7 30,803 16,783 29.8 
City of Havelock North Carolina 47.3 47,208 20,322 13.6 
City of New Bern North Carolina 59.9 41,148 23,511 19.9 
Craven County North Carolina 55.2 47,985 24,553 15 
Pasquotank County North Carolina 59.1 45,378 22,187 19.1 
City of Greer South Carolina 68.6 44,455 24,360 18.9 
City of Mauldin South Carolina 68 59,960 28,161 6.5 
Greenville County South Carolina 63.4 50,540 27,200 13.8 
Oconee County South Carolina 52.4 41,237 24,666 18 
City of Yakima Washington 61.6 40,726 20,187 23 
Grant County Washington 63.5 48,714 20,251 16.1 
Kittitas County Washington 60.6 46,458 24,014 20 
Yakima County Washington 61.6 44,749 19,793 19.1 
Data from the U.S. Census Bureau: Quick Facts 
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Table D8: FEMA Declared Disasters 
Case State 
Total FEMA Declared 
Disasters Since 1953 
Total FEMA Declared 
Disasters since 2000 
City of Fort Pierce  
(Data for St. Lucie County) 
Florida 25 11 
Martin County Florida 28 13 
St. Lucie County Florida 25 11 
Carson City and County Nevada 11 9 
City of Fernley  
(Data for Lyon County) 
Nevada 9 6 
City of Elizabeth City  
(Data for Pasquotank County) 
North Carolina 13 6 
City of Havelock  
(Data for Craven County) 
North Carolina 20 8 
City of New Bern  
(Data for Craven County) 
North Carolina 20 8 
Craven County North Carolina 20 8 
Pasquotank County North Carolina 13 6 
City of Greer  
(Data for Greenville County) 
South Carolina 9 7 
City of Mauldin  
(Data for Greenville County) 
South Carolina 9 7 
Greenville County South Carolina 9 7 
Oconee County South Carolina 8 7 
City of Yakima  
(Data for Yakima County) 
Washington 23 12 
Grant County Washington 6 3 
Kittitas County Washington 22 13 
Yakima County Washington 23 12 
Data from the FEMA Disaster Declaration Database for States and Counties 
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Table D9: Estimated Costs of Climate Change by County 
Case State 
Mortality (deaths per 
100,000 people) 
Total Damages (percent of 
county income) 
City of Fort Pierce  
(Data for St. Lucie County) 
Florida 42.56 14.44 
Martin County Florida 57.02 8.84 
St. Lucie County Florida 42.56 14.44 
Carson City and County Nevada -7.78 0.15 
City of Fernley  
(Data for Lyon County) 
Nevada -3.76 0.18 
City of Elizabeth City  
(Data for Pasquotank County) 
North Carolina 17.48 6.22 
City of Havelock  
(Data for Craven County) 
North Carolina 17.73 5.71 
City of New Bern  
(Data for Craven County) 
North Carolina 17.73 5.71 
Craven County North Carolina 17.73 5.71 
Pasquotank County North Carolina 17.48 6.22 
City of Greer  
(Data for Greenville County) 
South Carolina 18.49 5.92 
City of Mauldin  
(Data for Greenville County) 
South Carolina 18.49 5.92 
Greenville County South Carolina 18.49 5.92 
Oconee County South Carolina 16.05 6.02 
City of Yakima  
(Data for Yakima County) 
Washington -5.81 -0.34 
Grant County Washington -1.07 0.77 
Kittitas County Washington -7.22 -0.30 
Yakima County Washington -5.81 -0.34 
Data from Hsaing et al (2017). 
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Appendix E: Problem Definition Agreement and Autonomy Measures 
Table E1: Problem Definition 
Locality Bureaucrat 
Overall 
Agreement (Scale 
from 0 to 10; 10 is 
full agreement) 
Climate Change 
is Cause for 
Changing Policy 
Local Level 
Appropriate 
Level of 
Government 
Geographically 
Proximate 
Temporally 
Proximate 
Problem is 
Severe 
Pasquotank 
County, 
NC 
Shelley Cox, Planning 
Director 
3 
Disagree - 
bureaucrat thinks 
happening, elected 
leaders do not 
No - agree Yes - agree 
Disagree - 
bureaucrat 
thinks 
happening, 
elected leaders 
do not 
Disagree - 
bureaucrat 
thinks 
happening, 
elected leaders 
do not 
City of 
Fort 
Pierce, FL 
Marc Meyers, 
Director of the 
Building Department 
4 
Yes - opinion only 
from bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion only 
from bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
FL-Local 
Bureaucrat-762, 
Lower level bureaucrat 
4 
Yes - opinion only 
from bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion only 
from bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
Martin 
County, FL 
Anne Murray, 
Hydrogeologist 
10 Yes - agree Yes - agree Yes - agree Yes - agree Yes - agree 
Kathy Fitzpatrick, 
Coastal Engineer 
7 Yes - agree Yes - agree Yes - agree Yes - agree 
Disagree – 
bureaucrat 
doesn’t think it 
is severe, elected 
leaders do 
Don Donaldson, 
Director of 
Engineering 
8 Yes - agree Yes - agree Yes - agree 
Disagree – 
bureaucrat 
doesn’t think it 
is happening 
yet, elected 
leaders do 
Yes - agree 
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Locality Bureaucrat 
Overall 
Agreement (Scale 
from 0 to 10; 10 is 
full agreement) 
Climate Change 
is Cause for 
Changing Policy 
Local Level 
Appropriate 
Level of 
Government 
Geographically 
Proximate 
Temporally 
Proximate 
Problem is 
Severe 
St. Lucie 
County, FL 
Jason Bessey, 
Stormwater Program 
Coordinator 
4 
Yes - opinion only 
from bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion only 
from bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
Mark Satterlee, 
Deputy County 
Administrator 
4 
Yes - opinion only 
from bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
No - opinion only 
from bureaucrat 
No - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
City of 
Fernley, 
NV 
NV-Local 
Bureaucrat-282, City 
Department Head 
7 Yes – agree 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion only 
from bureaucrat 
No opinion 
from 
bureaucrats or 
elected 
officials 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
NV-Local 
Bureaucrat-895, 
Lower level bureaucrat 
7 Yes – agree 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion only 
from bureaucrat 
No opinion 
from 
bureaucrats or 
elected 
officials 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
Greenville 
County, 
SC 
Paula Gucker, 
Assistant County 
Administrator for 
Community Planning 
4 
Yes - opinion only 
from bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion only 
from bureaucrat 
No - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
Brian Bishop, 
Floodplain Manager 
4 
Yes - opinion only 
from bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion only 
from bureaucrat 
No - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
Kittitas 
County, 
WA 
Mark Cook, Public 
Works Director 
10 Yes – agree Yes – agree Yes – agree Yes – agree Yes – agree 
City of 
Yakima, 
WA 
David Brown, Water 
and Irrigation Manager 
7 Yes – agree 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion only 
from bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
Yes - opinion 
only from 
bureaucrat 
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Locality Bureaucrat 
Overall 
Agreement (Scale 
from 0 to 10; 10 is 
full agreement) 
Climate Change 
is Cause for 
Changing Policy 
Local Level 
Appropriate 
Level of 
Government 
Geographically 
Proximate 
Temporally 
Proximate 
Problem is 
Severe 
Yakima 
County, 
WA 
Joel Freudenthal, 
Senior Natural 
Resource Specialist 
10 Yes – agree Yes – agree Yes – agree Yes – agree Yes – agree 
Scott Revell, Director 
of the Roza Irrigation 
District 
10 Yes – agree Yes – agree Yes – agree Yes – agree Yes – agree 
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Table E2: Bureaucratic Independence (Autonomy) 
Locality Bureaucrat 
Overall 
Independence 
(Scale from 5 to 16, 
16 is the highest level 
of independence) 
Years in 
Position 
Training: 
General or 
Special 
Difference in 
Expertise 
Structural 
Independence 
Hiring and 
Firing Power 
Opportunities 
for Discretion 
Pasquotank 
County, 
NC 
Shelley Cox, 
Planning Director 
14 5+ special 
one area of 
overlap: local 
conditions 
moderate - runs 
own department, 
answers to 
manager 
commissioners 
and manager 
hiring and firing 
power 
many 
City of 
Fort 
Pierce, FL 
Marc Meyers, 
Director of the 
Building 
Department 
14 5+ special 
one area of 
overlap: local 
conditions 
moderate - runs 
own department, 
answers to 
manager 
city council, city 
manager hiring 
and firing power 
many 
FL-Local 
Bureaucrat-762, 
Lower level 
bureaucrat 
9 not clear special 
one area of 
overlap: local 
conditions 
low - answers to 
department 
director then to 
city council 
city council, city 
manager hiring 
and firing power 
many 
Martin 
County, FL 
Anne Murray, 
Hydrogeologist 
8 5+ special 
two areas of 
overlap: local 
conditions, 
emergency 
management 
low - answers to 
department 
director then to 
city council 
commissioners 
and manager 
hiring and firing 
power 
a moderate 
number 
Kathy 
Fitzpatrick, 
Coastal Engineer 
8 5+ special 
two areas of 
overlap: local 
conditions, 
emergency 
management 
low - answers to 
department 
director then to 
city council 
commissioners 
and manager 
hiring and firing 
power 
a moderate 
number 
Don Donaldson, 
Director of 
Engineering 
9 5+ special 
two areas of 
overlap: local 
conditions, 
emergency 
management 
moderate - runs 
own department, 
answers to 
manager 
commissioners 
and manager 
hiring and firing 
power 
a few 
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Locality Bureaucrat 
Overall 
Independence 
(Scale from 5 to 16, 
16 is the highest level 
of independence) 
Years in 
Position 
Training: 
General or 
Special 
Difference in 
Expertise 
Structural 
Independence 
Hiring and 
Firing Power 
Opportunities 
for Discretion 
St. Lucie 
County, FL 
Jason Bessey, 
Stormwater 
Program 
Coordinator 
9 5+ special 
two areas of 
overlap: local 
conditions, 
emergency 
management 
low - answers to 
department 
director then to 
city council 
commissioners 
and manager 
hiring and firing 
power 
a moderate 
number 
Mark Satterlee, 
Deputy County 
Administrator 
9 
0-5 (but 
5+ with 
city as 
planning 
director) 
special 
two areas of 
overlap: local 
conditions, 
emergency 
management 
moderate - runs 
own department, 
answers to 
manager 
commissioners 
and manager 
hiring and firing 
power 
a few 
City of 
Fernley, 
NV 
NV-Local 
Bureaucrat-282, 
City Department 
Head 
12 0-5 general 
one area of 
overlap: local 
conditions 
high - answers 
directly to 
mayor and city 
council 
city council 
hiring and firing 
power 
a few 
NV-Local 
Bureaucrat-895, 
Lower level 
bureaucrat 
7 not clear special 
one area of 
overlap: local 
conditions 
low - answers to 
department 
director then to 
city council 
city council, city 
manager hiring 
and firing power 
a few 
Greenville 
County, 
SC 
Paula Gucker, 
Assistant County 
Administrator for 
Community 
Planning 
12 5+ special 
one area of 
overlap: local 
conditions 
moderate - runs 
own department, 
answers to 
manager 
commissioners 
hiring and firing 
power 
a moderate 
number 
Brian Bishop, 
Floodplain 
Manager 
11 0-5 special 
one area of 
overlap: local 
conditions 
low - answers to 
department 
director then to 
city council 
commissioners 
hiring and firing 
power 
many 
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Locality Bureaucrat 
Overall 
Independence 
(Scale from 5 to 16, 
16 is the highest level 
of independence) 
Years in 
Position 
Training: 
General or 
Special 
Difference in 
Expertise 
Structural 
Independence 
Hiring and 
Firing Power 
Opportunities 
for Discretion 
Kittitas 
County, 
WA 
Mark Cook, 
Public Works 
Director 
12 0-5 special 
two areas of 
overlap: local 
conditions, 
emergency 
management 
moderate - runs 
own department, 
answers to 
manager 
commissioners 
hiring and firing 
power 
a moderate 
number 
City of 
Yakima, 
WA 
David Brown, 
Water and 
Irrigation Manager 
12 5+ special 
one area of 
overlap: local 
conditions 
moderate - runs 
own department, 
answers to 
manager 
city council, city 
manager hiring 
and firing power 
 
a moderate 
number 
Yakima 
County, 
WA 
Joel Freudenthal, 
Senior Natural 
Resource 
Specialist 
12 5+ special 
one area of 
overlap: local 
conditions 
low - answers to 
department 
director then to 
city council 
commissioners 
and manager 
hiring and firing 
power 
many 
Scott Revell, 
Director of the 
Roza Irrigation 
District 
15 0-5 special 
one area of 
overlap: local 
conditions 
high - runs own 
special-purpose 
government 
(irrigation 
district) 
commissioners 
hiring and firing 
power 
a moderate 
number 
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Appendix F: Bureaucrats Who Did Not Act but Thought Climate Change Adaptation Was Necessary 
 
  
Non-confrontational behavior Politician-led action 
Defiant behavior Cooperative action 
Figure F1: Predicted Forms of Bureaucratic Behavior for Bureaucrats Who Think Climate Change is Happening but Did 
Not Act, Based on Observed Autonomy and Agreement Measures 
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